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Abstract 
 
The forced migrant, driven into the global circuits of ‘survival migration’, and subject to 
an increasingly securitised European asylum and immigration system, is fashioned at 
the Europe Union’s distended and de-territorialised external borders as a figure of fear. 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate how this operation goes far beyond the quotidian social 
production of marginal and excluded figures: it argues that the forced migrant has 
become a key ideological resource in the attempt to de-historicise, universalise and 
naturalise the neoliberal system of global capitalism. Based on secondary literature, but 
using primary sources where necessary to validate its arguments, the thesis investigates 
the way Europe’s core nation-states attempt to displace their contradictions and 
conflicts – inherent in their nature as centres of and conduits for global capitalism – 
through the manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of 
inclusion/exclusion. The national border is key to the discursive definition of the forced 
migrant as a threatening ‘global illegal’. The thesis argues, however, that the concept of 
the European border has expanded from its everyday construct into a normative global 
instrument that not only assigns identity, but is summoned into being by the supposed 
inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it, wherever they may be. The 
creation of racial stereotypes has become one of the foremost tools of this form of 
identity management: the research reveals that the racialisation of the figure of the 
‘absolute alien’ plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of 
‘European-ness’. The war on terror, by summoning up the racialised figure of the 
‘global jihadi’, which is discursively linked to the image of the forced migrant as a 
threatening global ‘illegal alien’, has enabled the creation of a European asylum-
security nexus. The way the figure of the forced migrant has been fashioned into the 
natural subject of a politics of (in)security has become an essential component in the 
construction of a hyper-national ‘European identity’. The thesis concludes that the 
forced migrant, fashioned out of national materials as the ultimate ‘global alien’, is the 
ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation as manifest in 
its national form, and gains an even more exaggerated importance when economic and 
political crisis presents an overwhelming need to promote the idea of ‘European-ness’.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
The research question 
The figure of the forced migrant today commands a heightened sense of awareness not 
witnessed in Europe since the 1930s – it is encountered as a key concern in current 
political rhetoric and policy measures (both European and national) and academic 
discourse alike. The presence at the external borders of the Europe Union of individuals 
who have been forced into what Ghosh (cited in Marfleet, 2006, p.93) calls the ‘survival 
circuits’ of global migration is testimony to the many millions displaced by the 
continual round of wars, internal repression, economic upheaval and environmental 
disasters that capitalist globalisation has left in its wake in the Global South. The 
numbers arriving at Europe’s borders represent but a fraction of the massive population 
displacements taking place across the worldi yet they have become an unprecedented 
focus of concern, placed under the spotlight of an increasingly international system of 
high-tech surveillance, registration and interdiction. As Agamben (2005, p.184) notes, 
the figure of the forced migrant is in a continuous relationship with power, ‘at every 
instant exposed to it’, and thus ‘no life is more political’. This was the starting point of 
my investigation: how and why, at this particular historical juncture in the most 
economically and politically powerful countries of Europe, has a deliberately 
marginalised and depoliticised figure been endowed with such an exceptional visibility 
and political importance, apparently far beyond anything justified by its bearers’ 
corporeal presence?  
This relates to a further question: what is the significance of the fact that such 
agitation is happening at a time when the nation-state itself is challenged by the 
centrifugal, albeit uneven, processes of economic globalisation that are fast eroding any 
distinction between the domestic and the global market? This economic transformation 
has also had profound social consequences: mega-cities are spreading throughout the 
world, sucking in millions of workers, and their populations – especially in the 
metropolitan sites of capital accumulation – are becoming increasingly racially, 
culturally and linguistically diverse. But at the same time, we are witnessing the 
retrenchment of national and regional borders. It is at these borders that policies of 
national inclusion/exclusion are manifested through daily processes that identify, mark 
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and exclude the ‘external’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘alien’. What is the relationship of the 
forced migrant to the dynamics of globalisation and to its apparent antithesis, the 
national/regional border, and how and why has this figure come to be so integral to an 
inflated discourse of nationalism apparently so obsessed with the ‘integrity’ of a 
European identity? 
Aspects of this question have, of course, been a focal point for much intellectual 
enquiry. Soguk (1999) has provided one of the most cogent analyses of the 
phenomenon, and his theories have subsequently been reinforced and expanded by other 
scholars. He argues that representations of the forced migrant have been discursively 
orchestrated to reaffirm the ‘relations, institutions and identities of territorial, 
citizenship-based liberal democracies’ (Ibid.,  p.210) and recruited into the service of 
the nation-state in an attempt to recoup its centrality in a world increasingly defined by 
global, extra-territorial economic powers. The figure of the forced migrant is 
constructed as the absolute embodiment of alterity through processes of marginalisation 
and exclusion that have, as a consequence, become critical to state affirmation. The 
delineation of a national identity whose existence is premised on the fact that those 
included in its embrace can only be defined by reference to those who must be excluded 
ensures that the ‘excluded’ figure plays a foundational role in the (re)constitution of 
state power. The political managers of the nation-state have found new purpose in the 
regulation, management and disciplining of those marked as ‘belonging’ to its 
sovereign, territorial domain, aided by the identification, marginalisation and 
criminalisation of those who are not. 
A further question arises: if this is the case, how and why has this figure, evoked for 
national purposes within Europe, become a new global subject? The attempt to harness 
a revived and belligerent nationalism is framed by an overriding emphasis on ‘security’, 
which appears to be driving governments into more coercive mode and easing a new 
military discourse into common usage by way of the spectre of global ‘Islamic 
terrorism’. Those dispossessed and displaced by the capitalist system’s relentless spread 
and systemic convulsions are forced, in hope of survival or a life beyond mere survival, 
to follow its threads back to its origins in the wealthy and powerful nation-states. 
Control over and/or denial of the freedom to undertake this journey has been invested 
with far more significance than the mere management of marginal groups of people 
would appear to warrant. It has become one of the main rationales for the expansion of a 
multi-billion-dollar security business, whose full power and influence within the 
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European Union was unleashed by the ‘global war on terror’. The legacy of the war on 
terror is a (re)entrenchment of the ‘politics of fear’ as a credible mechanism of 
government, laying the basis for the seemingly endless expansion of a vast ‘security-
industrial complex’ and the ‘securitisation’ of a common European asylum and 
immigration process. Indeed, the new discourse of terror appears to have woven 
terrorism, transnational crime and forced migration/asylum into a tight nexus of security 
concerns.  
The discourse of political fear relies upon the identification of the object of fear, 
which comes to dominate the political agenda and necessitate permanent vigilance. 
However, when the discourse of terror began to infect European asylum rhetoric, 
legislation and policies it entered ‘an already heavily prestructured domain of 
insecurity’ (Huysmans, 2006, p.63): as the figure of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ emerged 
centre-stage, it slipped into a template already occupied by the forced migrant, while the 
image of the terrorist intensified the perception of the threatening nature of the ‘alien’ at 
Europe’s borders. The external border, which is increasingly located far beyond its 
initial geographical limits, is perceived as a dangerous zone of crime, terror and 
illegality. It is, in fact, a zone outside the law: it represents a space where governments 
and their (public and private) agents operate beyond public oversight, outside the 
strictures of national law and skirting the (state-centric) system of international refugee 
and human rights legislation. Those denied the right to cross, meanwhile, carry the mark 
of inhabitants of this zone, and are systematically criminalised, dehumanised and 
endowed with the identity of ‘global alien’.  
This begs the question of why it is the forced migrant (increasingly characterised as 
an ‘illegal’ border-crosser) who has become the global personification of ‘illegality’, 
paradigmatic of the ‘global enemy’ at the national border. De Genova and Peutz (2010, 
pp.26-7) have argued that the figure of the forced migrant has become an urgent site of 
struggles around ‘the global socio-political production of space, and the freedom of 
movement that remains … as one of the very foundations of any conception of human 
freedom’. The attempt to control such mobility (to enforce the ‘global management of 
migration’), and thus to control and manage the wider movement of labour, whose 
exploitation ensures the reproduction of the capitalist system, entails that the forced 
migrant be denied the rights and protections accruing to national citizens. They are 
increasingly situated (through an implied correlation with transnational criminal and 
terrorist networks) in an ‘anarchic’, ‘illegal’ space outside the global system of nation-
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states. A general sense of insecurity, channelled and focused by the war on terror, can 
then be displaced with apparent ease onto those individuals categorised as ‘alien’: they 
are not only available (and thus readily embodied) but, most importantly, they are also 
rendered vulnerable – displaced, stripped of resources, ‘silenced’ and easily presented 
as a screen onto which such collective anxieties can be projected.  
The central pivot of my research, therefore, is the question of how this global figure, 
seemingly the focus of an unremitting drive to the ‘securitisation’ of the control of 
global movement (and increasingly of wider European society), relates to the 
privileging of the tropes of nationalism that appear so central to the European Union’s 
attempts to create and naturalise an enhanced pan-European identity. How does asylum 
policy, merged with internal security concerns, figure in the creation and management 
of a European state infrastructure designed to meet the need for defining who is and 
who is not ‘European’? The construction of the figure of the forced migrant as the 
ubiquitous ‘global alien’, embodying not only the potential threat of extremist violence 
but presented more generally as presaging social disruption, deepening economic and 
cultural rifts, and the dissolution of the bonds of national/European norms and morality, 
appears to have become a vital ideological tool for European capitalism’s neoliberal 
global orientation. Analysis of this process, therefore, demands that we question the 
relationship of the forced migrant to the neoliberal ideology that infuses the project of 
the European Union – a bloc that revolves around a powerful core, but whose nation-
state members are locked into mutually beneficial yet deeply conflictual and 
contradictory relationships – and informs its political dynamics, particularly at a time 
when acute financial and economic crisis appears to be driving its constituent countries 
apart.  
 
 
The novelty of the research 
By weaving together the threads of disciplinary theories that foreground the 
phenomenon of forced migration as a subject of academic focus, my research aims to 
help further understanding of forced migration as central to an analysis of the 
ideological impulses of global capitalism. I situate my research within the domain of the 
Europe Union, in order to shed new light on the attempted construction of a European 
identity: I seek to demonstrate how this operation connects to the requirement of the 
global capitalist system to both obscure and naturalise its nature as an historically 
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constructed economic process (one that is inherently exploitative, alienating and crisis-
ridden) and a profoundly unnatural system of social relations. I intend to discover how 
and why the figure of the forced migrant, an extreme manifestation of the impacts of 
these processes on human lives, has been shaped from national materials into a 
representation of the ultimate ‘global alien’ – and, as such, whether it can lay claim to 
be the crucial ideological hinge between a European identity in its ‘hyper-national’ form 
and the role of Europe’s core nation-states as essential regional conduits of global 
capitalism and purveyors of the ideological ballast for its global regime. Although this 
thesis travels the path carved out by many researchers and theorists from different 
disciplines, I believe my presentation of the question in terms of the crucial ideological 
importance of the forced migrant to the identity of Europe and its relationship to global 
capitalism is a novel way of constructing the problematic. 
 
 
Methodological considerations 
I investigate these questions by consulting both primary and secondary textual sources. 
The primary sources comprised a selection of relevant papers produced by European 
Union bodies concerned with terrorism, security, border control, and ‘migration 
management’ and asylum procedures. These included policy proposals, policy 
documents, research reports, and summaries of both agreements with ‘third countries’ 
and of appropriate legislation. Apart from the problem of restricted access (many of the 
most fateful decisions relating to security, and therefore migration policy, are taken 
behind closed doors, often by the highly secretive and powerful group of bodies known 
as the Coreper committeesii), the main obstacle was ascertaining what should be 
considered essential to consult. I frequently turned for guidance to the independent 
monitoring agency, Statewatch, which provides a regular forensic analysis of the most 
current European debates, proposals and legislation concerned with issues of security, 
asylum and civil liberties. Besides providing a critical overview, the Statewatch website 
posts links to hundreds of relevant documents. I also examined information garnered 
from the websites of related organisations with connections to the European Union, 
companies in the security industry, and national governments, in order to check factsiii. I 
further consulted many of the reports and research papers emanating from a number of 
agencies concerned with forced migration into Europe. 
Topicality can enrich and drive forward an analysis. It can also, however, complicate 
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efforts to develop a historical perspective. At worst, it could result in a fractured and 
incoherent analysis. At best, however, I believe it can help to highlight the 
contradictions that constantly appear in the real world. Sometimes reality breaks free of 
the initial interpretation of the problematic – and it is essential to monitor and respond 
with flexibility when this situation occurs. Therefore, throughout my research, I reread, 
revisited, re-situated and sometimes reinterpreted my work, and attempted through this 
procedure to avoid placing it in the exclusive framework of the national and regional 
political debates of the day, while allowing an awareness of their direction to shape my 
understanding of the subject.  
Secondary sources ranged over a number of disciplines, due to the fact that my 
research, although concerned with the representation of the forced migrant, is located 
within an interdisciplinary tradition. The decision to take an interdisciplinary approach 
was initially motivated by the argument current within the field of refugee studies that 
just as the complexity of the globalised world is increasingly reflected in the ‘holistic 
experience’ that is modern migration, so the remit of refugee studies has to be extended 
if it is to take account of the full complexity of forced migration – as a geographical, 
cultural, physical, social, political, legal and psychosocial phenomenon, affecting 
individuals, groups, communities, networks and institutions, including nation-states. 
Castles (2003, p.27), for example, calls for a ‘sociology of forced migration’ – situated 
as a fundamental part of ‘a global sociology’ – which starts from the paradigm of 
‘forced migration as a pivotal aspect… of the new political economy’, and links 
research into forced migration to ‘broader theories of social relations, structures and 
change’.  
For this reason, my research draws on contributions from scholars working in several 
different disciplines, including refugee studies, political economy, international 
relations, sociology, race theory, critical security studies, political geography and 
citizenship studies. Their analyses have helped expand and deepen my investigation into 
the construction of the figure of the forced migrant and its relationship to contemporary 
global processes. Although I incorporate into my work various theories developed by 
leading proponents in these different fields, I worked with these ideas critically, using 
their insights to help interpret my subject, rather than necessarily fully endorsing their 
trajectory or conclusions. My aim has been to critically rearticulate these insights in 
light of my research objectives to allow their perspectives to influence the direction of 
my research where appropriate, rather than borrow from them in an eclectic fashion to 
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reinforce my arguments. The freedom that interdisciplinarity grants has meant I was 
able to base my research on what I consider to be some of the most crucial theoretical 
developments on the subject to have emerged out of diverse academic fields (as I point 
out in the section on the disciplinary context of the thesis, below). 
My decision to place myself within the tradition of interdisciplinary scholarship was 
not only driven by the complexity of the subject and its relevance as a problematic to a 
number of disciplines, but also by an understanding that the different perspectives on, 
and arguments around, the subject are not mutually exclusive – each can be relevant, if 
not vital, to an analysis of the ideological importance of the figure of the forced migrant. 
The ever-present danger is that interdisciplinarity degenerates into eclecticism. Having 
said that, however, the rewards an interdisciplinary approach can offer can be rich. As 
Harvey (2006, p.76) points out, the necessity to explore the interplay of themes in a 
relational way implies a recognition that certain processes may be independent of one 
another but together can form ‘a dynamic field of interaction’ – and I believe that an 
appreciation of this relationality can go some way towards helping avoid the potential 
dangers. 
Relationality is, however, not necessarily co-terminous with relativism. In this 
context, Bigo’s (2008) understanding of interdisciplinarity is relevant. He believes that 
the ‘deconstruction’ of the boundaries between different disciplines can allow a more 
coherent field of analysis to emerge, but warns that relativism is not an option for the 
social sciences. The dangers of relativism can be seen, I believe, in the example of the 
tendency of postmodern cultural theory to collapse material space into socially 
constructed space – when it comes to my research, although working with abstract 
issues (or precisely because I am doing so), I have found it essential to continually bear 
in mind that I am dealing with ideological abstractions that attempt to re-interpret and 
re-present the material realities that face individuals. When forced migrants travel 
across global space, for example, the actual physical distance they move or are forced to 
move matters, as do the physical borders that act as separation barriers and help define 
what counts as ‘acceptable’ movement across a world politically constructed as a mass 
of territorial nation-states. I have, therefore, tried to bear Bigo’s warning in mind 
throughout the research process.  
Bigo (2008) further stresses, however, that it is essential to investigate how a 
‘semantic security continuum’ is constructed, with the war against terror at one end and 
the figure of the forced migrant at the other. It was fundamental to my own research to 
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understand, and hence deconstruct, this semantic continuum, addressing areas that relate 
to migration and security, both of which range over many different theoretical 
landscapes. Migration is most obviously situated within the framework of economic and 
political analysis, as well as anthropology, and sociological and psychosocial 
investigations, but it equally involves an understanding of the migration-security nexus 
and its contribution to the normative framing of migration, as well as a critique of the 
ways that ‘belonging’ and exclusion are embedded in the structure of social 
consciousness, and this calls in turn for an awareness of the power relations which 
underlie official migration/security discourses. De Genova and Peutz (2010, p.26), for 
example, speak of the necessity for an ‘elaboration of a socio-political problematic … 
across several interdisciplinary fields, in multiple academic contexts … on the 
fundamental relation between [migration] and the complex intersection of state 
sovereignty, citizenship, national identity, and the social productions of (nation)-state 
spaces’.  
Many of the theorists studying forced migration from different disciplinary vantage 
points express the need for cross-fertilisation among the different disciplines concerned, 
the better to develop a more responsive vocabulary and create new theoretical tools (cf. 
Guild, 2009). Although many of the aspects of forced migration have traditionally been 
treated as distinct sectors of research, they increasingly demand to be ‘grasped and 
explained together, in their mutual imbrications’ (Wacquant, 2008, p.14)iv. This thesis, 
therefore, follows in the steps of those from many different fields of study who have 
considered it vital to challenge and deconstruct the framing of the current political 
debate around migration, asylum and security, in line with Dillon’s (1996, p.29) 
injunction to confound the ‘neoliberal common sense that “naturalises” the current state 
of affairs … through a … critique of the categories and topics which [together] weave 
the fabric of the dominant discourse’. Due to the complexity of the way these 
‘categories and topics’ ‘weave’ together, I believe such a deconstruction calls for the 
use of a wide selection of theoretical tools. 
One further point I wish to draw attention to is the fact that I use the term ‘forced 
migrant’ rather than ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘migrant’. I have deliberately chosen 
to do this because, although these terms have distinct legal definitions, they have been 
increasingly abused and distorted by a political discourse that has loaded them with 
negative connotations. My embrace of the term ‘forced migrant’ also indicates that I do 
not draw a distinction between those forced by political circumstances (such as state 
9 
 
repression, civil war, invasion or an atmosphere of generalised violence) into seeking 
safety elsewhere and those forced into seeking out an environment which offers the 
chance of a release from extreme poverty. In both cases, I believe, when such 
individuals decide to undertake what is often a dangerous, arduous, financially costly 
and increasingly ‘illegal’ global journey, their decision is framed by parameters that 
permit little choice, and must be regarded as taken under compulsion (a subject I return 
to more fully below). In addition, the confluence of reasons for forced migration cannot 
be easily disentangled; violence or repression, whether quotidian or exceptional, state-
directed or random, is usually inherent in an environment structured by government 
repression, neglect or corruption, social breakdown, the absence of a welfare 
infrastructure, high levels of poverty, structural decay, environmental degradation and 
‘natural’ disasters.  
 
 
The disciplinary context 
Forced migration, then, occupies a key position in Europe, discursively, politically and 
ideologically: the subject dominates the European Union at a number of interlinked 
(‘superstructural’) levels, providing the rationale for a whole mass of government 
apparatuses. In seeking to understand why this is so, I have taken my lead from Soguk’s 
(1999) theory that the figure of the forced migrant is fundamental to the social 
(re)construction of the nation-state and the (re)constitution of its power and sovereignty. 
However, I have attempted to develop this into an investigation of the role that the 
forced migrant (as a ‘global’ figure of absolute ‘otherness’) plays in the attempt to 
embed among Europe’s populations the sense of an overarching European identity. This 
entails an analysis of the relationship between an increasingly securitised region to a 
global environment that, on the one hand, appears to be structured on every level by the 
processes of capitalist globalisation, but on the other remains geographically and 
geopolitically ordered as an international system of nation-states.  
In order to do so, I have situated my work within a Marxist framework, but claimed 
the freedom within this to explore the insights not just of contemporary Marxist 
interpreters, such as Callinicos (2009), Harman (2006, 2009); Harvey (2000, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2010); Mészáros (1989); and Thomas (2009), but also of those working 
outside these parameters. For example, I have taken ‘globalisation’ and ‘neoliberalism’ 
as givens in my analysis, but as they continue to be contested yet often vaguely defined 
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terms, I believe it is important to point out which understanding of these terms I am 
working with. For example, I employ Harvey’s (2006) interpretation of ‘globalisation’ 
as the spread of ‘global capitalism’, with its systemic imbalances and its tendency to 
crisis. As it has spread it has left no place or person immune, and has multiplied the 
experience of alienation, exclusion and marginalisation throughout the world. 
Meanwhile, Sparke (2008), in his description of ‘neoliberalism’ captures, to some 
extent, the contradiction between its ideological and rhetorical face and its pragmatic 
political adaptations. He describes neoliberalism as a ‘contextually contingent 
articulation of free market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal 
forms of social and political rule…’ (Ibid., p.135, italics in original). Thus, 
neoliberalism in ideology appears to contradict neoliberalism in practice, which leads to 
coercive re-regulation, not of financial markets but of social relations, including the 
intensification of a system of border security. However, the practices of neoliberalism 
also contradict its free-market ideology in further ways, the most glaring example being 
the state bailout of global financial institutions, as well as the creation of vast 
transnational monopolies and cartels. I prefer to adopt Harvey’s (2005) interpretation of 
‘neoliberalism’ as both a political ideology and a form of capitalist rule that do not 
necessarily form a coherent politico-economic programme but the effects of which have 
profoundly altered daily lives (through the policies of privatisation, financial 
deregulation, fiscal and economic austerity, welfare ‘reform’ and the punitive policing 
of those most disadvantaged by global capitalism).  
Underpinning an understanding of both these terms lies Harvey’s (2007) 
recapitulation of capitalism as a social relation that internalises its tensions and 
contradictions, and conceals its concrete form as a system based on the appropriation 
and exploitation of the free, creative labour power of individuals. Individuals are thus 
subordinated to the mandates of capital accumulation, which assumes the form of an 
objective, all-embracing power. I believe that such an understanding of the functional 
and ideological attributes of capitalism and the way they are manifest is fundamental to 
my thesis – as Harvey (2007, p.450) says, it is necessary to have a framework for 
understanding, a conceptual apparatus, ‘with which to grasp the most significant 
relationships at work within the intricate dynamics of social transformation’. 
In specific instances, I have also turned to concepts used in other areas of study 
related to the objectives of this thesis. For example, I have referenced the concept of 
‘biopolitics’ (which developed from Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’) when dealing 
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with the securitisation of Europe’s asylum and immigration regime. I have found it a 
useful analytical tool when considering the role biometric technology plays in the 
identification, classification, surveillance and control of forced migrants as objectified, 
‘illegal’ ‘mobile bodies’. It particularly encapsulates the way the technology’s 
algorithmic reduction of individual identities into a mass of mathematically measurable 
body parts has enabled and defined the European Union’s pursuit of its avowed goal of 
‘global migration management’. However, elsewhere, I have tried to use the term with 
care, heeding Thomas (2009, p.225) when he claims that the Gramscian notion of a 
‘hegemonic apparatus’ renders a fuller and more complex sense of the meaning the term 
‘biopolitics’ attempts to convey. This ‘hegemonic apparatus’ is defined as a complex set 
of ideologies, practices, institutions and agents forming ‘an intricate network of social 
relationships’ that only comprises a unity through its purpose as an elite class project 
that seeks to integrate its class ‘antagonists’. The more recent concept of ‘biopolitics’, 
Thomas argues, suffers in comparison by evacuating from its description the specific 
nature of class power that is so essential to Gramsci’s theory. I have not delved into all 
the arguments around the interpretation of biopolitics as a concept; instead, I have used 
the term in those contexts where it helps shed light on specific practices, but in the sense 
that Thomas describes as pertaining to Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic apparatus’. 
Similarly, I have used the concept of ‘securitisation’ (commonplace among critical 
security theorists) in the sense of an extreme politicisation of a subject (for example, the 
forced migrant) that enables the use of extraordinary measures to be deployed in the 
name of ‘security’. Securitisation involves ‘the mass manufacture of global danger … 
mundanely engineered by our forms of political life, and routinely deployed by their 
ordering regimes … as strategies integral to the technologised political production and 
pursuit of community, identity, interests and rights’ (Dillon 1996, p.170). Securitisation, 
therefore, necessarily comprises a network of interrelated discourses, institutions, 
architectural structures (such as detention centres), laws (including anti-terrorist 
legislation and laws criminalising ‘illegal entry’), and administrative measures (such as 
detention or deportation) – in essence, what Bigo (2008, p.35) describes as a ‘Ban-
opticon’ (cf. chapter five). Thus the securitisation of the common European asylum and 
immigration regime contains a political purpose: the targeting of certain individuals and 
groups of people in the interests of normalising a discourse of fear directed towards 
forced migration. This procedure is a collaborative European venture, one that is 
pursued beyond the region into extra-territorial and virtual global spaces. However, in 
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order to marry the apparently contradictory notions of the extreme politicisation of a 
subject through securitisation with that of its radical depoliticisation through 
technological security procedures, I found it necessary to engage with Agamben’s 
theories (I turn to the arguments that have arisen in this respect in detail later in this 
section) and with the Marxist concept of dialectics (as described below). 
Ideas and approaches such as these, I believe, can add to a fuller understanding of the 
theoretical problem, one that weds an analysis of material processes to the variable 
capacity of the state to produce a distorted form of ‘social reality’. However, to try and 
ensure that the use of such concepts or terminology from varied intellectual traditions 
does not threaten to compromise the theoretical integrity of my work, I have used as a 
grounding a number of long-established paradigms. I use Foucault’s (1977 [1972]) 
theory of discourse as a totalising and self-referential system, comprising the 
classification and distribution of meanings and interpretations, which permeates all 
aspects of social, academic, political and popular thought. As Soguk (1999, p.48) 
explains, a particular discursive statement or practice never stands alone but is always 
related to others; it is woven into ‘a discursive space’, where statements or discursive 
practices imply or cross-reference one another, supporting ‘a common institutional and 
political pattern’ which privileges and promotes a specific imagination of the world as 
self-evident and natural. I have also drawn on the concept of Orientalism, as analysed 
by Said (1991 [1978], 1987) as a description of a style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction between the ‘other’ (‘non-Europeans’) and 
‘we Europeans’; as well as Anderson’s (1991 [1983]) seminal theory of ‘imagined 
communities’ and identity formation and Cohen’s (1972) paradigm of ‘moral panics’. 
My broad framework mobilises notions of ‘ideology’ and ‘dialectics’ grounded in 
Gramsci (1971, 1988), primarily as interpreted by Thomas (2009), although with 
reference to his key texts, and Lukács, as expounded by Mészáros (1989), but with 
selected reference to Lukács (1971 [1923]). A Marxist understanding of the role of 
ideology clarifies the process of ‘objectification’ that is central to the construction of the 
figure of the forced migrant as a productive force in the political creation of a 
securitised nation-state. It further establishes how such conceptions become naturalised 
and embedded in everyday social life. As Harvey (2006) explains: 
 
Given the … opacities that mask the processes of capital circulation 
and accumulation, we cannot expect anything other than 
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‘commonsense’ conceptions of the world to regulate the conduct of 
everyday life. …[T]he activities of capital circulation and 
accumulation are refracted through actual discursive practices, 
understandings and behaviours… (Harvey, 2006, p.83) 
 
Underpinning the conduct of my research has been an understanding of the  
dialectical method of analysis. This has been based on Harvey’s (2006) and Thomas’s 
(2009) exposition of a Gramscian theory of dialectics as expressing the inner (not direct 
causal) relations of capitalism as a complex social, political and economic system. Such 
a theory presents a means by which to capture the system’s fluidity and dynamics. 
Dialectics, by its very nature, deconstructs the ideological reification of capitalism: it 
reveals it to be not a thing but a social relation or process, which is perpetually 
changing. A dialectical method, therefore, does not seek to discover a coherent linear 
progression, and goes deeper than an analysis of its structure in order to understand the 
system’s dialectical character in a way that incorporates the contradictory and 
fragmentary outcomes of this process as they manifest themselves in everyday life. As 
Harvey (2006, p.79) says, ‘Theory should be understood … as an evolving structure of 
argument, sensitive to encounters with the complex ways in which social processes are 
materially embedded in the web of life’. 
These theoretical insights lead me to highlight two arguments that have been central 
to my research. In order to avoid the obvious intrusion of these arguments into the main 
body of the work, I have rehearsed them here at some length. 
 
Agency versus abstraction 
As Soguk (1999) reminds us, there is no intrinsic paradigmatic refugee. Mezzadra 
(2004), for example, in upholding the individual’s absolute ‘right to escape’ via the 
‘illegalised’ circuits of global migration clearly maintains a refusal to accept the 
disappearance of the individual forced migrant into an abstract, undifferentiated ‘flow’ 
of people. He calls for a revision of the field of research and theoretical debate, with 
migrants as the subjects not the objects of academic discourse. In fact, the discipline of 
refugee studies has produced a vast number of detailed, focused and invaluable studies 
with forced migrants – and migrant and diaspora communities – as the subjects of their 
own trajectories and narratives, including research undertaken by those who have 
experienced forced migration themselves. Mezzadra’s criticism, however, is directed at 
the social sciences, which he claims have tended to reduce migration to purely objective 
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causes; as well as those critiques of neoliberalism where ‘migrants are seen as objects 
overwhelmed by capitalist globalisation’, sections of cultural studies that have portrayed 
the migrant as a ‘paradigmatic figure of the rootless and “hybrid” character of the 
postmodern subject … free to cross nomadically the boundaries between cultures and 
identities’ (Ibid., p.271), and ‘more general interpretative schemes derived from 
demography’, where migrations as objective processes, abstracted from the actions and 
decisions of individual subjects, are posited as the necessary outcome of economic 
imbalances (Ibid., p.269).  
Mezzadra emphasises that it is through migration that millions of individuals have 
‘materially organised their own existence, their own social relations, their own 
production and reproduction … and constructed new “transnational social spaces” ’ 
(Ibid., p.272). Mobility, redefined as subjective movements of escape, he claims, is ‘one 
of the denied motors of radical transformation’;  ‘[d]iscovering the power and 
immanently political character of mobility’, therefore, can be a ‘theoretical step for 
articulating a critique of capitalism’ (Ibid., p.275). To enable such a critique, Mezzadra 
believes it is necessary for research to focus on the ‘plurality of positions and problems 
that define the figure of migrant’ (Ibid., p.268).  
As Mezzadra has stressed, when analysing any aspect of forced migration it has to be 
continuously borne in mind that such movements do not represent an autonomous, 
abstract phenomenon. The concept of ‘forced migration’ is itself an abstraction imposed 
on the ‘fluidity of a thousand faces’ (Soguk, 1999, p.176) which obscures the fact that it 
comprises many thousands of individual daily choices and journeys. Such decisions, 
however, are often made in circumstances where the term ‘choice’ is a tragic misnomer. 
Forced displacement obviously does not represent a choice. Neither does the decision to 
cross one or many borders from one country or region into another that appears to offer 
greater security from poverty, repression or violence seem any more of a choice if the 
only other it can be weighed against (albeit one that is forced on many millions) is to 
remain in a difficult, hostile or dangerous environment. This may be especially so if to 
remain means spending an indefinite period, perhaps even a lifetime, in a vast, 
overcrowded refugee camp situated in an isolated, desolate area or on a sprawling urban 
perimeterv. As Davis (2006, p.47) points out: ‘Some of the Third World’s huge refugee 
camps have evolved into edge cities in their own right’. Massive warehouses for the 
victims of drought, famine and imperialist war, these urban edges have become a new 
‘zone of exile’. 
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The decision to migrate will also be related to the unique life circumstances of each 
individual: whether they take, and follow through, this momentous decision will depend 
not only on the depth of their need to do so or that of their families, but on access to 
essential resources such as money or credit, information, and smuggling and diaspora 
networks, as well as unquantifiable psychological and emotional resources. This is not 
to imply that individuals are autonomous subjects; people are embedded in social and 
family networks, with a deep investment in their home environment, which they are 
forced to abandon at great psychological cost. As Harvey (2005, p.167) emphasises, 
‘individuals embedded in networks of social relations … have accumulated various 
skills (sometimes referred to as “human capital”) and tastes (sometimes referred to as 
“cultural capital”) and, as living beings, [are] endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, 
hopes, doubts and fears’. However, a common experience in the Global South that adds 
to the compulsion to flee is fact that the implementation of extreme neoliberal policies 
not only robs the individual of security from poverty and violence, but can also strip 
away this protective covering of social and cultural relationships, leaving them exposed 
to ‘acute social dislocation’ (Ibid., p.167). In this context, Boal et al. (2005, pp.193-4) 
cite Polyani as saying, ‘Capitalism is rooted in a continual disembedding of basic 
elements of the species’ life-world from the extraordinary matrix of social relations… 
This disembedding is an atrocity, and will continue to be felt as such by those who 
experience it’.  
Having taken all this account, I have, however, decided to directly engage with the 
processes of abstraction that objectify, dehumanise and homogenise the forced migrant, 
rather than concentrate on the individual lives that lie beneath. In Kelly’s (2008, p.134) 
study of Foucault’s work he emphasises the claim that critique should be used as an 
instrument by those who ‘resist and refuse what is’ in order to challenge what is deemed 
self-evident and necessary. As the figure of the forced migrant is subject to continuous 
daily (re)invention, it is only by interrogating the relationship of this consistent 
objectification to the processes of global capitalism that a critique can begin to ‘question 
and disrupt the self-evidentiality of the refugee category’ (Soguk 1999, p.259).  
The portrayal of forced migration as a purely objective phenomenon is most clearly 
evident in the security discourse that increasingly drives European governments’ 
asylum and immigration policy and practices. This elite, professional discourse helps 
shape everyday commonsensevi perceptions; it is woven into the social context in which 
daily life is experienced and is implicit in the explanatory narratives which feed both a 
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common perception of the world ‘as it really is’ and the actions that flow from these 
understandings. It is through such discursive practices that the very real insecurities and 
anxieties manufactured by the market – which is understood as if it were an abstract, 
autonomous force – are transmuted into fears over ‘threats’ to personal security, 
national identity, cultural coherence and economic wellbeing, and focused on the 
objectified figure of the ‘alien’. It is essential, then, in a study such as this, to directly 
address the objectification of the forced migrant and the social consciousness of which 
it is a constituent ingredient. Discourse cannot ever be entirely free of intention: it 
produces practical effects and holds profound implications for the lives of the 
individuals caught up within it and objectified by it. It is only by seeking to unravel the 
discourse that obscures the ‘thousand faces’ and their personal trajectories that 
constitute what Papastergiadis  (2000) calls the ‘turbulence of migration’, that an 
attempt can be made to reveal the ruling ideological abstractions beneath the dominant 
‘discursive pattern’ and the commonsense perceptions it promotes, and to discover in 
turn the underlying forces that generate such abstractions (cf. Harvey 2000, p.85).  
Castles (2003) suggests that such an approach can help us relate the complex 
individual narratives of forced migrants to their wider social, economic and political 
context. More particularly, when seeking to subject the increasingly hostile and 
securitised characterisation of the forced migrant to critical analysis in order to assess its 
relative weight within the dense matrix of neoliberal discourse, as this study attempts to 
do, it is essential (while keeping the individual who is forced to inhabit this figure in 
focus) to deal in its currency and operate in this sphere of abstraction – the better to 
deconstruct the ideology that both sustains and obscures the workings of the system that 
fuels forced migration.  
Moreover, as Mészáros (1989, p.3) argues, ‘everything is soaked in ideology’. But 
although ideology seeks to be both universalising and naturalising, part of the effects of 
its ‘routine operations’ (the way it is anchored in the everyday social workings of the 
system) is the ‘unavoidable dislocation between appearance and reality’ (Eagleton, 
1994, p.4). Commonsense is necessarily fragmented and incoherent due to the fact that 
‘society is expressed as discrete, isolated entities whose connections and dynamic 
totality are hidden’ (Ibid., p.2). This apparent non-correspondence between ideas and 
reality is structural: everyday discourses betray in their contradictions the imprint of real 
material contradictions and conflicts. It is here, where the individual living within the 
system of global capitalism comes up against the fractures, inconsistencies and 
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contradictions in the ideological abstractions – the current given (neoliberal) world-
view – that the forces behind them begin to come into focus. The forced migrant may be 
objectified through nationalist tropes but this very objectification highlights the 
dissonance of a picture of the world of ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ mobility, set within 
national boundaries, with the reality of a constantly changing, fast-moving global 
economic environment, structured by intense competition, which demands the constant 
supply of highly exploitable and expendable labour. In fact, Mezzadra (2004, p.271) 
himself asserts that if the condition of the forced migrant has any paradigmatic 
characteristics it is that it represents instances where the contradictions between a 
radical reclaiming of liberty and ‘the functioning of old and new mechanisms of 
domination, exploitation [and exclusion]’ become ‘strained’. Isin (2002, pp.275-6) 
concurs: the figure of the forced migrant can ‘summon up that moment when the 
naturalness of the dominant virtues is called into question and their arbitrariness 
revealed’. By seeking out the fault-lines in the neoliberal ideology that suffuses the 
discourse of forced migration we can expose the limits of its way of presenting the 
world as these are ‘the inscription within it of certain limits in historical reality itself’ 
(Eagleton 2004, p.13). 
As both Mezzadra (2004) and Isin (2002) suggest, one of these fault-lines lies within 
the phenomenon of forced migration itself. In the major economies of Europe, for 
example, the forced migrant is presented as a marginal figure, to be swept out of sight 
into detention centres and refugee camps beyond the border, yet at the same time the 
discursive visibility of the figure of the forced migrant in these countries is magnified 
far beyond their actual physical presence. The contradictions that are a constituent part 
of these ideological processes exemplify the fractures and conflicts that lie at the heart 
of the system itself, and the contradictions the forced migrant brings to these 
manufactured discourses always threaten to reveal the reality beneath the abstractions. 
The promotion of the idea of an unproblematic global mobility and the international 
potential (of educational and cultural intercourse, travel and tourism, economic growth 
and lucrative investment opportunities) that globalisation holds is already losing its 
patina with the onset of economic crisis, but its misfit with reality is most forcefully 
represented by the situation of the forced migrant, forced into mobility while forbidden 
to move. The attempts to recoup some semblance of rhetorical coherence have resulted 
in warnings about globalisation’s dark ‘underside’ of organised crime, 
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trafficking/‘people smuggling’, global ‘Islamic terrorism’, and the threat posed by the 
ubiquitous ‘global alien’ to the essential integrity of national cultures.  
The contradictions such a discourse attempts to cover can be encountered in practice 
on any day at any European port. Nordstrom (2007)vii describes, for example, how the 
flow of international trade and the immense profits it represents can in no way afford to 
be disrupted by systematic checks, systematically enforced regulations or effective 
barriers to smuggling and/or ‘illegal migration’ – and in reality there is little attempt to 
do so. The complex meshing of the ‘illegal’ with the legal economyviii is accepted, if not 
openly acknowledged, as integral to a system of global trade and financial transactions 
and transfers. Only when the illegal element of the ‘legal’ economy threatens to subvert 
the system from withinix and precipitate financial and economic crisis, potentially 
undermining its ideological ballast, is the spectral ‘underside’ fleetingly glimpsed as an 
integral part, even a true reflection, of the whole system. The discourse of global 
mobility is but a distorted reflection of the reality of a system driven by the compulsions 
of competition and profit that lie behind the constant global traffic of (il)legal goods, 
financial transactions and labour power. 
I have endeavoured to keep in mind throughout the course of my research the fact 
that although such ideological practices appear to constitute a form of ‘social reality’, 
the description of thousands of individual movements as a singular objective force 
obscures a whole multitude of different individual decisions, actions and experiences 
that cannot be reduced to an abstraction without also reducing the humanity of those 
whose lives this research is really about. In order to advance my theory, however, it has 
been necessary to work at the level of abstraction, the better to deconstruct it, and in the 
process, assist in the labour of revealing how human beings are buried beneath its 
discursive weight. 
 
Agamben and the paradigmatic ‘refugee’ 
On an individual level, the forced migrant’s struggles to find security and freedom from 
danger and poverty could also be described as an example of an attempt ‘to wrest a 
realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity’ (Marx cited in Jameson 2005 [1981], p.4) 
– one small instance ‘in a vast unfinished plot’ for collective liberation from the 
compulsions of the system. It is perhaps due to this that the forced migrant (or more 
specifically, the figure of the ‘refugee’) has also become a paradigmatic figure for many 
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social theorists involved in the critique of neoliberalism and capitalist globalisation (cf. 
Bauman, 1998, 2004; Giroux, 2004; Wacquant, 1999, to cite just a few).  
But it is the use of the refugee as a paradigm in Agamben’s radical philosophy 
that has caught the imagination of many of those dedicated to a critical study of 
migration, from social sciences and critical security studies to citizenship studies. 
Within refugee studies, Agamben appears to have become as essential to the analytical 
framework of certain theoretical studies as Arendt or Foucault. This is not surprising: 
Agamben’s (1998, 2005) concepts of the ‘state of exception’ and ‘bare life’ appear to 
furnish a close analogy with the current situation of the forced migrant – particularly in 
the context of the security discourse that defines European asylum and immigration 
policies and that increasingly appears to influence the polities of European nation-states 
themselves. In fact, Agamben (1994) specifically singles out the ‘refugee’ as the 
exemplar of his theory, a figure who is thus of prime political importance.  
For this reason, I began my work much attracted by Agamben’s theories. 
However, I came to question the wisdom of using all his concepts as a basis for my own 
work. Although they appear to speak to the experience of the forced migrant, and 
although his philosophy is a radical critique of the political condition of the citizens of 
the liberal-democratic state, the way in which Agamben presents the figure of the 
refugee (or forced migrant) as paradigmatic of this condition is, to some extent, 
problematic – and, as critics of Agamben’s theoretical stance (for example, Bull, 2004, 
2007; Owens, 2008, 2009; Huysmans, 2008; Rancière, 2004; Squire, 2009) argue, could 
in fact be said to encourage the depoliticisation of the individual behind the abstraction. 
Of course, it is not essential to utilise these complex philosophical concepts in order to 
analyse the contemporary experience of forced migration. As Sparke (2008, p.151) 
says: ‘…while Agamben’s account of “sovereign power” and “bare life” certainly 
seems to map on to the totalitarian sovereignty exercised over asylum seekers … we do 
not have to turn to his abstract invocation of homo sacer in order to come to biopolitical 
terms with the denial of civil rights to those expedited into the removal system…’. 
However, I felt it was essential to engage with some of Agamben’s concepts as many of 
the theorists whose work I call upon base their ideas on a sophisticated understanding of 
his philosophy. As Agamben’s insights are often quoted, I believe it is important to 
explain my hesitation by working through a number of the critiques of his conclusions.  
As Owens (2009, p.2) explains, for Agamben, the refugee is ‘the symbolic 
representative of social and political reality’; ‘…the ultimate “biopolitical” subject … 
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who can be regulated and governed … in a permanent “state of exception” outside the 
normal legal framework…’.  Agamben (2005, pp.3-4) stresses the biopolitical 
significance of the ‘state of exception’ (or state of emergency), which he asserts has 
become one of the essential political practices of the contemporary state. Indefinite 
detention, for example, by erasing the legal status of the individual, produces ‘a legally 
unclassifiable being’ who becomes solely an ‘object of pure de facto rule’. The 
detainee, no longer a victim of the state’s legal system, as ‘every fiction of a nexus 
between violence and law disappears’, enters a ‘a zone of anomie, in which a violence 
without any juridical form acts’ (Ibid, p.59). The refugee camp bears a direct 
relationship to the Nazi death camp (Agamben, 1998, p.166) and is therefore the 
‘hidden matrix of modern political space’ – it becomes a new juridical paradigm in 
which ‘the norm is the exception’, where the concepts of legal rights and protection no 
longer make any sense. Agamben identifies the camp as the ‘absolute biopolitical space’ 
(Ibid., p.171). Hence, the refugee or forced migrant, the inmate of such camps (which 
range from airport ‘zones d’attente’ or holding centres to detention centres) becomes for 
him the absolute biopolitical figure, representative of his concept of the ‘homo sacer’ – 
that is, a human being reduced to ‘bare life’ (‘a life lacking every political value’), 
‘stripped of every right and forced into perpetual flight’ (Ibid., p.183).  
Such a description often accords with the experience of forced migrants. Once they 
reach a European ‘country of asylum’ they appear to enter a world within a world, one 
that goes unnoticed or unacknowledged by the majority of ordinary citizens, where 
Arendt’s (1976 [1948]) fundamental ‘right to have rights’ appears to be arbitrary or 
even non-existent. This is frequently a zone of anxiety and fear, of legal liminality and 
indeterminate identity, as well as one of poverty and sometimes destitution; a zone 
characterised by the extreme distortion of time, as the forced migrant endures the 
endless wait for the results of an asylum claim or an appeal against a negative decision, 
unable to restart (and often legally prevented from restarting) a ruptured life. At the 
same time, they live from moment to moment under threat of deportation and the early 
morning raid.  
Agamben’s theoretical construction, however, appears to lead to demobilising 
conclusions for the forced migrant. He incorporates and develops Foucault’s theory of 
the disciplinary control of ‘biopower’ and Arendt’s conception of the concentration 
camp and totalitarian state as ‘exemplary spaces of modern biopolitics’ (Agamben, 
1988, p.4). Both these accounts have supplied vital tools for analysis of the situation of 
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the forced migrant (cf. Donà, 2007; Owens, 2008, 2009). Agamben (2005), however, 
marries these concepts with Schmitt’s exposition of the political utility of the ‘state of 
exception’ to authoritarian rule, although he goes on to depict the ‘state of exception’ 
where the refugee/forced migrant dwells as a ‘zone of anomie’ (a zone of lawlessness) 
that betrays the real character of all liberal-democratic societies as ones where the 
exception has become the norm. Huysmans (2008, p.172) declares that Agamben’s 
perspective is a yet more radical, totalising conception than any of his influences: he 
collapses the ‘dialectic between norm and exception’, detaching violence from law – 
violence (and thus politics), he asserts, no longer need the justification of the law. 
This approach runs the risk of underestimating the power (including biopolitical 
power) held by the liberal-democratic state in its juridical armoury of repression, 
particularly vis-à-vis the forced migrant. The state still holds the monopoly of violence, 
which it deploys through its legal, juridical and administrative infrastructure. As Bull 
(2004, p.5) says, under the law, the individual’s vulnerability is ‘truly terrifying’. What 
is done legally in the name of the nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) can 
often be equally violent (including the routinely dehumanising processes of 
surveillance, incarceration and deportation to sometimes certain torture or death) as that 
which occurs within the ‘space of exception’ (as witnessed in the ‘rendition’ of ‘enemy 
aliens’ to so-called ‘black sites’ in the war on terror) without the need to analyse it as a 
‘zone of anomie’. 
Moreover, the ‘state of exception’ is usually employed as a formal device, used for 
the most part by the ruling political elite to combat the collective power manifest in 
mass strikes, social unrest or insurrection that carries with it a challenge to the state’s 
monopoly of power and violence. Bull (2004, p.6) believes that the ‘state of exception’ 
is deployed to try to close up the space torn in the fabric of the state’s legal, political 
and ideological infrastructure by such manifestations of working-class power until it can 
function in a more ‘democratic’ fashion once again, with the use of what Chomsky 
(1998) famously characterised as ‘manufactured consent’. Furthermore, the 
contemporary use of exceptionalism by European politicians to insert into domestic law 
extraordinary powers to deal with terrorism is more of an exemplary tacticx as terrorism 
is sporadic and ineffectual – its power lies in its symbolism. As Hobsbawm (2007) says: 
‘It is a symptom, not an agent’. The danger of terrorist attacks to the regimes of stable 
nation-states is negligible. However devastating they may be for the individual victims, 
they ‘hardly disrupt the operational capacity of a big city for more than a few hours’ 
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(Ibid., p.135). The attacks of 9/11, for example, left the power of the US and the 
international structures it monopolises wholly intact.  
The constant imposition of ‘states of exception’ can, however, as Agamben (2005) 
asserts, weaken the liberal-democratic state machine and allow for authoritarian forms 
of governance to become embedded within it, creating an opening which totalitarian or 
fascist forces may be able to exploit – as in his example of the Weimar Republic:  
 
[T]he last years of the Weimar Republic passed entirely under a 
regime of the state of exception … [and] clearly demonstrates that…a 
‘protected democracy’ is not a democracy at all, and … functions 
instead as a transitional phase that leads … to the establishment of a 
totalitarian regime. (Agamben, 2005, p.15) 
 
When state power is removed from public accountability, accompanied by rigid, 
racially-based exclusions from national citizenship and a discourse of security with a 
‘Manichean division of the world into modalities of good and evil’, an entry point is 
created for fascist tendencies (Giroux, 2004, p.6). These are able to adopt familiar forms 
of ‘nativist’ discourse that in times of crisis can resonate with popular emotions. This 
gradual introduction of authoritarian measures, as exceptional cases that are then 
assumed into the norms of governance, holds the potential for an extremely dangerous 
outcome. However, it should be recalled that fascism has historically come to full 
political power in Europe under very specific and extreme circumstances, in times of 
acute economic, social and ideological crisis and stark political polarisation, where the 
state has faced down a fundamental challenge from below but sections of the ruling elite 
no longer have faith in liberal-democracy’s ability to contain a further full-scale social 
and political crisis. The use of exceptionalism as part of the day-to-day running of the 
liberal-democratic state, on the other hand, most often represents, as Huysmans (2008, 
p.180) points out, an attempt to ‘marginalise or erase’ social and collective action so as 
to allow the state to recoup and strengthen its juridical use of force and its monopoly of 
violence.  
Exceptionalism, therefore, combines with liberalism, and with the routinised 
technologies of control and surveillance, as the key to the functioning of the liberal 
democratic state. As Harvey (2005) says, neoliberal policies and ideology can only be 
maintained, in the final analysis, through a constant resort to such authoritarian 
measures (as seen, for example, in the welter of ever-more stringent and exclusionary 
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asylum and immigration laws emanating from the European Union). The imbalances 
and contradictions of the capitalist system continually lead to crises, which in a 
globalised economic environment carry with them the seeds of a contagion that could 
generate a far wider and deeper structural crisis, threatening to destabilise the whole 
system and its ideological buttressing. Harvey (2005, p.37) maintains that ‘the only way 
the liberal utopian image is sustained is by force’, even more so as crisis begins to 
undermine its ideological narrative of a self-equilibrating free market and its promises 
of peace, order and prosperity: the ruling elites turn to ‘authoritarian, hierarchical, even 
militaristic means of maintaining law and order’. The current trend towards intense 
social control through mass surveillance, the criminalising of social problems and 
incarceration of ‘disposable populations’ (cf. Bauman, 2004; Giroux, 2004), including 
the mass detention of forced migrants, and the political manipulation of a climate of 
anxiety and hostility focused on imagined threats all illustrate Harvey’s thesis. 
However, such authoritarian impulses are integrated with, and rely for their acceptance 
on, more subtle cultural and social means of ensuring consent, which are always 
underpinned by Marx’s (1867 [1976], p.899) ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’. 
Agamben  (2008), however, breaks into new territory by linking the use of 
exceptionalism with the creation of the ‘homo sacer’. In his writings, the ‘homo sacer’ 
is the ultimate creation of biopolitics, and the ultimate ‘homo sacer’ is the ‘refugee’. 
Huysmans (2008) argues that, for Agamben, the refugee/forced migrant is paradigmatic 
of all citizens living within liberal-democratic states. Although forced beyond the 
margins of the political state into a liminal existence outside the law, the refugee/forced 
migrant as the paradigmatic ‘homo sacer’ is, therefore, in his view, not a marginal but a 
central political figure. Agamben (2005) believes that as the totalitarian structure of the 
modern democratic state is exposed through its espousal of exceptionalism as a 
governmental norm – especially when it directly unites power with ‘bare life’ in the 
camp – so the figure of the refugee/forced migrant calls into question the fundamental 
categories of the nation-state.  
There is a problem here with Agamben’s use of the term ‘political’. The figure of the 
refugee or forced migrant is, as this study argues, a crucial ideological component in the 
discourse of neoliberalism. It is true that this figure is profoundly political – as the 
quotation from Agamben (2005, p.184) in my initial paragraph testifies, ‘no life is more 
political’ – but both Owens (2009) and Huysmans (2008) argue that the particular way 
Agamben elevates the refugee/forced migrant to a pole political position is, ironically, 
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fundamentally depoliticising. In Agamben’s theory, naked life displaces all other socio-
economic and political categories of being, ‘turning biopolitics into a struggle between 
the direct enactment of power upon bare life and the anomic excesses of life that 
“resist” it’ (Huysmans, 2008, p.180). Thus, the only political choice left to those who 
wish to resist this fate is the choice between the camps and embracing ‘anomie’. The 
key example here is that of refugee detainees on hunger strike sewing up their lips and 
eyes – in the absence of access to any other form of resistance – to protest their 
treatment (their debasement to existence as ‘bare life’). Yet, as Huysmans (2008, p.179) 
points out, resistance that purely focuses on the bodily resistance of the ‘biologised’ 
individual cannot hope to be effective without the wider mobilisations of collective 
solidarity that are so crucial to the politicisation of such protests. 
If, as Agamben (2005) says, the refugee/forced migrant as the ultimate biopolitical 
subject governed in a state of exception is the symbolic representative of our current 
social and political reality, then the refugee/forced migrant equally illustrates new ways 
of ‘political belonging’ (Owens, 2009). As Owens says, Agamben’s portrayal of the 
refugee as paradigmatic of the condition of the populations of liberal-democratic states 
is not simply a diagnosis of the current situation of the forced migrant but ‘a particular 
conception of the political’ (Ibid., p.13). Agamben (2004, p.3) believes that it is only 
through embracing the biological destiny of the forced migrant that a radical new 
political order can come about: ‘If in the system of nation states the refugee represents 
such a disquieting presence, it is above all because by breaking up the identity between 
man and citizen … the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty’. 
The argument of this thesis is fully in accordance with the idea expressed in this 
quotation. However, as Huysmans (2008) points out, the problem lies with the 
conclusion that Agamben’s theory appears to lead to: if the only way to undermine the 
reality of the nation-state system, and its exclusionary and dehumanising practices, is to 
embrace ‘bare life’ – in order to expose the violent lawlessness of the Western liberal-
democratic political order – then this form of ‘political belonging’ is a ‘radically 
denuded’ one.  
This prescription for resistance equally depoliticises state power and repression by 
placing them in the ‘sphere of exception’, an anthropological – not political – sphere 
(Rancière 2004). This means that the refugee/forced migrant (and, by extension, all who 
live under the yoke of neoliberalism in this sphere of exception) have an ‘ontological 
destiny’ that allows only resistance of a purely atomised and ‘biological’ type (Ibid., 
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p.308). This conception is in danger of closing down the potential to not only affect the 
political process – for the forced migrant, the prospect of reclaiming the right to exist 
and act as a political being (Ibid., 305) – but of any form of collective challenge to the 
system as a whole. Huysmans (2008, p.175) even goes so far as to state that Agamben’s 
theory does not simply depoliticise socio-political struggles but ‘ontologically erases 
them’.  
The danger with pursuing Agamben’s theory into the sphere of refugee studies, 
therefore, lies not only in the potential depoliticisation of the forced migrant, which 
flows from an acceptance of their extreme objectification as the ultimate ‘homo sacer’, 
but also in the fact that its theme of a biopolitical destiny that can only be resisted 
through embracing this destiny and thus laying bare its foundations, helps occlude a 
reality that is far more complex, contradictory and vulnerable to challenge. The 
processes, practices and discourses of capitalist globalisation in all their dehumanising 
aspects, including the objectification of the forced migrant, are frequently contested in a 
myriad of ways throughout the world. If, as Squire (2009) urges, we take resistance as a 
starting point rather than ‘sovereign biopower’, we can see that forms of resistance 
always exist – even in the way Bigo (2008, p.46) suggests, as ‘hidden transcripts that 
mock power even where it seems to apply itself in a unilateral manner’. Indeed, the 
ability of forced migrants themselves to resist, including from within the forbiddingly 
restrictive environments of detention centres, crucially when coupled with the potential 
for the sparks to fan out into wider society, igniting both individual acts of solidarity 
and more collective protests, has been one of the motivations behind the decision to 
manage forced migration from a location ‘upstream’, through the co-option of ‘third 
states’ and ‘countries of origin’ and by ‘an anticipatory knowledge of the future’ (Ibid., 
p.46) supplied by surveillance and biometric technology.  
De Genova and Peutz (2010) argue, on the other hand, that Agamben’s concepts 
have too often been reduced to analogies of more common tropes – for example, ‘bare 
life’ has become used as an exemplar of mere ‘exclusion’.  Agamben’s formulation, 
they argue, is more subtle: he is positing the politicisation of bare life as ‘the defining 
“threshold” where the relation between  … (human) being and socio-political order [is] 
substantiated, and where the sovereign state power presumes to … inscribe the 
humanity of living men and women within its normative order” (Ibid., p.7). This 
incorporation of ‘bare life’ into the political realm constitutes the original nucleus of 
sovereign power. The ‘illegalised’ figure of the forced migrant makes manifest the fact 
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that the foundation of state sovereignty lies in its attempts to assert its power over 
individual freedom of movement (the ‘precondition of human freedom’) (Ibid., p.7). As 
Agamben (1994, p.134) says, the figure of the refugee, therefore, represents ‘a limit 
concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state’. 
Such a reading of Agamben can encompass both the depoliticisation of the figure and 
its extreme politicisation as representative of the way the sovereignty of the nation-state 
is manifest – and, as such, is invested (as a concept) with the power to overturn the 
whole established order. Agamben (1994) believes that an understanding of this 
fundamental relationship is the lever that could prize open the way to a radical new 
perception of the world, with revolutionary consequences: ‘It is only in a land where the 
spaces of states will have been perforated and topologically deformed, and the citizen 
will have learned to acknowledge the refugee that he himself is, that man’s political 
survival today is imaginable’. 
As I illustrate above, the use of Agamben’s theories can prove both productive and 
problematic. As Agamben’s ideas lie at the heart of some of the analyses I have used 
throughout my research, and as they have enabled a more radical analysis of 
contemporary attempts to control mobility, they do appear in my work – for example, I 
have used the elements of de Genova’s (2010) analysis of Agamben outlined above. I 
have, nonetheless, attempted to bear in mind the criticisms of some of his contentions. 
 
 
The structure of the thesis  
This thesis, therefore, foregrounds the forced migrant, the ‘global alien’, as pivotal to 
the ideological practices of neoliberal governance. The emphasis on this figure arises 
from the ways in which the capitalist process is integrated into the very structures of 
social being. There are contradictory outcomes: processes of exploitation and 
dispossession bring inequality and alienation, driving some individuals in regions most 
exposed to its extreme economic and social impacts to attempt to escape their fatal 
constraints. They travel thousands of miles across multiple borders in the hope of 
transforming their situations. The same compulsions drive those who benefit from or 
manage this system to attempt to project the image that they can (and must) enforce 
control over this form of extra-territorial movement – to (at least discursively) isolate its 
stream from the vast ebb and flow of an ocean of global movements of financial 
transactions, goods and people – by declaring their movement to be ‘illegal’. In the 
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process, they attempt to incorporate into their ideological agenda a nationalist 
representation of these criminalised ‘border-crossers’ as representatives of a racialised, 
alien global threat. In Europe, this can be seen in its recruitment as a motivating force in 
the inflation of a sense of national identity into a specific pan-European one. The 
political managers of Europe’s nation-states seek to shore up their national and regional 
power through displacing the social fall-out of the operations of a globally extensive 
system, with its recurrent tendency to plunge into cycles of crisis and reconstruction, 
onto those labelled ‘alien’ and rendered most vulnerable. This represents a key tactic in 
their struggle to contain the potential for social unrest.  
The figure of the forced migrant has become a key ideological resource within 
Europe. This, I argue, is a consequence of its crucial ideological significance, standing 
at the intersection of the seemingly contradictory ideological currents of ‘nationalism’ 
and ‘globalisation’. The formation of such a figure arises from the relationship between 
different facets of an ideology that operates on many different levels. In chapter two, 
therefore, I discuss aspects of the production of the ‘global enemy’ out of a discourse of 
national identity: how the nation-state intersects with the neoliberal forms of capitalist 
globalisation to produce a form of ‘hyper-nationalism’. I investigate the way Europe’s 
core nation-states attempt to displace their contradictions and conflicts through the 
manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of inclusion/exclusion (creating 
the perception of a unified cultural entity by endowing the forced migrant with the 
threatening identity of the ultimate alien, the ‘global illegal’), and how this discourse of 
‘global illegality’ is related to the complex of discourses that strives to naturalise the 
exploitative and divisive system of global capitalism.  
The national border is the key to the discursive definition of the forced migrant as the 
‘global alien’, through the criminalisation of attempts to cross Europe’s external 
borders. As the border is presented as the inscription in linear, geographic space of the 
distinction between one national entity and another, it has become the iconic 
representation of ‘national security’. In chapter three I explore the contradictions 
inherent in this definition: the European Union’s border controls stretch far beyond its 
geographical limits – into other continents, far out at sea and even into cyberspace 
(through the introduction of ‘e-borders’), as well as deep into the region itself. The 
concept of the border, then, must be expanded from its everyday construct (while 
bearing in mind that its physical manifestation undoubtedly matters to those who come 
up against it) into a description of a normative instrument that not only assigns identity, 
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but is summoned into being by the supposed inherent qualities of the individual who 
attempts to cross it. The excluded carry the border within their persons as part of their 
ascribed identity as ontologically, globally ‘alien’ wherever they may happen to be.  
The creation of racial stereotypes has become one of the foremost and most lethal 
tools of this form of ‘identity management’. In chapter four I discuss how the 
racialisation of the figure of the forced migrant is manifest. The projection of an 
homogenous, immutable, ‘alien’ ‘cultural essence’ onto the forced migrant has been 
amplified by the advent of the war on terror. This has left as its legacy both the 
structural edifice of a politics of securitisation and a resurgence of Islamophobia, which 
has in turn served to heighten the ‘xeno-racism’ directed against the forced migrant. 
Islamophobia has been instrumental in the naturalisation in Europe of a racism in 
‘cultural’ disguise, what Balibar (1991a) calls a ‘racism without race’, that is then 
focused on the forced migrant as the global embodiment of an ‘alien’ threat to the 
cohesion of an equally essentialised and universalised European identity and culture. 
The racialisation of the figure of the ‘absolute alien’ plays a fundamental role in the 
construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’ purportedly embedded in a 
specifically European culture and character, whose attributes are deemed as universal as 
those of the ‘alien’ to which they are opposed. 
The war on terror has also enabled the creation of a European asylum-security nexus 
that has allowed the introduction of securitisation into the political framework of 
Europe. Chapter five explores the relationship between the figure of the forced migrant 
and an emerging European ‘security state’ by interrogating the relationship between 
techniques of governance, the construction of a national (or ‘hyper-national’) identity, 
and the discourses, practices and technologies of security. The way the figure of the 
forced migrant has been inscribed with fear and fashioned into the natural subject of a 
politics of security is an essential component in the construction of a ‘European 
identity’. Its ideological function as the negative substrate of ‘European-ness’ entails 
that it must be visibly controlled and rejected: individual forced migrants are caught in a 
relentless focus, monitored and tracked by a vast network of surveillance and 
intelligence gathering and processing technologies, which feed into the militarised 
policing of the border.  
The ideological creation of the forced migrant as a ‘global alien’ is thus infused with 
state power and placed on the stage of national political discourse; it becomes an 
ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation as manifest in 
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its national form, and gains an even more exaggerated importance when economic and 
political crisis presents an overwhelming need to prevent the disintegration of the idea 
of ‘European-ness’. In the process of displacing anxiety and the sense of profound 
alienation produced by daily existence within a capitalist society, the forced migrant is 
highlighted in ways that, I contest, go beyond the quotidian social production of 
marginal and excluded figures that is a norm for ideological systems of national rule. 
Indeed, the forced migrant has become an even more essential element in the constant 
attempt to de-historicise, universalise and naturalise a global system that, as it enters 
crisis, threatens to reveal to its subjects that is none of these things.  
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Chapter Two 
 
A World in Crisis: The ‘Illegalisation’ of the Forced Migrant  
 
Introduction 
There is no such thing as a continuous ‘refugee’ figure that can be tracked through 
Europe’s historical record. Although those forced by political persecution, war or 
poverty into seeking refuge in Europe have been a continuous presence since the early 
modern era (cf. Soguk, 1999; Marfleet, 2006), the representations of such individuals 
have been mutable, changing according to the political requirements of the time. In 
today’s context, the way the figure of the forced migrant is fashioned reflects the 
relationship between the phenomenon of forced migration and the current ideological 
agenda of the political managers of the major European economies. 
Individuals are compelled – by the dispossession and displacement that arise from 
the globally extensive demands of capital accumulation – into undertaking often 
arduous and life-threatening journeys to the borders of Europe. Due to the European 
Union’s securitised asylum and immigration policies and practices (the policing of its 
external borders) they are driven into the global circuits of ‘survival migration’, their 
journeys facilitated, for the most part, by agents working within the illicit, shadow 
economy. If they attain the borders of Europe’s nation-states, once within these borders 
they are subsumed into the underside of the ‘legal’ economy as part of a highly 
exploitable, because they are highly vulnerable, irregular workforce: the criminalisation 
of those caught up in this process ensures they are endowed with the identity of ‘illegal 
migrant’, leaving them open to the threat of detention and deportation, with increasingly 
little scope for having the stain of  ‘illegality’ dissolved through the granting of refugee 
status. 
The enforced marginality of the forced migrant (in terms of their presence and 
their political ‘voice’) is both ideologically and economically productive for the core 
national/regional hubs of the global capitalist system. On the one hand, the forced 
migrant – as an ‘illegal migrant’, ‘sans-papier’ or ‘failed asylum seeker’ driven 
underground – is an easily exploited and profitable resource, an important cog in the 
service, catering, construction, agriculture and food processing sectors of these 
countries’ economies (cf. Shelley, 2007). On the other hand, for the political elite, the 
forced migrant represents a potential disruption to the perceived ‘normality’ of the 
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system it manages and benefits from. It attempts to recoup the semblance of stability by 
deploying discourses that frame the forced migrant as a dangerous, because ‘illegal’, 
‘alien’ presence, creating a ‘spectre’ at the border onto which can be displaced the 
anxiety and confusion provoked by an exploitative global system that appears to operate 
beyond human control. In a seemingly contradictory process, even as forced migrants 
are silently and invisibly incorporated into the national economy, their portrayal as 
figures of putative criminality and danger – to be identified, tracked down, incarcerated 
and expelled – magnifies their rhetorical visibility and political importance far beyond 
their physical presence.  
This magnification comprises a crucial element in the (re)construction of the 
nation-state (cf. Soguk, 1999), and more fundamentally in the stabilisation of the 
overarching ideological practices that attempt to naturalise, and thereby disguise, the 
exploitative and divisive nature of the system as a whole. However, as the ideological 
process of shoring up the system is not self-equilibrating, the discourses of ‘national 
belonging’ the political elite employ have to be continually reconstructed, refashioned 
and rhetorically emphasised in order to meet these new centrifugal challenges that 
confront a nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) locked into a global economic 
system. In an attempt to displace the inherent contradictions, conflicts and challenges, 
currently sharpened by the onset of global economic crisis, national politicians and their 
ideologues endow the forced migrant with the threatening identity of ‘global illegal’ by 
means of the manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of 
inclusion/exclusion. This discourse of ‘global illegality’ is interwoven with the complex 
of discourses that obscure and sustain the system of global capitalism.  
This thesis argues that the figure of the forced migrant, standing at the intersection 
of nationalism and globalisation, functions as a crucial ideological hinge in the 
articulation of the ‘identity’ of Europe with the reality of its contradictory relationship 
to global capitalism. 
 
 
Global capitalism and forced migration 
Globalisation, dispossession and displacement 
The acceleration of the global reach of capitalism’s processes of intense exploitation, 
coupled with dispossession, has created the circumstances whereby individuals are 
forced through displacement into the international circuits of migration, amplifying the 
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global circumstances of what may at first appear to be local crises. The situation of the 
forced migrant is currently made even starker by the intensification of the global 
system’s structural instability and inequality by financial and economic crisis. Many 
individual decisions to migrate, therefore, are made under the extreme pressures that 
neoliberal policies and practices visit on those living within the regions that lie on the 
margins of the world’s economic system, outside the central nodes of global wealth, 
power and privilege. In this sense, forced migration as a term is not easy to delimit: it 
lies on a continuum, where chronic unemployment, poverty and the drastic curtailment 
of life-chances shade into political persecution, ethnic violence, and the devastation of 
war and mass displacement. What Davis (2006, p.174) terms the ‘brutal tectonics of 
globalisation’– the ‘epochal’ transfer of power and resources from the Global South to 
the command centres of global capitalism – have propelled many millions into motion 
across the globe, turning many into ‘survival migrants’. This world of perpetual 
movement is one particular manifestation of ‘[t]he incessant tearing apart of old patterns 
of the economic and social by capitalism as it restructures itself on a world scale…’ 
(Harman, 2009, p.343). The phase of global restructuring which began in response to 
the economic crisis of the late 1970s is most visible in the policies and programmes 
implemented by the IMF and the World Bank, which, even as the current crisis 
threatens to throw their ideological underpinning into question, continue to carry out 
what Davis (2006, p.199) calls ‘the late capitalist triage of humanity’.  
The neoliberal deregulation of global finance forced open countries in the Global 
South to wave after wave of speculative finance, destabilising local currencies and even 
whole economies. Direct foreign investments, however, have continued to flow almost 
exclusively between the key regions of capital accumulation, drawn by the powerful 
centripetal force exerted by these major centres of production, finance and commerce, 
with less than a third seeking out the Global South (and then principally those regions 
producing raw materials such as oil and gas) (cf. Callinicos, 2009, p.204). Meanwhile, 
most of the Global South is locked out of the lucrative flows of trade by complex 
barriers of tariffs, pricing structures, subsidies and patents. As their governments have 
been forced into countless rounds of borrowing, initially to finance state expenditure, 
then escalating interest payments, the ratio of debt to GNP in the economically most 
vulnerable countries (known as the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ or HIPCs) has 
reached far beyond sustainable limits. Continued dependence on World Bank and IMF-
directed austerity programmesxi – access to credit is wedded to their adoption – has 
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further intensified the crisis in agriculture and industrial output, with increased 
deforestation, desertification and other markers of environmental degradation, over-
reliance on food imports, and declining terms of trade and capital flight. Often the only 
resort for individuals attempting to avoid destitution is, as Zolberg (2001) says, to 
physically ‘exit the state’. 
Austerity measures have locked many of the countries in the Global South into 
chronic economic stagnation (cf. Harvey, 2005, 2006, 2007). The accompanying 
wholesale privatisations of public services and the erosion or complete collapse of the 
last vestiges of state welfare and subsidies over the last three decades have left the 
majority of their citizens exposed to unemployment, poverty and environmentally toxic 
habitats, and, as a consequence, rendered them vulnerable to the rapid spread of disease 
and epidemics, and to ‘natural’ disastersxii. In some areas deep poverty helps breed an 
environment where primitive forms of exploitation can flourish: domestic servitude that 
is on a par with slavery, child labour and prostitution, and the farming of human organs 
(what Davis (2006, p.198) calls an ‘existential ground zero’).  Almost inevitably, such 
circumstances lead to violence, as economic and political crisis intensifies conflict at 
every level. Under the pressure of neoliberal austerity programmes, fragile state 
structures fragment, and as power and the monopoly of violence disperse away from 
their centralised source, social unrest (under the direction of political demagogues) 
frequently transmutes into ethnic, religious and racial conflict, threatening to ignite civil 
war.  
Some already vulnerable areas have been further devastated by the military 
invasions of the US and allied NATO powers, carried out by a combination of national 
armies, equipped with high-tech surveillance equipment and weaponry, and vast 
mercenary organisations based in the West – an illustration of the neoliberal drive to 
privatise even the conduct of war itself (cf. Klein, 2007). Such companies – one of the 
most visible and powerful being the US-based Blackwater (now rebranded as Xe 
Services), whose influence, reach and revenues rival that of many nation-states (cf. 
Scahill, 2007) – have been deployed by Western governments in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(in the war against terror) and in Columbia (in the ‘war against drugs’). There are even 
plans to deploy such private armies along state borders in the ‘war against illegal 
migration’ (for example, along the US- Mexico border) (Ibid., 2007). The fact that these 
private security companies operate in a culture of impunity, lawlessness and 
corruptionxiii, allied to the elevation of Western foreign policy into a permanent state of 
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pre-emptive war, helps ratchet up the sense of chaos and threat in many areas – 
especially when the rhetoric of the war on terror is used by local regimes as a cover for 
intensified repression.  
The economic hegemony of the US may be fatally compromised by its status as 
the world’s biggest debtor economy, and challenged by China’s surging growth rate and 
newfound geopolitical assertiveness, but it still retains its global military supremacy, 
and its military presence continues to structure the lived environment of many millions. 
Throughout the world there are 737 officially recognised US bases (cf. Johnson, 2007), 
not to mention secret installations and de facto facilities under flags of convenience. 
Thus the experiential world of many in the Global South is one distorted by the ever-
present shadow of military conflict, whether conducted by state armies, mercenary 
groups or militias. Whoever prosecutes the war, it is civilians who comprise the 
overwhelming majority of casualties and fatalities – and who are often the main target – 
and it is they who are driven by war beyond the borders of these zones of conflict in 
search of safetyxiv. 
The ripples of war spread out from the epicentres of invasion and conflict into 
unstable border areas (for example, from Afghanistan to the North-Western ‘tribal 
regions’ of Pakistan, or, in the case of Russia’s brutal war in Chechnya, into the 
neighbouring Caucasus states) and begin to infect whole regions. The corrosive 
influence of the economy of war, with its corrupt and violent black-market 
relationships, becomes networked far and wide throughout these regions, both 
benefiting from and fuelling the rapid growth of informal labour and the shadow 
economic system – which also provides the informal circuits of migration for those 
desperate to escape. Among the many examples (such as the Horn of Africa and Iraq), 
the war in Kosovo has left the economy of the region devastated and in the hands of 
various Balkan mafias (cf. Boal et al, 2005, p.106; Glenny, 2008), a conduit for 
organised smuggling and/or trafficking operations, while Afghanistan is once again 
locked into the opium economy under the control of competing warlords and their 
militias. 
In large pockets of many regions, therefore, arbitrary violence – and the ever-
present fear of it – has become normalised. That millions continue to survive and even 
build and maintain communities in the interstices of such unstable societies is a 
testament to their resilience and resourcefulness, but life in such environments is at best 
inherently fragile and at worst traumatic. Random warfare waged by armed bands of 
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soldiers outside state control, endemic civil war or state-directed terror has become the 
default condition of many societies, where ‘the loss of even the fiction of a national 
economy leaves the cultural field as one in which fantasies of purity, authenticity … and 
security [in the name of collective ethnic identities] are enacted: the nation-state is 
reduced to the fiction of its ethnos’ (Appadurai, 2006, p.23). In circumstances such as 
these, where daily life is characterised by the banal ‘everydayness’ of physical violence, 
conflict and brutality, the vestiges of a routine and predictable order are increasingly 
organised around the prospect and fact of violence, even as ‘a quotidian war is waged 
[that] destabilise[s] the idea of an everyday outside world’ (Ibid., pp.31-2). ‘[Such] 
societies of terror drive forced migration’ (Ibid., p.30). 
Meanwhile, in the course of expanding and restructuring at a breathtaking pace, 
global capitalism has generated the growth of mega-cities (over half the world’s 
population are now designated as urban-dwellers). Some, most notably in the region 
now known as Asean + 3 (South-East Asia plus China, Japan and South Korea), are 
situated in areas characterised by the rapid rise of new global centres of capital 
accumulation – spectacularly so in China, which is making its presence felt on the 
international stage as a potential economic and even geopolitical rival to the US and 
Europe (cf. Callinicos, 2009). Others have spread their footprint across regions in Latin 
America, Africa and South Asia, reflecting the complex, unequal patterns of change 
driven by a constantly evolving yet crisis-prone economic system. These mega-cities 
sprawl for many hundreds of miles, encompassing smaller cities, towns, villages and 
semi-rural areas, and are home to millions of migrants from the impoverished rural 
hinterlands, who settle in the vast ‘mega-slums’ so graphically described by Davis 
(2006). These become simulacri of cities themselves, despite lacking even the most 
basic infrastructure essential for a functioning urban environment.  
As Zeilig (2008) and Harman (2009) point out, the social topography of these 
‘slum cities’ is dense, complex and differentiated, encompassing a wide variety of 
social experiences, forms of housing, and formal and informal employment, self-
employment and unemployment, with a vital cross-fertilisation of ideas and cultural 
practices. Such areas can indeed boast self-sufficient communities that continue to 
survive amidst the deprivation, casual violence (often emanating from official sources), 
constant displacements and toxic environment. However, at the same time, many of 
their inhabitants would no doubt recognise Boal et al’s (2005, p.162) description of 
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these mega-slums as ‘urban archipelagos of destitution and disenfranchisement’. They 
are localised evidence of the vast imbalances that characterise neoliberal globalisation. 
Global imbalances are replicated within regions. Most countries throughout the 
world have witnessed over the last decade the growth of a yawning chasm between the 
wealth of a small elite at one end of the scale and extreme poverty at the other. Indeed, 
the characteristics of cities in the advanced economies are similar in many ways to those 
in the Global South in their degree of economic, social and spatial polarisation (cf. 
King, 1995). However, in the poor countries of the South, the fragmentation, 
incoherence and alienation experienced by so many urban-dwellers is magnified; the 
chasm between rich and poor creates near-surreal spectacles of vast wealth nestled 
alongside desperate impoverishment, with slums and favellas neighbouring gated 
compounds, skyscrapers, shopping malls and five-star hotels. Such regions have played 
host to the swift rise of a narrow class of super-rich, who have benefited from the 
privatisations, speculation and corruption, and who continue to profit from the current 
crisis. The members of this elite are the local beneficiaries of globalisation, but equally 
they are the true ‘global nomads/citizens’ belonging to Seabrook’s ‘superterrestial 
topography of money’ (cited in Davis, 2006, p.120); they are divorced from the social 
fabric of their home countries by their widespread international connections, financial 
transactions and peripatetic lifestyles, and protected in their fortified, gated ‘off-worlds’ 
against the violence provoked by the economic and social exclusion they represent.  
 
Global imbalances and the stratified access to mobility 
When such imbalances are mapped on a global scale between regions, they reflect the 
fact that although all regions may be caught in the net of neoliberal globalisation, they 
are differentially vulnerable to its effects. Some locations, such as the ‘global city’ of 
London, host the command centres of capital and, as such, are a crucial node in the 
production of an increasingly unequal world. From the axis of a city such as London, 
New York, Paris or Tokyo a ‘vast geography of dependencies, relations and effects’ 
spreads out around globe (Massey, 2007, p.13): their footprints are globally extensive. 
As Massey points out, maps of ‘global implication’ could be drawn up for the global 
city and its multitude of sectors and activities: its presence impacts on many millions far 
beyond its region’s borders, with its urgent need for energy and mineral resources, its 
appetite for markets for speculative financial activity and, often, for highly lucrative 
arms deals, and its dependence on an array of workers drawn from the rest of the world 
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for its daily social reproduction. Those subsumed into the dynamics of Europe’s urban 
economy and society, for example, are a part of a web of connections that stretch 
around planetxv. As Massey asks, where does the global city end? Thus, it is possible to 
place the deprivation and violence suffered in the major part of the world firmly within 
the radius of these centres of global power and wealth through a locally sourced and 
locally displayed global inequality.  
So it is that billions are forced to the very periphery of this world system. 
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are written off as ‘marginal’, apart from 
local enclaves of raw materials, most especially oil, which have sparked a new 
‘scramble for Africa’ – China is the latest entrant on the list of those industrialised and 
industrialising countries competing voraciously for fresh supplies of energy resources. 
Even in such enclaves, however, attempts at even basic development have been 
abandoned in favour of global ‘poverty relief’ and riot controlxvi. Millions are forcibly 
displaced within their countries or regionsxvii. And a further tiny percentage of people 
are driven to embark on arduous, dangerous, often fatal journeysxviii across deserts, 
oceans and fortified borders towards the richer, safer countries of the West.  As Sassen 
(2003, p.265) says: ‘It is in this context – marked by unemployment, poverty, 
bankruptcies … and shrinking state resources to meet social needs – that alternative 
circuits of survival [that is, the circuits of migration] emerge, and it is to these 
conditions that such circuits are articulated’.  
The immiseration of populations – and the violence and repression that often 
accompanies this – promotes forced migration; this takes place within an environment 
structured by the dynamics of the fluctuating demand for highly exploitable labour in 
the global cities of the West (and increasingly in the East). Forced migration then 
articulates with a global infrastructure that facilitates the crossborder flows that take 
place within both the legal and the illicit, shadow economy, which are networked 
together in necessarily opaque ways. There are in effect, as Bauman (1998, p.88) says, 
two worlds: the first is the one of the globally mobile; the second is the one of the 
locally tied who are banned from moving – for them, ‘real space is closing up’, they 
have to travel illegally, under threat of arrest and deportation. Through the enforcement 
of this highly stratified access to global mobility, the ‘circuits of survival’ forced 
migrants are compelled to use are criminalised and driven underground, often into the 
hands of mafia networks – and forced migrants themselves are transformed into global 
transgressors. 
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The global system and the nation-state 
The discourse of globalisation  
As any ideological discourse is part of a materially structured and sustained social 
consciousness, if it failed to reflect back to the individual their experience of the world 
– albeit in a distorted, fragmentary and contradictory way – its social and political utility 
would be nullified. Thus, the alienating, sometimes devastating, effects of capitalist 
globalisation are often experienced as if they were the outcome of the workings of 
impersonal forces; they are frequently experienced as if they were a natural part of the 
given, lived environment, conveying what Jameson (cited by Kunkel, 2010, p.14) calls 
‘the sense of a locked social geology so massive that no visions of modification seem 
possible’. A discourse of globalisation reflecting this sense can indeed have some 
purchase. If a critical analysis is to break open the ideological carapace within which the 
forced migrant is imprisoned, then one of its principle tasks must be to deconstruct the 
ruling ideological narratives that de-historicise the structural parameters of the given 
world and elevate capitalist globalisation into an abstract force, naturalising its uneven 
and contradictory processes.  
These processes, although springing from the compulsions inherent in a now-
global economic system driven by profit-seeking and competition, are grounded in the 
constant flow of many millions upon millions of individual actions and interactions, 
which are then fashioned into a substance that is abstracted and alienated from its 
source in human life and labour. Analysing how and why the figure of the forced 
migrant has become such a vital component in this process of ideological abstraction 
necessitates tracing the origins of the discourses that surround forced migration back to 
their source in the nation-state itself and in the narrative threads of nationalism from 
which the figure of the ‘alien outsider’ is woven. This involves, in the first instance, an 
interrogation of the picture presented by globalisation theories of the imminent demise 
of the nation-state itself and an analysis of the relationship of the nation-state to the 
process of globalisation. 
The discourse of globalisation portrays it as a ‘placeless’ force, but the global is 
grounded in the local; global capitalism is reproduced through concrete, locally situated 
processes in areas of highly concentrated forms of power  – it is the provenance of this 
power that lies hidden behind the neoliberal discourse of an abstract, frictionless, 
integrated global system. Transactions, products and peoples are sucked into the force-
field of the capitalist core, but the majority of trade and investment continues to flow 
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primarily between the advanced economies that make up this core, and it is this flow 
that remains the dynamo of the world economy – a process Callinicos (2009, p.183) 
calls ‘ostracising imperialism’. The global system, therefore, is best described as a 
hybrid one, comprising a system of unevenly developed states and regions, with the 
apex dominated by the core North American, European and South East Asian and 
Pacific rim regions, all locked into highly competitive yet interdependent relationships. 
These regions have been recently joined by new centres of capital accumulation, such as 
China and to a lesser extent India, complicating the global hierarchy of economic and 
geopolitical power. However, this only helps to emphasise that globalisation is more 
accurately termed ‘regionalisation’ – a globalised system of capitalist states and 
regional blocs of states whose competitive and conflictual interdependence adds up to ‘a 
dangerous, unbalanced world [of] shifting … social and political, national and 
international tectonic plates’ (Hobsbawm, 2007, p.48), an increasingly multipolar world 
of stark global asymmetries and regional disparities.  
Capitalism is structured fundamentally as a system of nation-states: the state is the 
‘nodal point’ in capitalism’s global nervous system around which capitals cluster (cf. 
Harman, 1991). Those specific nodes that lie at the core of the economic system 
continue to play a crucial role in promoting the global processes of capitalism: they 
create the infrastructure for the concrete, locally situated processes that make up 
capitalist globalisation. To facilitate the most recent round of global restructuring, under 
the ideological banner of neoliberalism – and under the cover of global economic crisis 
– the local nation-state has been fundamental in rolling back regulatory frameworks, 
implementing cutbacks in the social wage, initiating privatisations and providing 
massive financial bailouts (at the risk of undermining as it does so the long-term 
viability of the neoliberal doctrine itself) to try to prevent it spinning out of control. It 
will continue to be crucial to future attempts to restore profitability to the system by 
attempting to transfer the vast burden of its debt onto the shoulders of its national 
populations, deploying its monopoly of force (administrative, judicial, legal and, in the 
final analysis, military) and its vast, hegemonic (but never uncontested) ideological 
resources in order to secure some measure of consent.  
This is not to deny that the nation-state itself is a product of historical 
circumstances and cultural constructs, a changing and inherently unstable phenomenon. 
Challenges to its shape and form emerge from within the capitalist system itself, not 
least from the application of neoliberal policies that ‘seek to delegate the state’s 
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managerial functions to [unaccountable] international organisations and [to] privatise 
“public” power’ (Opello and Rostow, 1999, p.246), as well as from the conflicting 
interests of the different strands of capital as they consolidate into national, regional or 
global blocs. However, as Harvey (2006, p. xvii) says, ‘if something like states didn’t 
exist, capitalists would be forced to invent them’. Precisely because it functions in an 
increasingly hybrid, interconnected world, capital cannot entirely float free of its 
geographical moorings; its operations and financial relationships may be spread 
globally but capital and the state system are still locked into an interdependent 
relationship. The competition between the various blocs of capital, if unregulated, could 
lead to a contagious financial and economic crisis that, due to the global nature of the 
economic system, holds the threat of annihilation over even the most globally spread of 
transnational behemoths. The crisis that is currently unfolding could still be beyond 
national political intervention due to the sheer scale of the integration of national 
economies, yet there is no other solution but for the nation-state to intervene to try to 
contain the fall-out and to shift the burden of the cost of the local economic and social 
consequences of crisis-containment onto the backs of its populations. This process, of 
course, carries with it the risk of sustaining even greater damage by provoking profound 
social unrest (which again the state is expected to confront and control), and this is one 
reason why neoliberalism now carries with it a sense of ideological crisis as it openly 
moves to state intervention, contravening its neoliberal free-market discourse.  
This is not the only role of the nation-state: it is more than simply a ‘power 
container’; as McNevin (2006) shows, it can also be characterised as an ‘assemblage’ of 
forces and disciplinary practices through which identities are constructed, and cannot be 
analysed in isolation from the social relationships it encapsulates. The constant tension 
between the arid, alienating realities of a system based on profit-seeking and what 
Harvey (2007, p.xvii) calls the ‘lived lives of those producing the profits’ (with their 
‘richness of variegated cultures’) demands some sort of resolution if society is to have a 
measure of social stability, particularly at the point where ‘far-flung [global] 
connections and countervailing influences of extraordinary complexity send 
reverbrations through … communities which threaten to rock the foundations of civil 
society’. The most powerful nation-states continue to possess the necessary heft and 
ideological resources to attempt to contain and sublimate these tensions, sustaining 
allegiance to the capitalist system in its local forms. The nation-state naturalises the 
system of exploitation of which it is a structural part, not least through its reproduction 
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of ideological narratives of national and cultural belonging with their (racialised) 
definitions of inclusion and exclusion.  
 
The contradictions of global capitalism in its nation-state form 
The survival of locally or regionally based capitals in an internationally hybrid world of 
instability, regional conflicts and economic convulsions demands, therefore, an 
inherently ideological operation to postulate a unitary set of interests in order to 
naturalise and legitimate relations of dominance, construct identities and displace class 
antagonisms. Capitalism, in the process of its constant reinvention, continues to release 
forces that undermine its account of the world: the uneven processes of globalisation 
have begun to erode the distinction between the domestic and the global market. 
Nation-state allegiances with sources of transnational capital are not without historical 
precedent, but the trend strengthening these complex global relationships has been 
accelerated dramatically by the neoliberal policies of liberalisation and deregulation. 
External actors, such as unaccountable intergovernmental and regional institutions (for 
example, the European Commission, which Anderson (2007, p.17) calls ‘the EU’s 
unelected executive’), credit rating agencies, international financial markets, currency 
speculators and transnational industries, employ great powers of discipline within and 
upon the nation-states of Europe. As the distinction between the domestic and the global 
economy is now difficult to maintain, the power of the political managers of the nation-
state is becoming increasingly concentrated in their ability to assert control through the 
‘management’ and policing of their national populations.  
Meanwhile, the reality of the ever-widening chasm between rich and poor, within 
and between regions, has to be disguised behind an appearance of inevitability. The 
egregious global inequalities that were previously distanced from the central core of 
imperialist states, locked within the borders of the colonies (which de Genova (2010, 
p.54) describes as ‘vast de facto prison labour camps’), now confront the citizens in the 
Western metropolitan centres ‘on an unprecedented scale and ever more ubiquitously 
within the same spaces of practical everyday life’ (Balibar cited in de Genova, 2010, 
p.54). The individual anxieties of the national citizens of these core states find an echo 
in the spectacle of global casualties at the border attesting to the ruthless nature of the 
capitalist economic order. At the same time, identities are leaking: as global mega-cities 
spread across continents, sucking in millions of workers from within and beyond 
national and regional borders, they are becoming increasingly racially, culturally and 
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linguistically diverse. This has even led Appadurai (1998, p.22) so far as to predict that 
‘diasporic public spheres…are [becoming] crucibles of a postnationalist political order’ 
– although to what extent they can do so is not clear because, as they are nested within 
the system of nation-states itself, this is hardly a smooth or inevitable process. 
However, it is evident that, as the ideological process of shoring up the system is 
not self-equilibrating, the discourses of national belonging have to be continually 
reconstructed and refashioned to meet the centrifugal challenges that confront the 
nation-state (and regional blocs of states) locked into the global system. Lukács (1971 
[1923], p.9) describes how such discourses obscure ‘the historical, transitory nature of 
capitalist society’, so that ‘its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal 
categories valid for all social formations’. This is especially vital during a period of 
dramatic change, instability or crisis. One of the core elements of this ideological 
process is nationalism, which appears as an expression of a timeless ethnic essence, 
contained within and expressed by the nation-state. Nationalism’s ideological role is to 
offer ‘solutions’ to the complex of ideological, structural and psychological needs 
precipitated by capitalism’s ceaseless processes of change, but its application is 
increasingly calibrated by the global parameters within which it operates. The task of 
the nationally based political elite of cementing ever-more global modes of 
distinguishing ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ cannot be disembedded from the nation-state 
to which it owes its sustenance and to which it must secure allegiance.  
 
 
The nation-state and the forced migrant 
The discourses of the nation-state 
The nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) may be a crucial node in the system 
of capitalist globalisation, necessary for its processes, but it is also a construct and 
therefore depends on untold millions of daily activities to create its ‘reality’. Huysmans 
(2006, p.85) argues that, when analysing these activities, too strong an emphasis on 
symbolic and discursive practices carries with it the danger of dismissing Foucault’s 
understanding of how expert knowledge, technologies and inherited governmental 
techniques (‘the institutionalisation and enactment of procedures, routines and 
regulations’) dictate the form and direction of a discourse as powerfully as does its 
ideological framework. A problem arises with a Foucauldian interpretation of discourse, 
however, which claims that discourse itself is ambivalent: the same discourse may be 
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endlessly reappropriated, modified and ‘performed’ in various contexts by different 
actors. In this view, the discourse(s) embedded in the application of expert knowledge 
and techniques of government can become autonomous and self-referential, open to 
adoption by various political forces. Huysmans (2006), for example, contends that this 
plethora of routinised governmental activities and legal instruments (such as those 
deployed in national asylum and immigration regimes) is driven by an internal logic – 
they maintain their own power bases and knowledge systems – which is equally as 
significant as underlying ideological abstractions in forming an understanding of the 
nation-state (with its ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’).  
However, I believe that such an interpretation begs the question to what extent 
such activities are able to float free of the whole ideological structure of the nation-state 
of which they are such a crucial component. For example, Soguk (1999) shows how the 
problematisation of certain individuals as ‘refugees’ results in a normative ‘refugee 
discourse’, and it can be argued that it is this that informs their treatment at the border 
of the nation-state (or regional bloc of states such as the European Union). 
Undoubtedly, the generation and application of immigration and asylum laws, the 
dissemination of technical knowledge by security ‘experts’, the routine activities of 
immigration officials, the degrading and often brutal bureaucratic processes of 
separating privileged ‘insiders’ from unwanted ‘outsiders’, and the sophisticated 
technologies of surveillance and border policing all play a crucial role in this 
problematisation, particularly at a biopolitical level – marking, controlling and 
segregating individual bodies. However, as Gramsci (1971, p.333) explains, a discourse 
is not just a particular attitude held by certain individuals or specific sets of institutions 
but is part of the whole web of ‘social knowledge’ that is woven into the ‘collective 
certainty’ of a society, passed on in the socialisation process and normalised as a self-
evident ‘truth’.  
Once a particular official discourse is in everyday circulation it acquires through 
mass dissemination, constant repetition and implicit self-reference, and through its 
application in the context of a given understanding of the world, the patina of everyday 
commonsense; it becomes hegemonic, with the ability to inhibit the formation and 
dissemination of other explanations of lived reality. (This discursive power, naturally, is 
sourced in other, more material forms of political and economic power.) This process 
produces what Harvey (2005, p.114) describes as a sort of ‘cognitive locking’– the 
inability to think outside the given explanations. A hegemonic discourse, such as the 
44 
 
commonsense understanding of what it means to be a citizen of a specific nation-state, 
is therefore a social discourse  – one of exclusion and separation: the negative 
identification of who is not a citizen. An understanding of how expert knowledge and 
governmental techniques, technologies and activities are entangled in a complex process 
in which they are both driven by and help structure the social environment in which 
those who construct and carry out these policies, procedures and activities are 
immersed, and of how this process relates to the capitalist state’s trajectory, can help 
reveal the systemic compulsions that lie beneath its hegemonic discourses. As Jameson 
(cited in Kunkel, 2010) explains, ‘social life’ is…  
 
…a seamless web, a single inconceivable and transindividual process, 
in which there is no need to invent ways of linking language events 
and social upheavals or economic contradictions because on that level 
they were never separate from one another. (Jameson cited in Kunkel, 
2010, p.13) 
 
Political and institutional discourse, conveying a hegemonic, commonsense 
notion of a unitary identification with the nation-state, is generally conducted in the 
language and form of nationalism. The connection between nationalism and the 
capitalist system (even in its global form) is all-embracing: the system generates 
nationalism as the condition of its continued existence. The value of nationalism to 
politicians and ideologues alike lies partly in the fact that it can be offered as a salve for 
the psychic needs created by the very system it arises from – the alienation generated by 
the form that its economic processes take, and by the complex ways of social being that 
are finely tuned to its profit-driven rhythm of exploitation, is meant to be dissolved 
through a sense of belonging to a ‘national community’. As nationalism is therefore 
embedded within capitalism’s ideological processes, implanted in the web of social 
consciousness, it is linked to, and implies, other narratives, such as security and the 
immanence of existential dangers, which help affirm its state-oriented imagination of 
the world. It is through such narratives that, as Soguk (1999, p.32) says, ‘the specific 
vocabularies, significations and classifications [are developed] through which refugee 
stories are written, circulated and incorporated into images of “normality” ’, and forced 
migrants are attributed specific cultural, political and legal identities as ‘outsiders’, 
posited in opposition to the meanings and identities of national citizens or ‘insiders’. 
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However, because national identities (as ideological creations) are forms of social 
life, historically specific forms of consciousness, the fashioning of identity is itself an 
ongoing socio-historical process, one that is routine and invisible, creating – for the 
most part below the conscious radar – a complex pattern of discourse. What Billig 
(1995, p.6) calls ‘banal nationalism’ is in fact a whole interconnected array of 
‘ideological habits’ which enable the nation-states of Europe, for example, to be daily 
reproduced and continually (re)constructed as core components of a global state system. 
The repetition of the practices, routines and symbols of a familiar social world help 
preserve ‘a collective unconscious memory’; they become ‘second nature’ and as such 
are stitched into a wider commonsense understanding of this world (Ibid., p.42). The 
‘nation’, therefore, could be described as a set of discourses and banal practices that 
help structure perception, thought and experience, and inform political actions. 
Nationalism, the ideological conduit for these ‘habits’ of knowledge, is a 
‘heterogeneous set of “nation”-oriented idioms, practices and possibilities that are 
continually available or “endemic” in modern cultural and political life’ (Brubaker, 
1996, p.10), reifying a conception of nations as real communities and structuring their 
citizens’ frame of perception and interpretation.  
National ‘culture’, as a cognitive structure, is embedded in the everyday narrative 
of social life, and takes on quasi-biological overtones: people appear to be born with a 
cultural identity. This suppresses the reality of the complexities of social being through 
its essentialised understanding of national identity, formed in opposition to the 
essentialised characteristics of those who fall outside the national frame. The national 
citizen (the ‘we’ of banal, day-to-day discourse) inhabits an environment structured by 
the quasi-biological language of nationalism.  ‘We’ are encouraged to see ourselves in a 
distorting mirror through the manufacture of  ‘alien/other’ identities. As Kristeva (1991, 
p.96) says: ‘the only modern, acceptable, clear definition of foreignness’ is that the 
‘foreigner is one who does not belong to the state we are in’. Furthermore, ‘we’ 
represent normality as opposed to ‘their’ deviations from it. 
 
National identity and the ‘disruptive’ forced migrant 
Culture, however, is in reality fluid and flexible, encompassing a multitude of different 
features, and open to contestation and change. It is due to this fatal flaw that 
nationalism’s hegemonic discourse has to be constantly reinforced against competing 
explanations of lived experience: the given nature of the nation-state needs to be 
46 
 
ceaselessly validated and revalidated through physical spectacle, political rhetoric and 
the day-to-day activities of government, precisely because it masks practices that are 
primarily concerned with the maintenance class power. Capitalist globalisation itself, 
with its local cultural and social impacts, unleashes forces that challenge the exclusive 
claims of the nation-state over the images and discourses of these realities of life, but 
such forces simultaneously offer the nation-state new resources in the form of the forced 
migrant. As Soguk (1999, p.15) says, the figure of the forced migrant has ‘paradoxical 
implications for the practices of state sovereignty’: it is ‘both disruptive and 
recuperative’, a ‘problem’ to be addressed and a ‘resource’ to be used ‘in the service of 
the discursive … social and political practices of representation’ that naturalise the 
nation-state.  
The realities of the life of the forced migrant cut across what Soguk (1999, p.54) 
calls ‘the cartographic logic of the territorial state and its privileged sites of identity’, 
and challenge this particular hegemonic discourse. Their very mobility blurs the 
boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, destroys the notion of an impermeable 
barrier between the security of ‘here’ and the apparently dangerous and volatile world 
‘out there’, and threatens to fragment the commonsense partial and disconnected view 
of a world separated into chunks of national territory, chipping away at the national 
narrative. As Appadurai (2006) says: 
 
Their movements threaten the policing of borders. Their financial 
transactions blur the lines between national economies and between 
the legal and the criminal. Their languages exacerbate concern about 
national and cultural coherence … (Appadurai, 2006, p.45) 
 
‘The body of the historically produced minority’ is fashioned into the ‘embodiment of 
fears of the global’ (Ibid., p.47) (cf.: chapter five). Through its insertion into the pattern 
of neoliberal discourse and into the banal narratives of national belonging that underpin 
the commonsense understanding of the world, the figure of the forced migrant can be 
recruited to serve the ideological needs of the core nation-states and regional blocs of 
nation-states even as it threatens to disrupt them. 
 
The forced migrant and the construction of the nation-state 
Although construed as marginal, the figure of the forced migrant is therefore a vital 
component in the process of inclusion and exclusion – that is, in the practice of making 
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and remaking the nation-state and the national citizen. Bhabha (1990) speaks of the 
process of ‘people production’ through ‘narrating the nation’; the citizen is not a natural 
or even self-evident presence but must be repeatedly produced. The nation-state secures 
its coherence – its sovereignty and its right to exist – only insofar as it can successfully 
claim to represent and defend its citizens, its domestic ‘national community’, from 
existential dangers. The daily practices of statecraft must therefore ‘incite popular and 
institutional discourses of problems and dangers … and regiment them in terms that 
privilege a statist imagination of world’ (Soguk, 1999, p.40). The presence of the forced 
migrant is problematised to privilege the national citizen and thus the identity and very 
reality of the nation-state itself. And equally, as citizenship is a shorthand for 
legitimacy, it is only through reference to the nation-state and its national citizens as 
concrete, territorialised identities that the concept of irregular/‘illegal’ migration is 
constructed.  
New forms of exclusion, such as the increasingly frequent denial of a legal 
identity (or any form of identity vis-à-vis the nation-state bar that of ‘illegal alien’) to 
those forced migrants who manage to circumvent the barriers to entry into the core 
European nation-states creates a ‘voiceless’ and stateless figure within the national 
space itself. The very ontology of the nation-state is informed by these insider/outsider, 
citizen/non-citizen dynamics. Citizenship, therefore, embeds, and is in turn driven by, 
the naturalisation of a binary discourse of national belonging versus marginality or 
exclusion. It is precisely through this ideological process that the forced migrant, 
conceived through the logic of exclusionary national identities, becomes open to re-
inscription as the excluded ‘alien’ (cf. chapter four).  
The marginality of the forced migrant within the political and economic global 
system, however, is more than discursive; it is a very concrete marginality, created by 
the forces that first impact on individuals’ lives to such an extent that they are forced 
into flight and then deny them both political subjectivity (a ‘voice’) and the power to 
alter their lives except in extreme and disadvantageous, sometimes lethal, 
circumstances. In the process, forced migrants lose their faces, names and personal 
histories and are subsumed into an anonymous mass, obscuring the fact that, as Soguk 
(1999, p.4) says, there is no ‘intrinsic paradigmatic refugee’ and there is no 
commonality to their experience, save the experience of displacement, as there are as 
many reasons for moving as there are forced migrants. The fact that each forced migrant 
has an individual story, formed in particular circumstances, was to a certain extent 
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recognised by the terms of the Refugee Convention of 1951, in which the individual 
circumstances of the asylum seeker was laid down as the litmus test for national 
decisions over granting refugee status. Until the end of the 1990s and the inception of 
the war on terror, lip service was still paid to the Convention. However, by the time the 
war on terror was made manifest in a security regime that included the ‘rendition’ of 
putative ‘Islamic terrorists’ (many of whom were forced migrants) to regimes of torture 
and terror, or their deportation back to the dangerous situations they had originally fled, 
it had already been hollowed out by the declarations of European politicians that it was 
‘outdated’xix, and all but abandoned in practice.  
Soguk (1999) points out, however, that the Convention itself was part of an 
international regime of ‘refugee problematisation’, linked to a fundamentally territorial 
definition of the world as a jigsaw of nation-states with inviolable geographical 
boundaries, whereby the displaced were recast as ‘refugees’ to be regimented and 
contained. The ‘true’ were separated out from the ‘false’ refugees according to the 
Convention’s definition. However, within these restrictive terms, it did offer a certain 
practical, legal security to those that it deemed to fall within its definition (for example, 
the ban on ‘refoulement’ or forcible return to a country of danger, as well as a path to 
the relative security of some form of legal ‘belonging’ to a powerful and ordered 
Western nation-state). This particular international refugee definition, however, has 
been, for the most part, fundamentally transformed both on the ground and in official 
policy statements, in line with the changing needs of the global state system. National 
and regional asylum regimes are becoming increasingly, and overwhelmingly, driven by 
a global discourse of national and international security (cf. chapter five). 
These changes to asylum and immigration regimes have to be viewed in a wider 
historical perspective. Soguk (1999, p.51) believes that the various discourses of the 
refugee or forced migrant as the ‘alien’/‘outsider’ are a ‘permanent fixture of statecraft’: 
‘refugees come and go but refugee regimentations remain constant’. However, specific 
accounts of the forced migrant in circulation at a specific time acquire a self-referential 
power that allows for their widespread dissemination and acceptance, and these 
accounts structure both much of the policy-driven academic analysis of forced 
migration and the official responses imposed on the ‘fluidity of a thousand faces’. 
Today, current problematisions of the forced migrant are instrumental to the 
rearticulation of state-oriented notions of national and international security, leading to 
an overall ‘securitisation of asylum’ (cf. Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2006; Squire 2009).  
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The figure of the forced migrant is therefore a politically produced figure: the 
‘voicelessness’ and marginality that Malkki (1996) speaks of is the effect of a discourse 
that first effaces the forced migrant by evacuating their complex experiences of any 
political content, and then reconstructs them as a figure solely defined by the 
vocabulary and imagery of securitisation. They become the ideological prism through 
which the ‘reality’ of the nation-state – its internal coherence and identity – is reflected. 
This enforced and constructed marginality, therefore, is a vitally productive resource: 
the marginal has become a central feature in the constant work of (re)validating and 
(re)constructing the nation-state. 
 
 
European nationalism, citizenship, and the ‘illegalisation’ of the forced migrant 
The creation of a European ‘national’ identity 
As the nation-state is moulded into new shapes by global capitalism’s processes of 
transformation, the definition of the forced migrant as the ‘outsider’/‘alien’ at the border 
has also become increasingly functional to the development of a ‘European identity’ at a 
time when it appears more fractured than ever. As the core European nation-states face 
the effects of the current widespread economic crisis, the capitalist elite and its political 
ideologues strive to obscure the historical, transitory nature of the capitalist system and 
its systemic tendency to crisis by turning to an increased reliance on the timeless and 
habitual categories of nationalism. Despite the obvious contradictions in a regional 
cluster of nation-states adopting a strategy tailored to the individual nation-state itself, 
the nationalist template is employed by political ideologues in the attempt to invest 
‘Europe’ (a region riven by inequalities and competing capitals) with an emotional 
legitimacy – a ‘felt’ understanding of its populations of themselves as ‘European’. This 
entails its daily reproduction through multiple acts of exclusion and marginalisation. 
The formation of the European Union as a regional alliance of nation-states has 
been driven by certain identities of interest among its nationally based capitals – the 
desire for mutually supportive economic growth in order to compete successfully on the 
global economic stage, partially through the introduction of neoliberal policies into its 
constituent national economies under the disciplinary tutelage of an unaccountable 
European Central Bank. The pressures of the globalised financial markets and the 
emergence of new, globally competitive economic powers, such as China and India, 
have continued to focus sections of the region’s elite on the need for Europe to evolve 
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into a quasi-territorial unit. However, despite these external pressures, the recent 
financial and economic crisis has exposed the reality of its increasingly amorphous and 
incoherent character. The crisis has, instead, illustrated the importance of the nation-
state. Only the nation-state has the democratic authority to tax, borrow and spend, and it 
is the nation-states that have been crucial so far to preventing financial and economic 
crisis sucking the world into a global 1930s-style depression. The European Union, by 
comparison, has limited fiscal powers, and this is connected to its fundamental lack of 
any genuine democratic or popular legitimacy or moral authority. It is, therefore, an 
elite-driven project, but one far from the vision of an all-encompassing federal unity. 
The pressing need of many of its national capitals for a European ‘superstate’, and its 
reality as a conflicted, hierarchical entity, highlight the inherent contradictions lying at 
the heart of the European project. 
Even the global forces that underlie the move towards regionality simultaneously 
undermine it: uneven capital and labour flows between the nation-states lead to uneven 
development; competitive international pressures generated by the global economic 
system have helped forge a hierarchy of nation-states within the regional bloc, 
undermining political coherence; local class struggles can threaten to spread across the 
region with greater velocity; and global financial and economic crisis, which 
differentially affects its constituent nation-states, has precipitated dissension amongst 
the various national political elites as to how best prevent its European ramifications 
from undermining their legitimacy with their own populations. In fact, disputes about 
state spending were already rife throughout Europe before the onset of crisis, with 
increasing friction between the wealthy centres and their national hinterlands. What 
Traynor (2007) calls ‘the rich peoples’ rebellion’ spread to a pan-European level as the 
expansion of the European Union from fifteen states to twenty-seven widened 
disparities in wealth. With the European Union now comprising over 500 million 
people, the wealth gap is greater than ever, with the richest corner (inner London) 
generating over three times the wealth of the EU national average, in comparison to 
north-eastern Romania, which produces barely a quarter (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the crisis in 
the Eurozone itself (with the potential for national default fanning out among the 
weaker economies) has impelled a centralised ‘rescue plan’, under the pressure of the 
global stockmarkets, entailing draconian European Union-imposed austerity measures – 
bringing in its train the potential for the spread of social unrest throughout the region. 
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The European Union, as a regional alliance, has become just as fractured and riven with 
conflicts as its component states. 
Europe, therefore, faces an even deeper crisis of representation than its individual 
member nation-states. The coherence of the European Union partially rests on its ability 
to legitimise its existence among its various groups of national citizens, who are divided 
by the chronically unequal effects of neoliberal policies – exacerbated by the current 
crisis-driven implementation of austerity programmes – and the ongoing (re)validation 
of competing national narratives. The idea of ‘European-ness’ is generally regarded by 
many as an abstraction of dubious authenticity and appears to carry little in the way of a 
coherent social, cultural and historical narrative. Therefore, the political ideologues of 
the European Union have turned to what Anderson (1983, p.175) calls the tried-and-
tested ‘political-biographical narrative of the realm’, enlarged to encompass the idea of 
a European identity. The nation-state’s initial formation out of vast ‘polyglot’ empires 
entailed the engineering of profound changes of consciousness through the construction 
of ‘a narrative of identity’ (Ibid.). Equally, crisis today calls forth a frenzied reiteration 
of national narratives – a sort of ‘hyper-nationalism’ – but this time placed within the 
global context of a naked redistribution of privilege and deprivation, of wealth and 
poverty, of power and impotence, in a word: ‘glocalisation’. One result is that the 
process of reconstructing discourses of both European and national belonging (with 
their narratives of inclusion and exclusion) must be constantly recalibrated at an even 
higher pitch. 
As a part of this ‘hyper-nationalism’, the region’s internal conflicts and divisions 
have been translated into a discourse of opposition between the concepts of ‘cultural 
unity’ and ‘cultural heterogeneity’ – what Balibar (2004, p.12) calls, ‘code for the idea 
that, on the margins, “European” cultures are permeated and overlap with “non-
European” influences, which could [place] obstacle[s in the way of] the process of the 
“Europeanisation of Europe” ’. The reality of Europe, however, is of a region within 
which languages, religions and cultures coexist and mix. As Balibar insists, Europe as a 
region is a ‘series of assembled peripheries’ – ‘each region of Europe is made of 
overlapping peripheries, each of them open to influences from other parts of Europe and 
from the whole world’ – so the nature of a unified ‘Europe’ can only be one of 
constructed identities (Ibid., p.12). It is this further contradiction inherent in the 
European project that helps bring to the fore the multiple other fractures and 
contradictions that threaten to expose the ideological nature of its drive to a European 
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identity. This propels the sense of urgency behind the incessant (re)construction of a 
commonsense supranational narrative through daily rituals of inclusion and exclusion: 
the making of citizens through the creation of ‘aliens’. 
 
European citizenship and the ‘illegal alien’ 
The construction of a European identity manifest in a European citizenship, however, is 
in many ways problematic: as it can only be created through nationalist tropes, it can 
also militate against a commonsense perception of cultural unity. As Dauvergne (2007, 
p.506) says, each move to make supranational European citizenship more meaningful 
inscribes increased sovereign power to the states: thus, ‘formal citizenship … sheds its 
geographies while shoring up the embattled sovereignty of nations beleaguered by the 
onslaught of globalisation’. European citizenship is derivative: no-one is solely a citizen 
of the European Union as European identity is based on citizenship of one of its 
constituent nation-states. The European member states are the ‘gatekeepers’ to 
citizenship of the entire European Union (Ibid., p.504). While these contradictory 
elements of a European identity come to the fore in the figure of the privileged 
citizen/‘insider’, the non-citizen (most particularly the stateless individual dwelling 
within the European borders), whose designation as the ‘alien’/‘outsider’ is marshalled 
to endow European citizenship with a more unified identity, is conjured up as a coherent 
global presence.  
Thus it appears that as European citizenship is becoming more flexible (more 
nation-states now tolerate dual citizenship and the requirements for citizenship are 
increasingly less onerous), for those already outside the narrative of national belonging, 
citizenship law is becoming increasingly exclusionary (cf. Dauvergne, 2007). In 
combination with the erosion of jus soli (citizenship by virtue of birth within the 
territory of the nation-state), many nation-states are emphasising citizenship’s link to a 
hereditary ethnic ‘national community’ with the unspoken reassertion of jus sanguinis 
(citizenship by ‘blood’, that is, through the possession of an ancestor of that 
nationality). This, as Dauvergne (2007, p.507) shows, means ‘illegal’ status, and all the 
deprivations and injustices this entails, will be passed down the generations – ‘children 
may inherit a status of legal transgressor at birth’. It allows a migration of 
inclusion/exclusion away from the national/regional border and into the heart of Europe 
itself by labelling part of Europe’s population as ‘illegal’ and ontologically ‘alien’, 
complementing the shift of border policing far beyond the physical borders into other 
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countries and regions as part of an increasingly unified global migration/security regime 
(cf. chapters three and five). 
Underlying the emergence of the European citizen as a new historic figure lies the 
introduction of what Balibar (2004) calls the concept of ‘security-identity’:  
 
The material constitution of Europe … oscillates … between … a 
violent process of exclusion whose main instrument … is the quasi-
military enforcement of ‘security borders’, which recreates the figure 
of the stranger as political enemy, pushing the European construction 
… into the language of culture wars and clashes of civilisations, … 
[and] a ‘civil’ process of elaboration of differences, which involves … 
issues concerning … Europe’s ‘identity’ and ‘community’. (Balibar, 
2004, p.14, italics in original) 
 
This shows the complexity of the multiple activities that go into problematisations of 
the forced migrant. The encoded signifier in this discourse is ‘cultural compatibility’. 
The dissemination of a sense that the national identity in Europe (and its ‘inherently’ 
democratic values) is under siege from the ‘alien’ values of non-European ‘outsiders’, 
most especially ‘outsiders’ from Muslim cultures, entails taking the necessary measures 
to secure its survival. Hence, the extraordinary rigour with which the nature of the 
regional borders is reinforced through enhanced exclusionary activities, accompanied 
by a banal discourse of cultural difference (in effect, a coded racialised discourse) (cf. 
chapter four).  
The European Union’s securitised asylum and immigration process helps validate 
a belief in the integrity of its external borders as boundary and defence of an essential, 
specifically European national identity. Its legal and administrative policies, 
administrative measures, surveillance technologies, border policing, publicised 
deportation statistics and ever-expanding estate of detention centres disseminates an 
ideological narrative in which ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ attempting to enter Europe 
‘illegally’ constitute a grave threat to ‘national security’. This is particularly so when, in 
economically straitened times, each nation-state within the regional bloc needs to secure 
its role as a guarantor that much-reduced (and, in some cases, near-non-existent) public 
services and increasingly marginal opportunities for employment will only be granted to 
those who are included within its definition of ‘the nation’ (or even within ‘the 
European nation’, although this is a conception that reveals its own contradictions when 
hostility is directed towards migrants to the wealthier economies from the poorer 
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European nation-states). Such harsh ‘security’ measures are justified by criminalising 
the presence of the forced migrant, labelling their very existence as ‘illegal’. This helps 
feed the creation of a normative European identity that recognises itself as a rational, 
moral, universal exemplar, applicable to all humanity. Beneath the image of a besieged 
‘Fortress Europe’, therefore, lies the projection of normatively hegemonic Europe (cf. 
Loshitzky, 2006).  
 
 
The manufacture of the ‘global alien’ 
Nationalism and globalisation 
Neoliberal globalisation is the site for the work of this national/regional 
(re)construction. Capitalism’s socio-economic order is intelligible only in global terms, 
even as it continues to take the shape of the nation-state/regional bloc of nation-states. 
As Meszaros (1989, p.40) says, ‘[I]ts operative model [as a system of nation-states] is 
imposed by the capitalist [system] itself’, under the strictures of intense competition. Its 
ideological narrative, however, must be continually refined and restructured to mirror 
the constant systemic changes within global capitalism and the local manifestation of 
these changes within society. This narrative must attempt to reconcile the contradictions 
arising from the fact that, despite the increasing global integration of the financial and 
economic system, there is no mechanism of global governance; instead there is only a 
system of nation-states (and regional blocs of states) locked into an interdependent but 
competitive and frequently antagonistic relationship. In less turbulent times these 
contradictions are more easily hidden, folded into the system’s structural crevices, but 
under the spotlight of crisis, the key nation-states that represent the local sources of 
global wealth and power must ideologically negotiate their global context. As they do 
so, they turn those individuals displaced by the processes of global capitalism into a 
rhetorical ‘global enemy’. Paradoxically, the ideological mobilisations used to form this 
global figure can only be those of nationalism, with its legitimising and hegemonic 
discourses of inclusion/exclusion.  
However, nationalism itself already incorporates what appears be its opposing 
concept: internationalism/globalisation. As it uses the syntax of hegemony it can come 
to be perceived (in the Western nations) as an ‘identity of identities’, representing 
universal, ‘civilisational’ values. At the same time, a ‘nation-state’ is also a comparative 
concept: no one nation-state’s history makes sense except in a global optic. 
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Nationalism, despite its provenance as the ideological expression of the nation-state, is 
also an international narrative, carrying the universal codes of ‘nationhood’ and 
‘citizenship’; it assumes a global context as it implies an overarching global order of 
nation-states, and a world made up of ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’, of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’.  
The central paradox the nation-state faces in a global system is that it is 
confronted with the need to assert new forms of legitimacy: global economic and 
political interests, not to mention those of an increasingly global working class, are 
often in contradiction with those of the nation-state, so its sources of legitimation are 
increasingly grounded in the assertion of its control of its populations, and of their 
defence against existential ‘threats’. The local beneficiaries and political managers of 
global capitalism, therefore, use the most vulnerable (and seemingly disposable) objects 
of its economic regime to construct a discourse that naturalises the figure of the forced 
migrant as a threat, not only to their specific nation-states, but one that is 
simultaneously immanent throughout the (Western) heartlands of capitalism (cf. chapter 
five). The figure of the forced migrant is made to stand as a global representative of 
menace, conveying an alien world ‘out there’, one portrayed as a kind of alien, 
backward hinterland, the site of anarchic wars, violence, terrorism and scarcity (cf. 
Kaplan, 1994).  
The underlying content of Kaplan’s 1994 article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (later 
published as a book), subtitled ‘How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and 
disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’, was and continues to be 
influential in security and policy circles in both the US and Europe – alongside 
Huntington’s theses (1998, 2004) – and this is reflected in recent policy discourses. Carr 
(2010, p.13) describes how a new genre of dystopian military/security futurology has 
emerged that sees threats to the European (or more widely, Western) way of life as 
emanating ‘not only from rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, but 
also from … conflicts over dwindling resources, migration, disease, organised crime, 
abrupt climate change and the emergence of “failed cities” where social disorder is rife’. 
The idea of an ‘arc of instability’ from North Africa to South-East Asia which threatens 
to disintegrate into an ‘arc of chaos’, precipitating the ‘collapse of governing authority, 
migrations, societal collapse and social disorder’ (Ibid, p.19), has generated an emphasis 
on ‘asymmetric’ warfare across what is increasingly portrayed in military terms as the 
‘global battlespace’. And as asylum policy has now become expressed almost solely in 
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terms of security, this discourse has infected the way the figure of the forced migrant is 
constructed. Kaplan (1994), indeed, portrays the forced migrant as carrying the ‘virus’ 
of this anarchic world to the very borders, and even into the heart, of the core (Western) 
nation-states:  
 
[A]s refugee flows increase … national borders will mean less … the 
real borders are the most tangible and intractable ones: those of 
culture and tribe. …. Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash 
official borders, bringing their passions with them, meaning that 
Europe and the United States will be weakened by cultural disputes. 
(Kaplan, 2004, p.7). 
 
 
The contradictions of globalisation 
It is not surprising then that at a time of financial, economic, social and potentially 
ideological crisis the forced migrant faces a climate of intensified nationalism, with its 
exclusionary racialised categories. But such a conjectural crisis also highlights sharp 
contradictions in rhetoric and practice. For example, the existence of the need for the 
‘global illegal’ as a key ideological resource, once mobilised, calls into being the 
rhetoric, policies, administrative structures, technologies, personnel and powerful 
industrial interests that cohere around ‘internal security’ and border control, and endows 
them with a self-generating momentum. This cluster of practices and technologies 
constitute a part of the everyday discourse of forced migration/security. However, this 
discourse must operate alongside a less visible appetite for irregular migrants as an 
essential (and desirable because disposable) economic resource that, to be economically 
viable, has to be kept in a state of ‘deportability’ (cf. Bacon 2010; de Genova 2009) 
through not only the rhetoric of security, but also the selective use of draconian asylum 
and immigration policies – selective because, as national employers must also be able 
access this resource, individual forced migrants/irregular migrants must also be able to 
circumvent the border controls of the ‘migration management’ regime.  
The tensions these parallel necessities generate are evident in the treatment of 
irregular or ‘illegal’ forced migrants. On the one hand, national discourses and practices 
represent forced migrants as ‘illegitimate outsiders’ – each time a forced migrant is 
incarcerated and deported, this reinforces the account of national belonging from which 
the state gains its legitimacy. However, the neoliberal policy environment in which this 
discourse takes place presents a very different picture: one of the main purposes of the 
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nation-state is to facilitate the global regime of capital accumulation, and the 
management of the global flow of a highly exploitable irregular workforce is part of this 
function. ‘Illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular migrants) work in key centres of the 
global economy (cf. Anderson and Rogaly, 2005; Andreas and Synder, 2000; 
Bhattacharyya, 2005; Shelley, 2007; Sassen, 2003). They are therefore incorporated into 
the political community as economic participants but endowed with the status of ‘global 
outsiders’. Their creation (due to a structural demand for cheap migrant labour and the 
growth of a transnational industry in clandestine migration, driven by an increasingly 
militarised policing of the border, which compels forced migrants to enter nation-states 
‘illegally’) shows how the core national governments are continually forced to make 
political compromises and risk contradiction with their nationalist security rhetoric in 
order to sustain their economic legitimacy. 
The processes of capitalist globalisation, therefore, set in train movements of 
peoples across cultural and national boundaries into the vast global cities of the central 
regions of global capitalism, where multiple allegiances and modes of identity threaten 
to unravel the nationalist narrative. The global context that nation-states are forced to 
operate in brings into being multiple dimensions of belonging. To neutralise the impact 
of this, the carriers of these potentially alternative identities and modes of belonging are 
then ideologically mobilised for national political purposes. The concepts of ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ are constructed in new ways: ‘illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular 
migrants) are policed as ‘outsiders’ even though they are economically incorporated 
through informal labour markets. As McNevin (2006, p.136) notes, ‘Their ambiguous 
position reflects the incorporation of states and individuals into the global political 
economy and its patterns of privilege and marginalisation’.  
Simultaneously, particularly at times of economic and social stress, the discourse 
of national identity intensifies, as national politicians and ideologues strive to recoup a 
comprehensive explanation that can anchor inequality (as the natural outcome of living 
in a globalised environment) into the day-to-day running of their national systems (cf. 
chapter four). This carries with it a resurgence of symbolic struggles around racialised 
classifications, assuming the cloak of variations on the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse 
that translate nationalism into a global phenomenon. Those excluded from the narrative 
of ‘national belonging’ are criminalised by means of the nationalist tropes of 
inclusion/exclusion but in fundamentally global terms, universally cast outside the law, 
regardless of which nation they enter or try to enter.  As Dauvergne (2004) shows, the 
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‘migration law-national identity’ relationship has evolved, creating the novel concept of 
the forced migrant as somehow being ‘illegal’ and the increasingly ubiquitous use of the 
term “illegal” as an identity: 
 
The migration law-national identity coupling is not new… [However], 
what is emerging at the outset of the 21st century in response to the 
growing forces of globalisation is a new twist on this relationship, the 
nub of which is encapsulated by the idea of people ‘being illegal’. 
(Dauvergne, 2004, p.87) 
  
Forced migrants, who are compelled to cross the borders of the rich economies through 
the now-criminalised circuits of migration, are endowed with this identity, as though the 
term ‘illegal’ has ‘a fixed meaning’ and is not simply ‘an adjectival description’. ‘The 
label ‘illegal’ is empty of content: illegals are transgressors, and nothing else, by 
definition’ (Ibid., p.87). The legal understanding and identity of the refugee/forced 
migrant has been increasingly subsumed by that of the ‘illegal’. This process helps 
engineer a global understanding of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The relentless spread of global capitalism has fashioned, on the one hand, a new global 
elite, citizens with global entitlements, including the unconditional freedom to move 
around the world (‘global insiders’), and on the other, its extreme mirror image: 
stateless ‘global outsiders’, whose movements are condemned as ‘illegal’ and 
threatening. As the entitlements of citizenship of these nation-states become 
increasingly standardised, the exclusions of illegal status are equally homogenised and 
universalised. Their presence (as an army of super-exploitable ‘illegal workers’) within 
the borders of the core European nation-states, crucial regional nodes of global 
capitalism, is rhetorically magnified and condemned. This identity of ‘illegal’ creates 
the figure of the forced migrant as a blank slate onto which can be inscribed whatever 
image of threat is required by the political exigencies of the nation-state/regional bloc of 
states. The use of the rhetoric of a ‘global enemy’, manufactured out of national legal 
terms (national citizens versus ‘illegal migrants’) is invested with a global menace 
(from drugs and transnational crime to terrorism and ‘illegal’ migration). The idea of a 
global threat from beyond national borders displaces the responsibility for systemic 
failures and crises onto those carrying its visible marks; individuals forced to flee the 
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consequences of violence and wrecked or dismembered national economies are branded 
as the ‘global enemy’, ‘global alien’, ‘global illegal’ – with the forced migrant portrayed 
as the carrier of ubiquitous, global threats to national identity and cultural integrity, and 
to national and international security.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Europe’s Global Borders: the Site of the Production of the ‘Global Alien’  
 
Introduction 
Some of the most crucial activities that create, define and maintain the nation-state take 
place at its borders: here its ideology is born and its discourses normalised; here, as 
Anderson (1991 [1983]) so cogently argued, an abstraction traced on a map is 
‘imagined’ as a concrete symbol of internal coherence and identity; and it is here that, 
driven by its own exclusionary logic (and the contradictions this brings to an avowedly 
‘autonomous’ entity that is simultaneously a conduit for the global economy), the 
nation-state begins to mutate into a ‘security state’. It is at the borders of such powerful 
loci of globalisation as the European Union that we find the work of constructing and 
reconstructing, through a complex array of physical, discursive and biopolitical 
instruments, a national and racial discourse that assigns the forced migrant an identity 
that is inherently and ubiquitously ‘alien’. The forced migrant has been progressively 
transformed from ‘refugee’, the object of a discourse of human rights, into criminalised 
‘economic migrant’ and transgressive border-crosser, and from thence into a racialised 
global threat to national/international security. Their deterrence and control appears to 
have become the primary rationale of a common European immigration and asylum 
regime that is based upon practices that rationalise and normalise these identities, 
embedding them in social consciousness. Such policies, practices and technologies are 
both driven by and help produce, naturalise and augment a commonsense perception of 
the inherent alterity of the forced migrant. The relationship between the concrete and 
the abstract, between governmental policies and activities and their normative 
discourses, manifest in the production of the ‘global alien’, is therefore at its most 
visible at the border. 
As national security within the European bloc of nation-states has become 
informed by racial categorisations (most notably in relation to ‘Islamic’ terrorism, and 
by inference to all Muslim communities outside and inside Europe), the ‘politics of 
fear’ is woven into the very conception of the border (cf. chapters four and five). Those 
forced migrants driven to cross into the territory it demarcates, but lacking the 
appropriate privileged national identity that will allow them unproblematic access, are 
marked as inherently transgressive and dangerous, a threat to social stability and 
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security. European immigration and asylum policies have consequently been securitised 
and realigned as a form of deterrent ‘border policing’, informed by racialised themes of 
‘national security’ and avowedly targeted at the detection, detention and deportation of 
the ‘illegal migrant’. As national border policies have increasingly become articulations 
of a wider system of ‘global migration control’, they have endowed the ‘illegal alien’ 
with a threatening global identity. Thus, the border has become a normative instrument 
that assigns a given identity to the forced migrant.  
However, the border itself is also effectively summoned into being by the 
supposedly inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it ‘illegally’. With 
the help of the latest biometric and surveillance border technology, dedicated to tracking 
the ‘illegal’ forced migrant throughout global space, the ‘illegalised’ forced migrant is 
inscribed with the border and carries it within them as an immutable part of their 
identity wherever they may go. In turn, I argue, an exclusionary sense of ‘European-
ness’ is manufactured through its binary opposition to the forced migrant as the 
paradigmatic ‘illegal alien’. European identity is, in this sense, delivered through 
coercive, securitised asylum and immigration discourses and practices, and is born at 
the border. 
 
 
Alternative ways of analysing the border 
The border: reality or spectacle? 
The national border is traditionally the site where the sovereignty of the nation and the 
security of its citizens, and their ability to continue to enjoy their national political and 
social rights, is assured. However, as its operations increasingly take place within the 
context of the uneven processes of economic and financial globalisation, Europe’s 
external border no longer appears to be a defence against incursions by other nation-
states but more a bulwark against the global movements of the dispossessed and 
displaced. Yet even as its remit changes, the national border remains a synecdoche for 
the security and integrity of the ‘nation’. As Favell (2008, p.275) says, the nation-state 
remains ‘the world’s great disciplining device’; autonomous migration across its 
borders is regarded as ‘one of the key anomalies in a world divided up into more or less 
fixed population containers, which is why the state politically takes its challenges so 
seriously’.  
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The border, however, claims to demarcate and defend the ‘inside’ from the 
‘outside’ at a time when such distinctions seem increasingly tenuous, in a world where 
interior and exterior – and legal and illegal practices – are not so easily separable (cf. 
chapter two). Such contradictions are especially critical in Balibar’s (2004) ‘borderland 
Europe’ of overlapping, open regions. National border policies can often appear to be 
little more than the performance of a security response, aimed at deflecting the danger 
of internal social and political unrest – caused by the impoverishment and radical 
inequality entrenched by neoliberal policies – by turning the focus onto external 
‘threats’. As such, they appear to function as a crucial discursive barrier, helping create 
a besieged sense of national belonging and integrity constantly under threat from 
‘without’.  
However, the application of border policies or ‘border policing’ as a mode of 
separation of those who belong from those who do not in (implicitly racialised) 
nationalist terms holds a very concrete force. The discursive and rhetorical border is 
wedded to an underlying material structure of exclusion and control, and this 
relationship can be usefully analysed in biopolitical terms. Indeed, the border has been 
problematised as both a political spectacle (Boal et al., 2005) and, through the extension 
and elaboration of Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’, as a concentration of biopolitical 
techniques and governmental security activities fashioned to control and discipline 
global migratory movements (cf. Agamben, 1994, 1998, 2004; Aradau, 2008; Bigo, 
2002, 2008; Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; de Genova, 2007, 2008, 2010).  
 
The discourse of spatiality and the ‘biopolitical border’ 
A further contradiction is exposed when we attempt to map the border according to 
where these mechanisms of migration control are deployed. The European Union’s 
external border stretches much further than its geographical confines: it is policed far 
into other continents (at ports, airports, embassies, detention centres and camps, and 
through the co-option of ‘countries of transit’ and countries of ‘migrant-producing 
regions’ as Europe’s ‘immigration police’ (cf. Kundnani, 2007)); into the seas around 
Southern Europe (policed by joint naval patrols); and even into global cyberspace, with 
the concept of European ‘e-borders’ (cf. chapter five). The European Union’s external 
border appears to have become a crucial link in a global ‘cordon sanitaire’ thrown 
around a core of rich capitalist states, guarding against the internationally mobile 
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‘illegal migrant’/‘illegal alien’ as part of the global management of market-driven 
forced migration.  
To begin to understand the nature of the border, therefore, and its relationship to 
both the nation-state and the global economy of which the nation-state is a constituent 
part, it is crucial – following in the steps of Massey (2007) – to question the dominant 
interpretation of the concept of spatiality and analyse how this is related to the 
neoliberal ideology that prevails throughout most of Europe. In so doing, we can widen 
the scope of research into what the border represents. The definition of the nation-state 
was only possible through the creation of borders: their territorialisation of space was 
the precondition for the emergence of modern nationalist politics. As a fundamental 
prerequisite for the nation-state, the concept of the border as a spatial marker has 
become normalised through the dominant understanding of a territorial geography that 
helps obscure the historically specific political and administrative processes that help 
create and maintain it. The border continues to appear as natural and self-evident even 
as it becomes dislocated from its territorial base.  
When attempting to unsettle this spatial naturalisation, the interdisciplinary 
attention given to the discursive biopolitical aspects of the activity of ‘bordering’ 
(marking boundaries of inclusion and exclusion onto the very persons of its subjects 
through a conception of identity that is bound up with national culture and race) can 
prove an invaluable key to deconstructing the concept of the border and thus to 
investigating the origins of the figure of the ‘global illegal’ – an identity that, 
counterintuitively, owes its life to the idea of the national border. As Soguk (1999, 
p.225) emphasises, the discourse presenting individuals as an ‘alien’ threat to national 
security is not a marginal, subsidiary one but a primary ‘boundary-producing’ discourse, 
instrumental to the task of ‘producing and stabilising’ the boundaries of sovereign 
statehood and citizenship. In order to present the dominant idea of the nation as if it 
were ‘an inherent, timeless attribute of humanity’ (Ibid., p.186), the figure of the forced 
migrant is crafted through complex sets of narratives and practices to become an 
essential element in the construction of ‘identity walls’ that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’, 
citizen from non-citizen, and security from danger. As Soguk (1999, p.219) says, ‘[T]he 
“writing” of the notion of territorially bounded space’ is made possible by the 
representation of those excluded from this space as threats to the culture, identity, 
economic security and even bodily safety of those included within it, and this makes 
possible ‘the “writing” of a community of citizens…as the perceptual infrastructure of 
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the modern state’ (Ibid.: p.219). It is at the border that the ‘excluded’/‘alien’ is 
ceaselessly (re)produced and the ‘intrinsic’ attributes of this endowed identity grafted 
onto individuals as if they were an inherent part of their being. The conditions of this 
imposed identity are then experienced as social realities, with all the devastating 
consequences this entails for the individuals concerned. Bearing the mark of exclusion 
within them, the forced migrant becomes the literal embodiment of the border. 
 
The border as site of a global racial definition 
The line drawn between the ‘included’ and the ‘excluded’ at the border, however, has 
shifted over the last decade to embrace a far wider global division. This is due in part to 
the global economic system’s competitive nature, driving nation-states to cohere into 
larger regional blocs (cf. chapter two). The European Union’s border has continued to 
increase its scope since its inception, embracing more of Europe’s populations within its 
definition of European citizenship. This entails that the exclusion of the ‘other’, non-
European, against which this image of Europe as a regional unity is measured, must 
similarly increase. Here Said’s (1991 [1978], p. 207) description of the discursive 
practices of Orientalism is equally applicable to the processes (enacted at the enlarged 
border) by which this globalised figure of the ‘alien’ is manufactured: ‘[They] are rarely 
seen or looked at; they are seen through; analysed not as citizens or even people but as 
problems to be confined… The point is that [their] very designation … involved an 
already pronounced evaluative judgement … [and] an implicit programme of action’.  
Through the border policies and practices of categorisation, segregation, 
incarceration and expulsion, the construction of the forced migrant as ‘illegal alien’ is 
ceaselessly reinvigorated on a global scale. While impediments to the free movement of 
commercial and finance capital and those who control or benefit from these processes 
melt away, other barriers are created or retrenched, imprisoning behind them those who 
inhabit an unacknowledged zone of exile from, and within, the nodes of global wealth-
creation and power. These barriers demarcate what Davis (2006, p.138) calls ‘two 
existential humanities’ – global insiders and outsiders, the included and the excluded. 
The forced migrant, dispossessed and displaced by the processes of globalisation, 
is inscribed with the image of the imagined global ‘outsider’. Fekete (2009, p.19) 
maintains that a ‘xeno-racism’xx infuses the biopolitical activities and practices that turn 
the forced migrant into the paradigmatic ‘illegal alien’ – practices that are redolent of all 
racialisation processes: homogenisation, dehumanisation, segregation and exclusion. He 
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detects the origins of xeno-racism in the point where the tropes of racism, ethnicism and 
nationalism meet and are reinvigorated by translating economic disparities and social 
antagonisms into the language of culture wars (Ibid.). Xeno-racism is first and foremost 
directed against the forced migrant. As such, it is a crucial element of what has been 
defined as the ‘new racism’ (cf. Balibar, 1991a; Goldberg, 2002; Kundnani, 2007; 
Seymour, 2010), where culture (most recently entangled with religion) takes the place 
of a discredited biological discourse, helping annul the charge of institutional racism by 
implicitly recruiting its techniques into the service of an apparently logical and ‘race-
free’ anti-immigration discourse (and also more recently and specifically an anti-
Muslim discourse), framed by commonsense nationalist tropes (as further discussed in 
chapter four). The national/European border, therefore, has become the site of a global 
racial definition; it is where the ‘global alien’ is produced and endowed with universal, 
intrinsic, homogenised qualities by a racialised discourse. Meanwhile, the transgressive 
border-crosser is discursively linked to international criminal networks (through the 
processes of human trafficking/smuggling) and, particularly if they come from Muslim-
majority countries, to a globally extensive ‘Islamic terrorism’. The rhetoric of 
racialisation, which assumes the character of universality, is complicit in the creation of 
national fears of the ‘outsider’ at the border, exploiting a popular xenophobia – often 
referred to as an inherently human phenomenon and therefore more excusable than 
racism (cf. chapter four).  
 
 
Physical and spatial borders: the geography of exclusion 
Geographical imaginaries 
The formal physical structures of national borders and their attendant national security 
policies represent a politics that is framed by a territorial imagination. The border is 
associated with closure, cultural unity, and the evocation of external enemies; it 
becomes a representation of the commonsense assumption that the world is by nature 
divided into sometimes antagonistic, always ‘different’, states and regions. As Massey 
(2007) says, this represents… 
 
…an almost moral geography, imagining regions and countries as 
autonomous entities [and] … constructing coherent place identities to cover 
over [internal] conflicting interests … These are the unequal binary 
geographies of self and other, us and them. … Lying behind [these] political 
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mobilisations … are more general geographical imaginations and implicit 
conceptualisations of space [that are] part of a wider world-view in which 
identities are autonomous, pre-formed before they come into relation with 
each other. (Massey, 2007, p.20)  
 
Geographical imaginations are most often implicit, seemingly self-evident, and 
undetected as one of the framing assumptions of our perception of the world. They are 
integral to ‘everyday’ understandings and help legitimate political activities, lying 
buried in the most mundane governmental activities. Territorialised space is construed 
as flat, almost one-dimensional, and this enables the inhabitants of certain parcels of this 
geographic space to be privileged in such a way that other individuals, such as forced 
migrants, who fall outside the territorial frame, can be designated as peripheral or 
threatening to the territorial order.  
Massey (2007, p.23) argues that by obscuring the fact that space is ‘relational’, a 
more complex and dialectical understanding of the interdependence of and interaction 
between peoples and between their cultures, histories and economic activities is erased: 
‘…the contemporaneous multiplicities of space are denied, and “history” is reduced to 
the singular linearity of “there is no alternative’’ ’. The geography of the world is 
projected through a prism that strives to entrench this disconnect in social consciousness 
and to further obscure the intimate connections between economics and politics, and 
between inequality, class and power. Space itself, therefore, is inscribed with political 
meaning: freedom of movement across the territorialised space of the globe is crucial to 
the ability of those who lack power or wealth in order to transform their objective 
circumstances, taking with them what is often their only asset – their labour power (cf. 
de Genova, 2008, 2010). The border – the symbol of this spatial territorial ideology – is 
etched with the ceaseless struggle to direct, control, circumscribe, and where necessary 
prevent this movement in the interests of global capital.  
It is difficult to see how, in an age of transnational movement, global capital could 
attempt to do this without enlisting the services of such a ‘great disciplining device’ as 
the boundary-defined nation-state. As Torpey (2000, p.5) reminds us, a critical aspect of 
the process of disciplining and controlling movement is the fact that populations are 
‘dependent on the nation-state for the possession of an “identity” from which they can 
escape only with difficulty and which significantly shapes their access to various 
spaces’. The nation-state, with its crucial ability to confer identities, along with its legal 
systems, border technologies and bureaucracies, security and policing practices, and 
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ideological master narratives of national culture and national security, remains an 
essential component of global capitalism, even as its political imperatives appear to 
clash with the compulsions of a global economic system that is predicated on movement 
(cf. chapter two).  
 
Rebuilding walls  
Although the border of the nation-state may be an abstract grid placed over contiguous 
territory and peoples, informed by an ideological spatial imagination, to those it 
excludes it looms as a concrete, physical barrier – the symbolic and exclusionary 
aspects of the border are made manifest in the literal. With the ascendancy of neoliberal 
logic, physical walls and barriers have been reinforced or newly created across the 
world, with the sole purpose of exclusionxxi. As Borger (2007) comments, ‘The new age 
of the wall has begun’. They are once again in the ascendant, erected or reinforced to 
allay perceived fears of ‘outsiders’. The most infamous example is the Israeli state’s 
‘security barrier’ in the West Bank (complementing the electronic fence sealing in the 
population of Gaza); each concrete slab symbolises the physical exclusion of 
Palestinians from their land. Including the fence, fitted with advanced surveillance 
equipment, the Israeli government is constructing along part of its border with Egypt to 
exclude ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal workers’ from the African continentxxii (cf. 
McCarthy, 2010; Greenberg, 2011), these barriers mean that Israel will soon become the 
ultimate ‘gated country’.  
In a wider context, Green and Grewcock (2002) identify three major ‘zones of 
exclusion’: the US/Mexico border, the Australian/South East Asian rim and the 
European Union or ‘Fortress Europe’. These zones mirror the major trading blocs and 
global spheres of economic, political and military influence, and the erection of physical 
barriers map the traditional territorial patterns of these sites of power and wealth. Those 
displaced or set adrift by the ceaseless practices of global capitalism as it hollows out 
local economies, cultures and social networks in the Global South (setting in train 
poverty, violence, environmental disasters and civil wars) face unprecedented barriers 
to emigration to the zones of power and influence: a ‘great wall’ of high-tech border 
enforcement disrupts their flight (cf. chapter five).  
The walls along the territorial borders of the world’s core nation-states are, 
therefore, walls of separation that mirror a globalised economic exclusion: they attempt 
to segregate the desperately poor from the relatively rich. They could be seen as a 
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physical allegory of global capitalism, constructed as they are as barriers against those 
forced into flight by its ceaseless uprooting of peoples – a dislocation and dispossession 
begun in an earlier phase of capitalist globalisation and now updated to neoliberal times, 
just as the walls themselves have been fortified by the very latest in security technology. 
As Berger (2007) says, since the poor are a majority everywhere, building physical 
barriers to safeguard privileged access to wealth and security has become the ubiquitous 
activity of the global elite. There are more than 40,000km of closed borders throughout 
the world and nearly 18,000km of these are walled (Migreurop 2009). Many of those 
that are strung around the richer areas of the world are indistinguishable from front-
lines, with armed guards, checkpoints, razor wire, minefields and electronic sensors: all 
the military equipment of a ‘security state’ on full alert against the ‘threat’ of the 
dispossessed.  
 
Restructuring space 
Davis (2006), Massey (2007) and Harvey (2010) all argue that the neoliberal 
(re)structuring of space across the world has become an increasingly politicised exercise 
in enclosure and exclusion. According to Harvey’s (2010) thesis, these acts of 
dispossession bear witness to a further round of ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital, 
extending and completing the first great upheavals that initiated the ceaseless search for 
profit that drives the capitalist system – one that is further impelled by the recurrent 
economic crises that mount in intensity alongside its global spreadxxiii:  
 
‘[A]ccumulation by dispossession’ continues to play a role in 
assembling the initial money power. Both legal as well as illegal 
means – such as violence, criminality, fraud and predatory practices of 
the sort that have been uncovered in recent times in the subprime 
mortgage market… – are deployed. (Harvey, 2010, pp.48-9) 
 
With the turn to neoliberalism in vast swathes of the world during the 1980s, a wave of 
‘financialisation’ swept the globe and the credit system became ‘the major modern lever 
for the extraction of wealth’, promoting ‘levels of debt incumbency that reduce whole 
populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage…’ (Ibid., p.245).  
The most fundamental dispossession, however, is the one that the whole profit 
system rests on: divesting the individual of control over their own creative labour power 
by means of their insertion into the capitalist economic process – and as a corollary of 
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this, the system’s political managers must also ensure they alone possess the means to 
control and direct the movement of those who represent this fundamental source of 
profit. Harvey (2010, p.242) reminds us that alongside this formative process of 
dispossession there lies a continuing history of the plunder of assets from the 
economically and politically powerless – divesting them of their means of ‘life, history, 
culture and forms of sociality in order to make space (sometimes quite literally) for 
capital accumulation’. Common rights to land are converted into private property rights, 
for example, as land itself becomes a commodity. Across the globe, property developers 
are ceaselessly expropriating the living spaces of the poor for urban redevelopment by 
expelling poorer populations from potential prime real estate locations by legal (that is, 
state-backed) and illegal means, with the consequent disruption of social networks and 
local communities. ‘It seems sometimes as if there is a systematic plan to expel low-
income and unwanted populations from the face of the earth’ (Ibid., p.245). The scale of 
contemporary population removal is immense, to the extent that Davis (2006, p.98) 
characterises the urban poor of the Global South as ‘transients in a perpetual state of 
relocation’.  
This ceaseless social war is evident not only in the continuous mass uprooting of 
the poor and slum dwellers by politicians and property developers, entailing the 
constant redrawing of spatial boundaries and dislocation of the powerless, and in the 
privatisation of public spaces and their expropriation by the forces of 
commercialisation, but also in the exponential growth of ‘penal warehouses’ (prison 
complexes and detention centres) to contain those who are thus dispossessed and 
uprooted (cf. Bauman, 1998; Giroux, 2004). This situation is compounded by the flight 
of the mega-rich, and in some areas the middle classes, to fortified networks of gated 
communities, in an obsessive quest for personal security and social isolation. In a 
similar fashion, previous class barriers between the rich and powerful and the poor and 
powerless were structurally and demographically etched onto national landscapes – for 
example, with the introduction of ‘spatial zoning’ during the colonial era in the cities of 
the Indian subcontinent, a policy the apartheid system in South Africa then took to its 
extreme. Now such spatial zoning exists on a global scale.  
The outcome is an ‘architecture of fear’, writ large in ‘Fortress Europe’, in which 
Fekete (2009, p.190) descries ‘a tale of two Europes’, with a new ‘underclass’ of 
stateless, rightless, ‘illegal’ forced migrants subsisting in ‘shanty towns and makeshift 
camps on the margins of many European towns and cities’xxiv. It is also apparent in 
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microcosm everywhere gated communities spring up, surrounded by walls, and in many 
cases, CCTV cameras and uniformed – sometimes armed – private security guards. This 
is a geography openly moulded by class. It entails a vast reorganisation of urban space 
and the ‘drastic diminution of intersections between the lives of the rich and the poor … 
the disembedding of elite activities from local territorial contexts’ (Davis, 2006, p.119). 
The insistent quest for security against those disadvantaged or impoverished by 
globalisation elicits an inevitable response from the burgeoning security industry – 
meeting the demand for ‘privatised emergency responses’ has become a key sector of 
venture capitalism. Alongside the demand of the fearful rich for personal security, 
however, this sector finds its most lucrative market in the ‘fortressing’ of Europe and 
North America (cf. Klein, 2007)xxv. In turn, the global heft of this industry ensures its 
profit-driven rationale invests the search for both private and national security with an 
inflated urgency, adding to a sense of ubiquitous danger. 
The carving up of social space, drawing physical boundaries between wealth and 
poverty, both within and around the nation-state or bloc of nation-states, has meant that 
those on the wrong side of such borders have become the subject of intense scrutiny. 
This is particularly the case with the European Union as the logic of security begins to 
permeate its border policies, infusing them with discourses more attuned to military and 
intelligence activities, and fuelling the growth of a vast, integrated, multinational system 
of surveillance and ‘pre-emption’ (cf. chapter five). As the harmonised asylum and 
immigration regimes of the European region become increasingly securitised, so the 
very space across which so many thousands are forced to traverse by globalisation’s 
waves of disembedding and displacement has also become increasingly fortified, 
sensitive to the movements of any individuals lacking the requisite ‘security clearance’ 
– that is, a privileged national identity. 
 
 
The ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘externalisation’ of the European border 
Projecting Europe’s external border into global space 
For some time now, European governments have deployed techniques such as identity 
or citizenship documentation to ensure that the forced migrant is immobilised at the 
external border, where the full force of nationalist rhetoric reinforces their image as 
irrevocably ‘alien’. They are not only immobilised at their home country’s or Europe’s 
territorial borders but in global space as the border itself disengages from its territorial 
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confines. Even as this space continues to be conceived of as a solely geographic, stable 
and linear dimension, European borders have migrated deep inside the region’s nation-
states, marking out part of their population as ‘illegal’, and in a parallel move, have 
stretched far beyond their geopolitical frontiers. As the notional boundaries between 
border enforcement and domestic policy, and between immigration policy and ‘national 
security’, fast disappear, borders themselves become elastic and mobile in an attempt to 
combat their increasingly porous nature. Along the ‘frontline’ between Europe and 
Africa, for example, physical walls only exist at a few of the European Union’s ‘entry 
points’, such as Cueta and Melilla on North Africa’s Mediterranean coast; driven by 
their global security remit, European border controls have become increasingly 
‘dematerialised and externalised’ (cf. Migreurop, 2009)xxvi. Through the extension of 
the processes of detection, detention and deportation into the global arena, forced 
migrants find themselves predefined as ‘illegal’, their movements criminalised, long 
before they reach the physical territorial border.  
The sheer breadth and scale of Europe’s immigration and asylum regime 
necessitates the formation of bi-national, pan-European and international alliances; the 
key European nation-states engage in a process of what Lahav (2004) calls ‘remote-
control’ policy-making through outsourcing to private, transnational and ‘third-country’ 
actors. The national security-influenced paradigm of a privatised, ‘externalised’ process 
of ‘global migration control’ has gained considerable traction within Europe, and 
various discrete operations informed by these principles are often up and running well 
before any formal political decisions are registered (cf. Amnesty/ECRE, 2010). Private 
contractors are hired by national governments to build, administer and police the 
expanding number of detention centres; private ‘visa facilitation agents’ are recruited; 
private security officers are delegated to take part in intelligence gathering and security 
operations at border and offshore ‘control zones’ and empowered to make decisions on 
the admission or detention and deportation of forced migrants; and private security 
guards are employed to undertake their deportation.  
As the European nation-states continue to both ‘harmonise’ and simultaneously 
outsource their asylum and immigration operations to private contractors and 
multinational corporations involved in the lucrative security/surveillance sector (such as 
EADS, Finmeccanica, Sagem Sécurité and Geogroup), these companies’ staff are 
almost inevitably to be found participating in the European Union’s special immigration 
advisory committees (cf. Cassarino, 2010) (see chapter five for a fuller analysis). As 
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they do so, not only the agenda but the whole ethos of the European asylum regime is 
distorted to fit a security framework, one in which the forced migrant becomes subject 
to a process of de facto criminalisation. They are transformed into a global threat, no 
longer perceived as individual human beings but more as dangerous objects to be 
quietly, efficiently and effectively removed.    
This ethos informs the series of bilateral agreements drawn up by the core 
European nation-states – sometimes under the flag of the European Union, sometimes 
as independent actors – delegating border policing to neighbouring countries. These 
agreements are empowered by the intergovernmental policy bargains made between 
member states – for example, over the ever-widening latitude of what constitutes a 
‘manifestly unfounded claim’ (by means of which an asylum seeker can be transformed 
through legal mechanisms into an ‘illegal migrant’) or of the designation of ‘safe third 
countries’ to which they can then be deported. The effect has been to criminalise 
emigration from a wide range of regions in the Global South. North African countries 
such as Morocco, Algeria or Libyaxxvii are recruited through bilateral and European 
Union-brokered agreements containing ‘returns and readmission’ clauses into playing 
the role of buffer zone, filtering out unwanted migrants. In this, they complement the 
role of countries on Europe’s eastern periphery, the location of its ‘Electronic 
Curtain’xxviii (cf. Cassarino, 2010). This is despite the fact that countries such as Libya 
have repeatedly been exposed as the site of migrant camps and detention centres 
notorious for their inhumane conditions, routine police brutality, and the deaths and 
‘disappearances’ of ‘illegal migrants’xxix. Significantly, the bilaterial agreements do not 
contain any criteria demanding the adoption of asylum procedures, respect for the rights 
of non-discrimination and ‘non-refoulement’ (the Refugee Convention forbids the 
return of asylum seekers to countries where they would be in danger of death or 
inhumane treatment), or safeguards against unlawful and arbitrary detention (cf. 
Amnesty/ECRE, 2010). 
The policy of ‘joint removals’ (the deportation of ‘illegal migrants’ by several co-
operating European nation-states on European Union-chartered aircraft, which takes 
place for the most part under the public radar, with the migrants themselves policed by 
private security staff) is facilitated by such readmission agreements with third 
countriesxxx. In this respect, the returns and readmission programmes that increasingly 
comprise a central plank of the European asylum regime are a form of routine 
(racialised) categorisation and expulsion. The vast web of agreements, which has 
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acquired formidable dimensionsxxxi, is grafted onto seemingly unrelated policies, 
helping disguise their importance: placed within the broader framework of more general 
aid and development policies, ‘memoranda of understanding’, economic pacts and 
police co-operation agreements, they become difficult to detect and even more so to 
monitor (Cassarino, 2010, pp.9-10). As such operations take place within a climate 
informed by the discourse of security, the day-to-day implementation of detection and 
expulsion – and the abuses and human rights violations that inevitably result – becomes 
increasingly mundane and acceptable, buttressed by a ‘subtle denial of moral principles 
… [and] the prioritisation of [the most] operable means of implementation at all costs’ 
(Ibid., p.24). 
 
The European Union and ‘global border management’ 
In pursuit of this agenda, the European Union constantly invests in new loci of control, 
the most recent being the construction of a ‘virtual’ or ‘digital’ border, comprising a 
vast, integrated data system (upgrading the Schengen Information System or SIS 
network) (cf. chapter five). By its very nature, this ‘virtual border’ will have the 
potential to span the globe. The European Commission (2004) declares that its ‘e-
border’ will be the basis for a new ‘security procedure’ (PROSECUR), enabling the 
‘permanent’ exchange and processing of information between the various border control 
agencies so that checks and surveillance can be carried out in a more ‘harmonised’ 
fashion at ‘external borders’. The security procedure itself is intended as the foundation 
for a common system of border patrols, enforced by a corps of ‘European Border 
Guards’, who will be delegated to handle surveillance, check individuals’ identities, and 
interdict incoming boats suspected of carrying ‘illegal aliens’ as part of an ‘integrated 
border management system’, with Frontex (the European agency responsible for 
‘external border security’) as its keystone.  
The remit of Frontex, according to its 2010 report, is quite openly declared to be 
‘the dismantling of illegal immigration networks [through] surveillance and intelligence 
gathering (particularly on increased migration from Muslim countries); joint returns 
operations; contracts with third countries; … [and] the collection, evaluation and 
transfer of information’ (Frontex, 2010b, my italics). As the agency operates in the 
opaque world of global security, there is no regulation, staff accountability or 
democratic oversight by the European Parliament or European Court, far less by 
national parliaments. Amnesty and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
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(ECRE) (2010) report that its ‘joint operations and pilot projects create a gap in 
accountability and permit member states to engage in border management with 
impunity’, and that it implements its ‘technical assistance projects’ with third countries 
through diverting funds intended for humanitarian and development aid to border 
control. They further maintain that the European Union uses Frontex to circumvent 
international obligations to human rights (preventing forced migrants from gaining 
access to international protection or asylum procedures) through relying on the bilateral 
agreements it appears to have carte blanche to draw up in its own name with third 
countries (Ibid.). Although its powers are bestowed by the European Union, the 
agency’s border operations take place in a global zone that appears divested of legal 
constraints – and it transforms the forced migrant intercepted at this 
‘dematerialsed/deterritorialised’ border into a parallel figure of extra-legality, one cast 
outside the world of legal rights and redress. (I analyse this process in more detail in 
chapter five.) 
This ‘illegalisation’ of the forced migrant on a global scale also means, as de 
Genova (2007) points out, that the core European nation-states can, whenever they need 
to do so, exploit for their own economic ends the inherent vulnerability and 
‘deportability’ of those who manage to cross Europe’s external border – although this 
can at times conflict with the populist political rhetoric of ‘national security’ and the 
security industry’s own commercial impulses and professional discourses that carry 
such weight in government policy circles. Jensen (2000) claims that the border zones, 
therefore, rather than representing seamless, impregnable boundaries, resemble more of 
a ‘cushion’, varying in size according to the changing security and immigration policies, 
economic needs and political priorities of Europe’s nation-states. I contest, however, 
that although such transactions may be formally enacted at the discretion of individual 
governments, according to their economic or political needs, Europe’s dislocated, 
privately policed, extended borders more tellingly reveal the way its asylum and 
immigration policies and practices mesh with a wider ‘global migration management’ 
agenda.  
Cuttitta (2010) appears to concur with Jensen when he argues that the European 
Union has no ‘master plan’ regarding asylum and immigration policy, stressing that 
actions on the ground by both individual member states and the European Union itself 
have frequently been ad-hoc, with migration objectives buried in bi-national 
agreements, or with the introduction of discrete pilot projects that appear to turn into 
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common policy purely by default. However, the fact is, these seemingly haphazard 
activities have recently cohered into a more politically legible and unified policy and 
programme of action: the European Union has adopted what it calls ‘the Global 
Approach to Migration’ as the basis for its Stockholm Programme in 2009 (a five-year 
plan for European ‘justice, freedom and security’ running from 2010 through to 2015) 
(European Commission, 2009) (cf. chapter five). This is openly premised on the policies 
of ‘global border management’, including co-operation over returns and the crafting of 
readmission agreements – such as that between the European Union and Libyaxxxii, and 
the decision that Turkey’s pre-admission criteria should include the acceptance of a 
bilateral readmission agreement (sweetened by the promise of financial support)xxxiii. 
This is one strand of evidence that the ‘global migration management’ agenda has 
turned the policy of detection, detention and deportation, and the launch of Europe’s 
external border into global space (with the consequent manufacture of the forced 
migrant as a global figure of illegality whichever national border they cross and 
wherever they might be), into a matter of prime political importance for Europe.  
 
 
Global movement versus national borders 
A ‘world without borders’? 
Andreas (2000) argues that although Europe has witnessed the deterritorialisation of its 
borders, the enduring ‘myth’ of border control continues to be essential to sustain the 
legitimacy of the European Union. The characterisation of border control as ‘myth’, 
however, raises the question of whether the integrity of the national border has indeed 
been fatally undermined or whether it continues to have a concrete function beyond the 
merely rhetorical. The answer to this is of fundamental importance to the way we 
analyse border controls and their formative relationship to the figure of the forced 
migrant as ‘global illegal’. It also links to the question raised in chapter two as to the 
relationship of the nation-state to the processes of globalisation. The issue of border 
control, therefore, demands an analysis that involves a dialectical understanding of the 
way the global economy apparently negates yet simultaneously reinforces the 
application and experience of border control in both its discursive and biopolitical 
forms. 
When viewed from the perspective of the predominantly global character of many 
economic processes, national borders do appear to be becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
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As Nordstrom (2007) shows in her work on the globalisation of the extra-legal 
economy, geopolitical frontiers lie both within and outside the law. The accumulation 
and circulation of wealth often appears to have little respect for borders. Extra-legal 
economic networks that operate both within territories and across frontiers are, she 
maintains, a ‘series of [invisible] power grids shaping the fundamental econo[mic]-
political dynamics of the world today’ (Ibid., p.xvii). They have the ability to affect the 
markets, politics and financial stability of entire countries, even continents, while 
operating outside national and international regulation and control. This is because, in 
the global economy, the terms ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ are muddied; they cannot be divided 
into clear categories – the ‘legal’ economy shades into the ‘irregular’ and the ‘irregular’ 
into the ‘illegal’. ‘Two-thirds of all trade moves outside of legal channels… The 
unregulated – the illicit and the smuggled – is fundamental to the world of business, 
economics and politics as we know them’ (Ibid., p.162).  
The intersections of legality and illegality are to be found along a continuum that 
spans criminal networks, multinational economic organisations and global commodity 
centres. A large share of globally mobile capital, for example, makes use of tax havens 
– they are central to the operation of global financial markets. These havens, however, 
are not necessarily located ‘offshore’: hidden billions are siphoned off through the 
system of international banking activities headquartered in the regional and national 
financial centres of the major economic players. Such financial activities have since 
erupted into public awareness with the onset of financial crisis. However, as national 
politicians are constrained by the neoliberal political agenda of deregulation embraced 
by the European Union, as well as their dependence on and intimate relationship with 
the financial markets (especially in the case of the UK), they are unable/unwilling to 
curb this activity despite its destabilising consequences. Indeed, dubious semi-legal (and 
extra-legal) ‘borderless’ transactions also involve the world of national politics: national 
governments seek foreign exchange and access to international economic and financial 
markets through duty-free zones, economic processing or free-trade zones, and complex 
trade and financial deals – these vital nodes of economic and financial activity are 
devoted to the unhindered flow of goods, speculative investment and profits across the 
globe. At every point in this process, the legal, semi-legal and illegal intersect in 
hundreds of ways that are both mundane and opaque. ‘This system of state/extra-state 
transactions moves out internationally, through wildcat profiteers, powerful 
international businesses, multinational enterprises and [national] governments.’ 
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(Nordstrom, 2007, p.62). Once money enters the system anywhere it can be 
instantaneously transferred around world and just as instantaneously washed clean of 
any trace of its origins. What Nordstrom calls the ‘dance of the il/legal’ dilutes physical 
frontiers; it is a graphic illustration of the contradictions inherent in the drive of the 
capitalist system to generate a world without spatial barriers, creating an uncomfortable 
disjuncture with the dominant geographical configuration of territorialised space.  
On the other hand, border security exists as an industry in its own right, 
generating vast profits and maintaining a costly physical infrastructure and bureaucracy, 
with the remit of focusing on illegal aberrations. Even this particular objective, 
however, can appear conceptually flawed when viewed through the prism of the global 
il/legal economy: the most commonly smuggled items, and most commonly used routes 
for such items, pass through ‘clean’ corporations. The truth behind global financial 
structures, for example, with their arcane and semi-legal (and often illegal) practices, 
which appear to take place in a world above and beyond state legislation or international 
regulation, was laid bare by the latest financial and economic crisis (cf. Shaxson, 2011); 
however, the rapid return of financial institutions to business as usual, continuing their 
opaque and deliberately obscure practices, illustrates how the wedding of ‘legality’ and 
‘illegality’ is a fundamental part of the modern capitalist process itself. A radical shift in 
this relationship could undermine the whole complex, inherently fragile financial 
structure that continues to oil the wheels of the economic system even as it floats 
dangerously free of its moorings in the real economy. The conclusion that Nordstrom 
(2007, p.201) draws is that security manifests itself in the ‘abstract proclamations of 
policy directives’ but is ‘forged on the frontlines [at the border controls], with people … 
who constantly navigate a fine line between balancing security with the necessities of 
trade’. 
Nordstrom (2007) implies, like Andreas (2000), that border controls for the most 
part constitute a ‘security performance’ that is mounted for its spectacular value. The 
‘politics of spectacle’, as defined by Boal et al. (2005), manifests itself in a very 
distinctive form in neoliberal times: an obsessive attempt to monopolise everyday 
discourse through the creation, management and manipulation of selective ‘securitised’ 
images that help instill a ‘politics of fear’ (cf. chapter five). These images are insistently 
driven home through their widespread dissemination by the mass media and through 
populist political rhetoric. In one sense, I concede that this appears a watertight 
argument: national governments often use the border for symbolic displays of prowess – 
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the intermittent reports of the arrest, detention and deportation of ‘illegal entrants’, for 
example, could be viewed as a tool to carry a message of [in]security to the national 
population. The unregulated movement of money, goods and people (particularly those 
who struggle to take the power to change their individual circumstances into their own 
hands through migration), although an inherent part of the global economic system, 
simultaneously threatens to undermine trust in the viability of that system – precisely 
because it is constructed on an infrastructure of nation-states and regional blocs of 
nation-states. It is of the utmost necessity to keep in circulation the narrative of a world 
focused on place, with autonomous territorial entities controlling and safeguarding their 
specific economies, polities and populations; meanwhile, the reality of incessant extra-
legal movement within and across these spaces, in a world that does not accord to such 
spatial categories, must remain unacknowledged or assigned to the role of the 
‘underside’ of globalisation (cf. chapter five). The intensity with which this 
territorial/national narrative is reiterated in times of crisis shows the fear of looming 
illegitimacy that seizes political elites when the current ideology they have espoused to 
keep the fundamental relations that structure the global system deliberately opaque 
threatens to start unravelling. 
However, I maintain, these actions are not only displays mounted to secure 
popular legitimacy, they possess a material force which further reinforces the social 
processes of identification, segregation and exclusion effected through the application 
of border-control technologies. As Bauman (1998, p.126) says, the whole legal, judicial, 
administrative and policing process dedicated to population control is ‘one long 
structured ritual of symbolic rejection and physical exclusion…’ (my italics). A closer 
look at the border and its mechanisms of control reveals the complexity of geographical 
determinations that comprise the global system of capital in all its manifestations:  
 
On the one hand, capitalists cannot abide geographical barriers of any 
sort – neither spatial nor environmental – and are engaged in a 
perpetual struggle to circumvent or transcend them. On the other 
hand, capitalists actively construct new geographies and geographical 
barriers in the form of physical built environments embodying vast 
quantities of fixed and immovable capital that must be fully used if 
their value is not to be lost. They also create regional divisions of 
labour which assemble around them all manner of supportive 
functions that then constrain the geographical mobility of both capital 
and labour. (Harvey, 2010, p.213)  
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The leading nation-states that contain and manage such built environments and police 
the divisions of regional labour through their administrative, legal and technological 
apparatuses create borders in ways that attempt to limit and control movement within 
the wider global context of countervailing impulses. The border is also a form of 
concrete state control. While the spectacle of the struggle over the border is enacted in 
order to project an image of national (in)security, it reflects at a deeper level the real 
struggle taking place on a daily basis over the social body – that is, as de Genova (2010, 
pp.57-8) puts it, over the definition and composition of, and the relations of power 
within, the population of the ‘national’ space (in this case, of European space). It is part 
of ‘the larger struggle to subordinate labour to the requirements of capital accumulation’ 
(Ibid., pp.57-8). The border becomes a crucial element in the struggle to maintain social 
power. 
The idea of a clear, defining border, encircling and defending the integrity of a 
national territorial space and keeping transparently ‘illegal’ incursions into this space at 
bay, is therefore illusory on one level, yet its practices and technologies are neither 
illusory nor simply mere ‘spectacle’: the reality of the border is far more complex. 
Political space has always been historically transient, constantly changing, and national 
borders have continually been subject to transgression and just as continually 
resurrected or reconfigured. In the context of an uneven economic globalisation they 
play an even more decisive role in disciplining the national labour force, securing its 
place as part of a wider international division of labour. This takes place partly on the 
discursive level, with the interweaving of nationalism (with its insider/outsider tropes) 
with the discourse of security, but the border also has a material function that is 
increasingly focused on ‘migration control’ – that is, on physical exclusion and the 
threat of physical exclusion that renders those thus targeted subject to a form of 
‘exclusionary’ existence, beyond legal parameters, whether they are outside or within 
the borders of the nation-state.  
 
The informal economy and the invisible workforce  
The extra-territorialisation of national border controls, with their extension and gradual 
transformation into a system of ‘global migration control’, contributes to the 
maintenance of a flexible labour market that can be supplemented by a supply of 
‘illegal’ migrants – individuals who are thrown into a state of ‘illegality’ by the 
application of border controls. Today, the sheer number of people who are driven to toil 
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in unprotected, low-wage, informal jobs in the service, construction, and agricultural 
and food-processing industries within Europe is part of a truly global phenomenon. The 
embedded relationships between the formal and informal economies are apparent in the 
incorporation of ‘informal workers’ (often ‘illegal migrants’) into key global industries. 
As Davis (2006, p.178) shows, they add up to a global informal working class about one 
billion strong, without recognition or rights; a ‘stealth workforce for the formal 
economy’, linked into it through a web of subcontracting networks. This is the case in 
countries throughout the world. Irregular workers are employed in ‘backstreet 
sweatshops, in the domestic services or in the service sector more generally [or] … in 
the production of space and of the built environment ... in the trenches … of urban 
capitalism’ (Harvey, 2010, pp.242-3).  
The phenomenon is most dramatic in the Global South, where the growth of 
informal labour is exponential, but it can also be found in the country that has 
increasingly become the Eastern locus of global capitalism, China (where the informal 
workforce comprises internal migrants), and in the command centres of global capital in 
the West, such as the European Union, where workers in the ‘informal economy’ are by 
and large ‘illegal’ forced migrants. They have become ever more of a presence in 
Europe over the last thirty yearsxxxiv, partly due to the changing nature of employment 
enforced by neoliberal corporate restructuring and deindustrialisation, and the 
enactment of policies introducing ‘flexible working practices’. The notion of labour 
market ‘flexibility’ in European governments’ policies plays an important role in the 
extreme exploitation of ‘illegal’ migrant and undocumented workers (often refused 
asylum seekers); they structure the precarious nature of their work and their often 
dangerous working environments.  
However, it is the nature of the border controls introduced by the European 
asylum and immigration system that has most effectively enabled these practices:  
 
Reworking the Fortress Europe policies of the 1990s, the development 
of a framework of managed migration [according to labour market 
needs] is indicative of an emerging global architecture with ever more 
punitive outcomes. For at the same time as mechanisms are put in 
place to funnel and order migration according to specific needs and 
desires, these same instruments underpin new and emerging measures 
of expulsion and criminalization. (Burnett and Whyte, 2010, p.7) 
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The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, the international legal norm applied to all 
signatory countries of asylum, appears to have been all but abandoned in Europe: at 
least since the 1990s the majority of forced migrants have increasingly found 
themselves defined as ‘economic migrants’. As such, they can be inserted into the 
‘undocumented economy’ as a cheap, disposable workforce at the same time as the new 
Europe-wide adoption of a securitised global agenda of ‘managed migration’ 
institutionalises this unheralded but dramatic change in the modus operandi of 
immigration and asylum policies. The double-bind that afflicts forced migrants is 
clearly illustrated by the European Parliament’s 2008 ruling that any ‘irregular migrant’ 
found working should face a period of up to 18 months imprisonment (cf. European 
Parliament, 2008). Those forced migrants who apply for asylum but whose applications 
are rejected are left destitute, with no resource but to attempt to find work in the 
‘informal economy’, yet by working ‘illegally’ they risk imprisonment and deportation. 
This criminalisation acts as a ‘disciplinary mechanism that reaches into all aspects of 
the labour process: the enforcement of low wages, long working hours and poor safety 
conditions’ (Burnett and Whyte, 2010, p.33). The ‘illegal’ status of the forced migrant 
coerced into taking irregular employment locks them into a form of ‘perennial 
servitude’, often experienced as something akin to slave labour (Ibid.). Whether this 
situation is part of a deliberate political strategy or simply, as is more likely, the 
advantageous meshing of different policy mechanisms pursuing their own specific 
political or economic ends, the vulnerability (particularly the inherent ‘deportability’ 
and disposable nature of ‘illegal migrants’) is structured by a combination of labour 
market regulation and border controls, rendering such individuals open to severe 
economic exploitation. 
Once they have managed to negotiate the European outposts of a global regime of 
‘migration control’, however, the forced migrant’s role as an economic participant must 
be obscured. Their presence as part of the nation-state’s economic and social 
composition must be denied public recognition – hiding the fact that they are an integral 
part of the population and, in many cases, of a national working class which is linked 
(through its fundamental relationship to the exploitative processes of a global economic 
system) to a global working class to which the forced migrant equally belongs. It could 
be further argued that, in some senses, such ‘illegal’ workers are symptomatic of a set of 
very specific relations of production that have become one of the defining features of 
the neoliberal character of capitalism within the various European countries. A 
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significant section of Europe’s workforce are subject to differing degrees and forms of 
fragmented and precarious labour that is often temporary, ‘flexible’, without the normal 
benefits and rights, and low-paid. The fact that the ‘illegal migrant’ worker lies at the 
extreme end of this continuum means that they are forced to work under 
correspondingly extreme conditions of exploitation. 
The mobility, dispersal and conditions of personal insecurity of ‘illegal’ migrant 
workers, added to their criminalisation, can make it difficult and often dangerous for 
them to construct class solidarities and organisations that reflect these, without the 
instances of collective mobilisations of support among national workers that can be 
mobilised when such conditions are publicised. This is despite the fact that, as Harvey 
(2010, p.243) says, ‘they are fully conscious of their conditions of exploitation and are 
deeply alienated by their precarious existence and antagonistic to the often brutal 
policing of … state power’. The very fact of their ‘illegal’ status, however, makes it all 
the easier for the political elite and the employers who benefit to obscure the salience of 
the relationship between the conditions of exploitation suffered by ‘legal’ workers with 
those of their so-called ‘illegal’ counterparts that cuts across national divisions. They 
effect this by the designation of the forced migrant as ‘illegal’ through very concrete 
border-control processes, marking them out as ‘aberrations’, guilty of self-generated, 
spontaneous movement in a global system of the otherwise orderly, ‘legal’ movements 
of labour, as well as through the manipulation of nascent conflicts over the ‘control’ of 
space (in the sense of the citizen’s manufactured feeling of belonging to and ownership 
of the national territory and polity, and the rights and benefits that accrue to citizenship, 
with all its accompanying racial connotations).  
At the same time as the forced migrant’s participation in and contribution to the 
‘legal’ global economic set-up is hidden, their ‘illegality’ is rhetorically emphasised in 
the interests of national/local labour discipline through exaggerating their numbers and 
the ‘threat’ of their presence as ‘rogue’ elements within the labour force (accused of 
driving down wages and conditions or taking the place of ‘native’ workers) and as 
culturally ‘alien’ intruders amongst the population at large. This rhetoric is framed by a 
banal nationalist discourse that is posed in implicitly (and sometimes overtly) racialised 
terms. They are, therefore, incorporated into strategic economic sectors in Europe’s 
‘global cities’ under conditions that render them invisible as productive elements of the 
national economy yet rhetorically highly visible as ‘alien’ ‘illegal migrants’. In this 
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task, the material practices of border control elide with the rhetorical in the interests of 
social control.  
As access to social rights is dependent on political rights (gained via citizenship or 
some form of legal temporary status), such ‘illegal migrants', although they may be 
formally free and globally mobile, find they are immobilised, fettered by a lack of rights 
or legal identity. They are cast into a state of the utmost vulnerability that Torpey 
(2000) characterises as a radically denuded form of ‘denizenship’. At the same time as 
the practical exploitation of such ‘denizens’ helps strengthen the neoliberal practices of 
labour ‘flexibility’ and the general dismantling of workplace rights and social welfare, 
the neoliberal discourse of national security is directly attuned to their ideological 
exploitation. As Favell (2008, p.273) points out, in a globally porous world, ‘the 
modern nation-state’s sharp ability to designate and recognise what spatial movers are 
foreigners is a remarkable political achievement’. It is at the border that this continuing 
power is manifest. The border technologies of identity documentation, for example, are 
a distillation of the heft that membership of a powerful, wealthy nation-state or region, 
such as the European Union, carries in an era of markedly differential access to global 
mobility. As Arendt (1976 [1948]) remarks, the loss of citizenship deprives people of a 
clearly established, officially recognised identity, and casts them outside a world 
composed of clearly defined and documented nationalitiesxxxv. The ‘illegalised’ forced 
migrant is simultaneously incorporated into the transnational political economy and 
marginalised by the discourse of national belonging that underpins citizenship. 
 
‘Global borders’ and ‘global apartheid’ 
The relative privilege of national citizens (‘insiders’) within Europe, however, is under 
threat not from the presence of such ‘alien outsiders’ but from the imposition of region-
wide austerity measures and privatisation programmes (and the erosion of social 
welfare) by its national governments in response to global competitive pressures and 
economic crisis. But however relative this privileged status may be, it remains a right 
that the logic of the national border stresses must be guarded jealously in a world of 
dramatic inequality – and this is made possible by the global practices of privilege and 
marginalisation that structure the territorial spaces of the global political and economic 
system. The real world of the global economy in which the marginalised and 
criminalised forced migrant is compelled to seek personal safety and some sort of 
livelihood is a world without borders, yet because the identities with which they are 
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endowed are located in the radically contrasting and unequal processes of global 
capitalism, their access to and the terms under which they enter those nation-
states/regions that comprise the core centres of the global economy are determined at 
the national border. The borders of such areas therefore symbolise the more elusive 
boundaries of global privilege and lack of privilege, power and lack of power, wealth 
and poverty that comprise a system of what Richmond (cited in Davis, 2006) calls 
‘global apartheid’. 
National or regional borders, therefore, must be continually redefined and 
resurrected in response to the evolving ‘spatial configurations of belonging’ created by 
both state agencies as they refine the practices of border control (safeguarding the 
nation-state’s ‘sovereignty’ or its access to global privilege in ever more draconian 
fashion) and by the forced migrants themselves as they struggle to resist these 
technologies of exclusion in their attempt to escape the often fatal constraints of global 
inequality (cf. McNevin, 2006). This process of retrenchment through transformation is 
exemplified by Europe’s external border; in its extended, de-territorialised form it is 
becoming a sort of global border. It is here, I would argue, that we can discern the 
outlines of how the ‘global alien’ is produced and how the meaning of being an 
‘outsider’ is transformed into that of being an ‘absolute alien’. Balibar (2004) sees in 
this paradigmatic shift a resurgence of traditional colonial, and therefore racial, patterns 
of exclusion, but one that is translated into a system of global concentric borders, 
radiating far beyond and deep within the European nation-state itself.  
 
 
Biopolitical borders and the manufacture of an ‘alien’ identity 
The border technologies of exclusion 
Despite the global sweep of Europe’s border controls, therefore, they remain the means 
whereby its nation-states are constructed, maintained and secured as seemingly 
coherent, autonomous entities. As Favell (2008, p.272) says, ‘The nation-state … 
constitutes itself in the very act of recognising, classifying and then sanctioning or not 
(that is, governing) physical movements … across its self-defined borders’ – whether 
that movement is distinguished as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ is arbitrary and ‘defined wholly by 
conventions imposed by the nation-state’. As they are conventions, such definitions of 
movement can vary over space and time in response to the economic and political needs 
of the nation-state and to the challenges it faces in its continual contest with those who 
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lay claim to the basic right of free movement (and therefore self-definition). Torpey 
(2000, p.5) maintains that the invention of the passport was a crucial moment in the 
formation of the modern nation-state, giving it a key technology with which to control 
mobile or ‘ambiguously defined’ populations: ‘the state system [does not] effectively 
control all movements of persons, but it has monopolised the authority to restrict 
movement’ (italics in original) through the creation and control of technologies of 
identification.  
Europe’s current security discourse – one that helps produce the figure of the 
‘illegal alien’ and is in turn empowered by this creation – is embedded deep within such 
technologies of identification and control: 
 
The capacity of security discourse to shape government is not simply 
the symbolic capacity of defining dangers but also the technological 
and bureaucratic capacity of structuring social relations through the 
implementation of specific technological devices (closed circuit TV, 
electronic walls, passports, visas, fingerprints) in the context of 
specific government programmes. (Huysmans, 2006, p.85) 
 
The texts, images and metaphors deployed by a dominant discourse such as this, 
therefore, do not exist in isolation but are part of a wider complex of techniques and 
instruments of government. Although Said (1991 [1978], p.3), in his seminal work on 
Orientalism, primarily portrays it as a created body of theory which he deconstructs 
through interrogating various historical texts, he goes on to make clear his adoption of 
Foucault’s belief that discourse is a ‘systematic discipline … to manage – and even 
produce – [an object] politically, sociologically, ideologically, militarily, scientifically 
and imaginatively’. As such, discourse is related to a whole complex, self-referential 
system that, while it is theoretical, imaginative, textual and visual, is also to be found in 
the application of the political, legal, administrative and technological instruments of 
power. If we apply this understanding to an analysis of the European border and its 
relationship to the creation and deployment of a racially informed process of exclusion, 
the securitised, exclusionary discourse directed at the forced migrant also includes the 
political instruments and technologies of border control. Together they comprise what 
could be termed a powerful ‘border discourse’ (cf. chapter five). 
Movement across the borders is managed through such border technologies as 
mass databases and surveillance equipment. Border controls themselves are 
sophisticated techniques for identifying and categorising ‘illegal’ activities and 
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individuals by reference to a nexus of transnational external dangers (‘illegal’ 
migration, human trafficking, global crime syndicates, ‘Islamic terrorism’) that are 
presented as threatening to overwhelm the integrity of European nation-states’ 
economies, social norms, welfare systemsxxxvi, and very culture and way of life. The 
discourse of security, therefore, is a multidimensional process. The way this discourse is 
forged at the border through the application of these technologies is fundamental to its 
direction – and, equally, the part they play in the formation of a securitised immigration 
and asylum discourse means they articulate certain political choices that are integral to 
the overarching neoliberal perspective. The technologies deployed at the border of the 
European Union reinforce and normalise the processes of categorisation, segregation 
and exclusion (the identification of the ‘illegal’ and the ‘alien’) that is their raison 
d’ètre, while the discourse of security rationalises such exclusionary processes through 
reference to the key trope of national identity – who belongs and who does not.  
 
A normative European identity built on exclusion 
The exclusionary impulse witnessed in the national governments of Europe’s major 
economies that lies embedded in these technologies is a response to what Davis (2006, 
p.205) calls ‘the delusionary dialectic of securitised versus demonic’ spaces  – spaces 
that lie beyond the borders of the Western world. They are organised according to a 
geographical imagination that divides global space into sovereign territorial entities, 
containing discrete economies, polities and populations that are separated by ethnic 
composition, language, culture, traditions and mores. They pursue their own agendas, 
according to their specific cultural, political and economic needs; they act on one 
another and react to one another but have no intrinsically fundamental relationship. 
However, Giroux (2004), Bauman (1998, 2004) and Harvey (2005, 2006, 2010) all 
argue that, contrary to this narrative, the fiction of territorial autonomy has become 
stretched to the limit. The global nature of capital accumulation means that the nation-
state can no longer control the financial and only partially influence the economic 
processes taking place within its borders and has ceded much of its power over these 
processes to transnational corporations (the global representatives of capital 
accumulation), unaccountable regional financial institutions (such as the European 
Central Bank), and international agents of the still-powerful Washington Consensus (the 
IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation).  
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The current economic crisis, which has propelled nation-states to step in to bail 
out the financiers, has shown the extent to which the nation-state and global capital are 
intertwined, both institutionally and personally. As Harvey (2010: 219) remarks, ‘the 
[global] ruling class, rather than the [national] political class that acts as its surrogate, is 
now actually seen to rule’. In Europe, therefore, many of the political managers of the 
still powerful but economically weakened nation-states have rejected the social model 
of governance, whereby they provided a measure of welfare and social security for their 
national citizens, in favour of the introduction of what Bauman (2004, p.67) calls the 
‘penal, crime-control, exclusionary model’, in order to bolster control of their 
populations and facilitate global capital’s room for manoeuvre and ability to make 
profits within their borders. Neoliberal ideology attempts to disguise this process, and 
through doing so to naturalise it. 
One of the leitmotifs of neoliberal ideology is the idea that the market should be 
the organising principle not just for economic decisions but for all political and social 
policies (although this is contradicted in practice by the inevitable advent of vast 
monopolies and the necessity for state or regional ‘supra-state’ institutions to underwrite 
the failed projects of finance capital). This produces a discourse of individual 
responsibility and personal security that emphasises individuals must seek ‘their own 
biographical solutions to systemic contradictions’ (Bauman, 2004, p.51). At the same 
time as state provision of welfare is reduced and privatised, the idea of the market as the 
sole arbiter of success puts the blame for personal failure onto the individual victim, no 
matter how limited or non-existent their choices; inequality and marginality are 
portrayed as personal and individual disasters. Such a narrative reifies the political 
production of differences, in a process whereby ethnicity, race and religion are brought 
to the fore and made interchangeable, eliminating the overwhelming power of class and 
political domination (including the history of colonialism and imperialism) from the 
story.  
This is a process of depoliticisation through the neoliberal ethos of individualism 
and what Brown (2006, p.14) calls the ‘culturalisation’ of politics. Anyone identified as 
‘alien’, whose presence might give a presentiment of the wider economic and political 
forces at work, must be kept at a distance, and a commonsense reason for this 
segregation is supplied by stigmatising them through daily administrative processes as 
representing a ‘lesser’ humanity, their identities stained by violence, poverty and 
inequality. ‘Poverty, violence and dependency are seen as what asylum seekers 
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necessarily are rather than symptoms of the crimes done to their countries’ (Kundnani, 
2007, pp.3-4). Meanwhile, the forced migrant is placed in a double bind: the discourse 
of individual responsibility makes them responsible for their own often untenable and 
life-threatening situation, and at the same time, by depoliticising the causes of their 
dislocation, as well as the political processes by which they are singled out as dangerous 
to the body politic, disarms them and attempts to render them powerless to change their 
conferred identity. ‘The way back to those meaningful places where socially legible 
meanings are forged daily are blocked’ (Bauman, 2004, p.78).  
It is partly through the insistent promotion of this exclusionary discourse, in 
which the technologies of border control play such a key role, that the designation of 
‘global alien’ reveals its importance to neoliberal ideology. For just as the role of the 
forced migrant in the global economy and their ideological importance must be 
rendered invisible, so too must the extraterritorial nature of class power (the 
fundamental source of decision-making and policy implementation), and its effects 
made to appear natural and inevitable. One answer to this preoccupation is to deflect 
attention by creating an unprecedented feeling of anxiety around the figure of the global 
elite’s extraterritorial mirror image, the ‘outsider’ or ‘alien’, which renders them, as 
Soguk (1999, p.210) says, ‘visible beyond their real, corporeal presence’. This 
extravisibility, particularly when displayed at the border, is crucial to the workings of 
the nation-state. The ‘outsider’ of course has frequently provided governments with an 
irresistible strategy, helping turn the anxiety and anger their policies threaten to provoke 
towards a manufactured link between the ‘alien’ and crime. In its latest manifestation, 
this link is resurrected through symbolising (particularly through intensive media 
campaigns) the attempt to cross the border ‘illegally’ as proof of innate criminality, 
emphasising the forced migrant’s ‘different’ and dangerous identity. The artificial 
nature of the border means that its maintenance entails constant vigilance in order to 
daily instill the difference between the admitted and the rejected, the included and the 
excluded. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Exclusion, therefore, is more than simply a rhetorical spectacle, but something that is 
concretely ‘done’ to individuals through the discourses and practices of ‘national 
security’. As a crucial element in the construction of national identity, it is manifested 
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through a continual reaffirmation of the decision as to the location of the national border 
(the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’). As Kyambi (2004, p.34) says, ‘The boundary 
must always be a decision, not a simple declaration’. This decision is reaffirmed 
through the administrative assignment of identities and consequent segregation of those 
who are gifted the right to exist within the border (‘national citizens’ and others 
inhabiting a defined hierarchy of varying degrees of temporary status) from those who 
are not.  
The border-security technologies and tiers of routine measures administered by 
the nation-state’s vast securitised immigration and asylum apparatuses are imbued with 
an unquestioned perception of the reality of the border as manifest in the person of the 
forced migrant, and this makes these border decisions appear to those involved in their 
making, as well as to a wider audience, as simply the automatic result of the application 
of expert knowledge and techniques to the task of identifying ‘illegal aliens’. The legal 
instruments  of criminalisation that empower these techniques and technologies, 
however, are created as grids of perception and evaluation, so that officials can manage 
the way in which the form and content of being ‘excluded’/‘alien’ are then circulated in 
everyday life (Kristeva, 1991, p.96).  
The external border of the European Union has become a normative instrument 
that not only assigns identity but is, in effect, summoned into being by the supposedly 
inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it. The excluded carry the 
border within their persons as part of their given identity as ontologically ‘alien’ (cf. 
chapter five). According to Balibar (1991b), Europe’s border represents: 
 
…a new world which is formally organised into equivalent nation-
states … but traversed by a constantly shifting frontier … between 
two humanities. … In the space of the world economy, the division … 
is a structural but violently unstable one. (Balibar, 1991b, p.44) 
 
Both in its more common national boundary sense and in its biopolitical sense as 
racially inscribed in the identity of the forced migrant, the border is at one and the same 
time local and global, concrete and ideological, inside and outside. Although defining 
localised political spaces, borders reflect a global regime, and as such they confer a 
universal meaning on those forced migrants who attempt to cross them. This thesis 
argues that Europe’s external border is imbued with political content: as access to the 
national space is predicated on national belonging, the question of national identity (and 
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consequently the struggle to define and embed a ‘hyper-national’ European identity) is 
an ineradicable part of its constitution. Its cross-referential instruments of border control 
acquire the authority to determine the boundaries of legitimacy – and, in so doing, it has 
become midwife to the birth of a European identity that is manufactured out of its 
binary opposition to the forced migrant, the representative of an ‘alien’ culture and way 
of life.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Racism, Islamophobia and the Forced Migrant: the ‘Culture Wars’ 
 
Introduction 
The discursive boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ may be constructed 
according to the logic of nationalism, but the ‘hyper-nationalist’ discourse prevalent in 
Europe masks an even deeper global division; in practice, they are stretched far beyond 
national borders to encompass global identities, summoning up older, more deeply 
entrenched ideological boundaries of race in the process. As Passavant (2004, p.153) 
says, this discourse is ‘hegemonising the field across national boundaries … [and] to the 
extent that governing practices are superseding national state sovereignty, they are 
functioning according to the biopolitical logic of race’. Indeed, the figure of the ‘global 
alien’, initially identified as the Jewish immigrant, has a long historical track record, 
dating from the aggressive, outward push of European nation-states in the first wave of 
globalisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This racialised image 
of the ‘global alien’ has resurfaced time and again (finding its most focused and virulent 
form in the extreme political project of Nazism); it may develop new attributes over the 
years, and be less visible at some times than at others, but the tropes are embedded in 
the structure of Europe’s nation-states. As the onset of recession promotes the 
reassertion of an openly nationalist agenda in both economic and socio-political 
contexts, these tropes lie close to hand, ready to play their part in the attempted 
naturalisation of a deepening (systemic) inequality. 
 In their most current form, these tropes are manifest in ‘cultural’ disguise, a 
‘racism without race’ (Balibar, 1991a) that is focused on the forced migrant as the 
global embodiment of an ‘alien’ threat to national identity and cultural cohesion. But as 
this form of racism now operates in an environment shaped by the Europe-wide security 
agenda unleashed by the war on terror, it has become intertwined with an increasingly 
overt current of institutional and popular Islamophobia. The mainstreaming of the ideas 
expressed by the concept of ‘Eurabia’ (the myth that a culturally homogenous and 
aggressive Muslim minority is threatening to submerge an equally essentialised and 
universalised European identity and culture) illustrates how the figure of the ‘absolute 
other’ plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of 
‘European-ness’. My argument is that the insertion of Islamophobia into the 
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institutional structures of European society, with the image of Islam now framed by a 
discourse of existential danger, has resulted in the naturalisation of an agenda of 
securitisation (cf. chapter five), which is seen at its most aggressive when applied to 
legislation concerning forced migrants. Forced migrants can now be portrayed as not 
only disrupting national/regional cohesion and cultural unity, but also, most particularly 
when identified as coming from Muslim-majority countries, as a potential global threat 
to ‘national security’. 
 
 
The nation-state and the discursive production of a racialised ‘illegal alien’ 
The binary typology of race 
Driven by the logic of a ‘securitised’ nationalism, the exclusion that takes place at 
Europe’s globalised borders helps instrumentalise and thus naturalise the idea of 
‘difference’ in a way that appears to naturally adopt the characteristics of racialisation 
(currently in the guise of a neutral and apolitical discourse of ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’). 
An incessant border activity of identification, categorisation and surveillance entails a 
constant focus on the ‘alien’ not as an individual but as representative of a generic type, 
and, as Said (1991 [1978]) reminds us, to make another human being an object of study 
is the very essence of racism. The administrative practices of border control are 
therefore steeped in the wider discourse of race, one that is able to draw on roots buried 
so deep that it can appear to be an a-historical phenomenon.  
As discourses themselves are forms of meaning-making, they help provide the 
material for our collective sense of reality (our commonsense understanding of the 
politically conceived and economically structured social relations we inhabit). However, 
given the nature of their raison d’etre and the profoundly political contexts in which 
they operate, such forms of discourse can lay little claim to neutrality. The very 
language a discourse employs to structure and disseminate its content naturally becomes 
the conduit for ideological practices and is therefore imbued with political import: 
 
Conceived in this ‘instrumental’ sense, as an ‘apparatus’ for the 
transmission and diffusion of knowledge, language becomes one of 
the primary fronts in the struggle between hegemonies. Struggles over 
meanings within language, its concrete deployment as a social 
organisation in particular, is thus not secondary to the properly 
‘political’ … its capacity for unification and division becomes the 
paradigm or ‘terrain’ of the political itself. (Thomas, 2009, pp.431-2) 
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The interaction between discourse and social practice is, of course, a complex one. 
However, discourses, and their dialectical relationship to social structures and social 
activity, evolve within specific political and economic historical environments. As 
particular conceptual systems encode within them certain values that help shape thought 
and action, they cannot help but be privileged as the predominant collective 
explanations of the material circumstances of the era in which they arise. As such, 
certain dominant discourses ‘reflect the material relations that render them dominant 
…[and] articulate these relations, conceptualise them [and] give them form’ (Goldberg, 
1993, p.9). The values they promote will necessarily reflect the ideological needs of 
those who hold economic and political power. This is not to say that such ideas are not 
continually contested, do not co-exist alongside contradictory notions within the mind 
of the same individual, or do not themselves co-opt and incorporate oppositional ideas 
or morph into new forms according to circumstances. Despite this caveat, however, a 
dominant discourse is able to acquire, through constant, banal usage, ‘mass, density and 
referential power’ (Said 1991 [1978], p.20). Due to their prominence, such discourses 
become grids for filtering the dominant values, ideology or worldview they articulate 
into day-to-day thinking, influencing relationships within society at large.  
Various discourses of race, for example, have accompanied the growth of a 
capitalist economic system founded on systemic, organised exploitation; they have 
historically served as a fundamental explanatory adjunct to its divisive political and 
social structures. Although such discourses change in appearance or focus, they are able 
to implicitly refer to each other in a closed circuit of self-validation at the same time as 
taking on the appearance of morally neutral scientific truths, validated by external 
reality. In such a fashion, although the themes associated with the biological basis of 
racial inequality may have long been discredited, its binary typology of advanced and 
less advanced (or even backward) cultures and societies, when evoked against the 
backdrop of a transparent global inequality, appears to remain as part of a bedrock of 
essential ‘truths’.  
The overt ‘scientific racism’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (a racism 
that drew its credentials from scientific and pseudo-scientific ideas of biological 
destiny) was a social construct, and like other social constructs, it must renew itself as 
society develops (cf. Kohn, 1996). Because scientific racism’s claim to provide the 
objective ‘truth’ about human society is rehearsed by modern currents of racialisation, 
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old biological themes can find their way into ‘new containers’ (Ibid.). It can then adapt 
to new demands on its explanatory powers, adopting the ‘objective’ language of the 
most amenable theories of the day – particularly those bearing the imprimatur that 
sophisticated new scientific techniques bestow – in order to naturalise current social 
circumstances: 
 
The social developments of recent years include the onward marches 
of genetic determinism and evolutionary accounts of human 
behaviour, the explosive growth of ethnocentric nationalism, and an 
isolationist mood among affluent whites, who may well be inclined to 
rationalise their reluctance to share resources and space … by 
adopting scientific claims of innate … inferiority (of certain, generally 
poor, generally black, subjects). (Kohn, 1996, p.6) 
 
This binary typology can therefore provide potent images and vocabulary that rely on 
agreed but unspoken codes of understanding, which then adhere to the articulation of 
‘difference’ when it is expressed by the powerful when referencing the powerless in the 
context of an exclusionary and deeply unequal global environment.  
We can see this clearly displayed in Europe when we turn to the rhetorical 
polarisation between different cultures, traditions and societies – with so-called 
‘Western values’ (portrayed as overwhelmingly rational, secular, liberal and logical) 
posited as a sort of universal fulcrum around which all other societies turn, the 
furthermost away being the most benighted. Such a discourse appears to speak to a 
‘known’ reality, and was promoted as such by US policy intellectuals Huntington 
(1998) and Kaplan (1994). Kaplan, for example, speaks of an ‘era driven by 
environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and 
refugee migrations’ (Ibid., p.51), and elaborates this thesis by stressing that ‘disease, 
overpopulation, unprecedented crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the 
erosion of nation-states and international borders’ (Ibid., p.45) increasingly characterise 
the world beyond the borders of the Western nation-state, a large part of which looks set 
to collapse into ‘ungovernable chaos’ – a world he characterises as belonging to 
‘reprimitivized man’ (Ibid., p.55). ‘Difference’ here is defined as embedded not only 
within the value-systems and ways of life of these ‘other’ cultures, but as comprising 
the very essence of those human beings who belong to them. The apparent disjuncture 
between the values and culture of the ‘West and the Rest’ (Huntington 1998) naturally 
becomes the precursor to conflict. Borders are portrayed as battlefronts; the ‘fault lines’ 
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between cultures that delineate the boundaries where inevitable future conflicts will 
erupt, taking us to the edge of the next global war.  
Such attitudes, essentialising other peoples and cultures, and stripping them of 
humanity, enter the popular bloodstream through a banal, daily ritual of reference and 
allusion that ensures that, after time, they gain a normative force and sink into the 
sediment of European societies as a sort of ‘cultural knowledge’. Through the use of 
emotionally charged metaphors, political elites are able to influence or even direct 
intellectual and emotional responses, precisely because ‘metaphor draws on the 
unconscious emotional association of words, the values of which are rooted in cultural 
knowledge’ (Charteris-Black cited in Bleasdale, 2008, p.5). However, the highly 
political context in which this knowledge – and the values that lie embedded within it – 
is produced remains obscured; the emotions evoked by reference to ‘cultural values’ are 
silently divorced from their political origins. 
 
The nation-state and the exclusionary discourse of race 
The resulting discourse helps define the modern nation-state (which Goldberg (2002) 
describes as the naturalised expression of an imposed order) through classifying schema 
that order and set apart through continual acts of inclusion and exclusion. The 
subsequent categories help foster the impression of ‘a circumscribed space in which 
likeness dwells’ (Shelin cited in Goldberg, 2002, p.259); this pre-defined cultural and 
national ‘likeness’ is prized as it is made to appear the prime ingredient of unity and 
collective power – as opposed to other more fundamental relationships that radically cut 
across such manufactured boundaries (particularly relationships of class). Due to its 
constructed nature, however, this artificial but seemingly self-evident ‘likeness’ – and 
its assumed integrity – can only be ensured through the exclusion of those classified as 
different/‘alien’. The ceaseless process of separation and segregation that takes place at 
Europe’s regional/national borders involves fixing identities through bureaucratic 
procedures which dehumanise as they separate, taking individuals with unique, complex 
social and affective histories and erasing all individuality. Those to be excluded are 
marked by the homogenous label ‘illegal migrant’ – a term which is freighted with very 
real consequences for its subjects.  
It is impossible when speaking of such radical exclusion not to imply the 
involvement of racism, particularly as it often forms an insidious undercurrent within 
nationalist discourse – a discourse that relies at base on the classification of individual 
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subjects into the binary categories of citizens (‘insiders’) and non-citizens/’aliens’ 
(‘outsiders’) in order to construct the sense of a natural ‘national’ cohesion that cuts 
across any wider allegiances and identities that might challenge its assumption of 
dominance. Any system of classification operates through categories – which are by 
nature reductive and must contain an internal logic to sustain their coherence. When 
classifying forced migrants, for example, the categories employed have to compress 
identities into a shape that will conform to this mode in order to fully enclose within 
them a multitude of individuals inhabiting innumerable identities formed through varied 
life experiences and social, familial, cultural and emotional histories and relationships. 
If they do not, they risk multiplying the categories beyond functionality. Thus, 
individuals are reduced to ‘ruthless cultural and racial essences’ (Said 1991 [1978], 
p.36) – the human being becomes no longer a unique individual but representative of a 
singular, given identity. A basically ideological portrayal of an abstract and uniform 
systemic ‘difference’ imprisons the individual in an identity from which there is little 
chance of escape, and ‘force[s] vision away from the common, as well as plural, human 
realities … forcing attention instead in … the direction of immutable origins’ (Ibid., 
p.233). As the act of classification is fundamental to the objectification of individual 
human beings, and as viewing certain human beings through a set of static, reductive 
categories as if they were objects is a fundamentally racial act, this naturally opens the 
way to the formation of racialised categories.  
These categories, with their themes of inclusion and exclusion, are sewn into the 
very social fabric of the nation-state, and consequently racism is able to silently 
penetrate everyday life. The classifications turn into social structures and develop into a 
seemingly natural and a-historical system of dominance; they become inherent in the 
hegemonic discourses and the nation-state’s hegemonic apparatus (its institutions, 
practices, social forms and ideology) that are used to keep its imposed order intact – 
naturalising the unnatural. Although, as Harvey (2010, p.258) emphasises, capitalism as 
it is currently constituted can in principle survive without this form of discrimination 
and oppression (that is, racism), ‘its political ability to do so [would] be severely 
curtailed, if not mortally wounded, in the face of a more unified class force’.  
Race can be readily mobilised as a controlling mechanism because the social 
structure and political economy of the European nation-states have already been racially 
conceived and shaped. This took place historically through the processes of global 
dispossession and plunder that funded their rise. The social and political practices 
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through which these processes were made manifest (slavery, colonialism and 
imperialism – each armed with a justifying racial discourse) shaped the nation-state and 
forged the most economically powerful into the standard bearers of the capitalist 
project. As they launched into the maelstrom of competition, rivalry and conflict that 
defines a world structured by capitalism, ideologies of race became crucial. The long-
gestated normalisation of the European nation-state as the naturally given context of its 
citizens’ day-to-day lives means it is able to portray the ‘fetish’ of national identity as 
similarly timeless and unchangeable, ascribing to it markers of ethnicity which have 
become ‘coterminous with the concept of the nation’: ‘race and nation are defined in 
terms of each other’ (Goldberg, 2002, p.10).  
The nation-state is versatile in inventing national identities in the struggle to 
impose socialisation and control, finding the materials for their construction in various 
scientific, pseudo-scientific, cultural and legal sources, incorporating elements from 
prevailing discourses. However, although the ‘seams of the social fabric’ are therefore 
‘identifiable through race’, their origins appear either invisible or shrouded in time 
(Goldberg, 2002, p.9). Ideology, as Said (1991 [1978], p.230) says, ‘ascribes reality to 
objects of its own making …; it conceals its own origins as well as those of what it 
describes’, making cultural, ethnic or racial differences seem to matter more than socio-
economic or political ones by using ‘a vocabulary and epistemological instruments 
designed … to avoid the distractions of circumstance or experience … obliterat[ing] … 
ordinary human reality’. As the nation-state is founded not just on these ‘differences’ 
but on their internalisation, the state apparatus is able to incorporate and naturalise the 
exclusion of ‘difference’ as part of its social fabric. As a result, nationalism as a 
technique of ideological control rarely functions without resource to some form of 
racialised social exclusion, be it marginalisation, segregation or expulsion. 
Bourdieu’s insight (cited in Weiss, 2006) that classifications turn into social 
structures as they become habitual helps clarify how racism (the assignment of criteria 
of ‘difference’) is able to develop into a system of domination, how racialised 
classifications play a leading role in the objective structure of society, and how race 
becomes part of a ‘hidden knowledge’ that can be disinterred and brought to the surface 
when necessary, ready to be manipulated in whatever form fits the political situation. It 
is because racial ‘difference’ is not merely present in the discourse of nationalism, but is 
embedded in the very structure of the nation-state, that it becomes hard to connect 
historical racial configurations to contemporary formations when expressed through 
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other forms of discourse targeting different subjects, and to discern any continuity. 
Racism can be disconnected from its overall historical and social context and displaced 
to the ‘private’ sphere, understood either as an individual (or group) psychological 
aberration or a natural xenophobic reaction, the inevitable result of the ‘clash’ of 
different cultures.  
Thus, when applied to the forced migrant at the European border, racism need not 
speak its name. The threat of the external, the unknown, the ‘outside’ beyond the border 
is, however, racially conceived – while, conversely, being named racially in such a 
context means to be characterised as a threat. This objectification allows the substitution 
of racial reference with coded terms, such as ‘immigration’, ‘criminality’ and ‘illegal 
entry’, which lead, as Goldberg (2002, p.2) argues, ‘not to the end of racism but of its 
charge’; it enables ‘a theoretical silence concerning the implication of the nation-state’, 
concealing the ideological narratives that inform its political and administrative 
apparatus and technologies.  
 
 
The ‘new racism’ and ‘xeno-racism’  
Racism and the concept of ‘cultural difference’ 
As recent theorists of race (cf. Balibar, 1991; Cohen, 1999, 2006; Macedo and Gounari, 
2006; Kundnani, 2007; Seymour, 2010, among others) stress, there is no generic racism: 
it is historically specific in its form, articulation and objects of reference. However, as a 
state-directed system of social control it uses some fundamental ideological techniques 
in order to reify structural inequality – classifying, objectifying and stigmatising its 
victims, ascribing to them an inherent homogeneous essence. If there is a consistent 
feature, it is the trope of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where race is employed as a marker of 
identity. It is also able, when necessary, to raid the store of images, vocabulary and 
rationalisations provided by the previous forms of racialisation to which it is organically 
linked.  
It may appear that racism, as manifest in a previously dominant guise, has been 
banished from open use (for example, the European anti-Semitism of the late 
twentieth/early twenty-first centuries – although, as analysed later in this chapter, 
Islamophobia has since adopted many of its themes), but racism as a form of exclusion 
is resilient and has the capacity to continually reinvent itself. The history of the modern 
capitalist system has left a legacy of racial beliefs scattered in its wake; these represent 
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the raw materials employed by those with power and resources to normalise a 
profoundly unequal economic and political order. Countless earlier episodes of 
institutional racism, many of them enacted in national laws, have provided a repertoire 
of racisms that can be actively mobilised in different contexts at times of social and 
political instability, tension and conflict. There is, as Balibar (1991a) says, not a single 
racism but a spectrum of racisms, and as they are politically and socially constituted, 
their character and articulation can shift according to the requirements of the situation. 
What has been termed the ‘new racism’, therefore, is an adaptive move towards 
the use of culture as a marker of difference, a ‘cultural turn’ first pioneered by the far 
right in Europe. ‘“[A] notion of race and racial purity and exclusivity” … has been 
“transposed, sublimated  and sanitised” into a notion of culture’ (Al-Azmeh cited in 
Williamson and Khiabany, 2010, p.86), isolating racism from its wider historical 
trajectory. It represents the attempt to remove the question of inequality from the 
structure of society by reframing it as an ideological narrative of cultural identity in 
order to legitimate a deeply divided global order, where, as Kundnani (2007, p.1) puts 
it, ‘great wells of human despair, rooted in poverty and powerlessness, can no longer be 
contained with national boundaries’. As these ‘wells of despair’ spill over into richer 
countries around the globe through forced migration, cultural racism is at hand to 
‘explain’ the phenomenon and disguise its fundamental causes.  
The use of culture and ethnicity as the basis for racialised exclusion is not a novel 
tactic, due to the fact of the historically relatively common phenomenon of 
heterogeneous populations living within the circumscribed borders of nation-states. 
However, now more than ever, nation-states are composed of people of various 
ethnicities and cultures, who have many different forms of allegiance and ways of 
understanding their identity, making it increasingly difficult to sustain the myth of the 
naturally and immutably homogenous nature of the nation-state. Globalisation is 
creating metropolitan spaces or ‘global cities’ where millions of individuals, all subject 
to the compulsions of the global market, come into daily contact. As they do so, it 
becomes pressing for the ruling elites to deflect a potentially coherent experience of 
exploitation and sense of growing socio-economic and political disenfranchisement that 
increasingly spans cultural, ethnic and national divides.  
In late twentieth-century Europe, the political managers of the key nation-states, 
such as the UK, sought an answer to this perceived problem in the adoption of a state-
defined ‘multiculturalism’, which Goldberg (2002, p.224) defines as ‘a retreat to a 
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neutral universalism evasive of racial reference and racial histories’. A state-co-opted 
‘multiculturalist’ discourse echoed the lived reality of its population but attempted to 
depoliticise it and (re)present it as a superficial cultural recognition, a celebration of 
diversity devoid of any mention of the underlying context of a deep and abiding 
institutionalised inequality. The fight against racism was redefined solely as the fight 
for ethnic recognition, as if it were conducted on a level social, political and economic 
playing field. Fekete (2006), in fact, believes the term ‘multiculturalism’ in this context 
is a misnomer: it should rightly be called ‘culturalism’. Multiculturalism refers to a 
pluralist society that strives for ‘unity in diversity’ whereas ‘culturalism’ ‘envisages 
society as a conglomeration of ethnic enclaves, separate and ostensibly equal’ (Ibid., 
p.11). As such, when the time came for the political adherents of neoliberalism to mount 
an attack on multiculturalism (primarily because it was seen to be a policy that 
represented, in however weak a fashion, a move towards an acceptance of diversity), it 
turned out to be an attack on a straw opponent. As it had failed to deliver any 
fundamental change, it was all the more ripe for demolition by a similarly state-
promoted ideological backlash. The ensuing rhetoric has become a code for the 
underlying motive: an attack on culturally diverse societies and the potential threat they 
represent to the neoliberal agenda.  
In distinction to the multiculturalist approach, the new racism works to cement the 
conception that not only is social solidarity only possible among groups of individuals 
who share the same language, value system and understanding of the world, but that 
these attributes are overwhelmingly defined by an individual’s ‘cultural identity’. Thus 
differential access to national (and international) economic and social goods is defined 
as a natural system of social organisation. Racialisation is currently employed to 
translate economic and social inequalities into the language of conflicting cultures – and 
in so doing reveals itself to be a powerful political structure of oppression. An ideology 
such as this, however, cannot simply be imposed through a top-down process; these 
ideas must give some (however distorted) explanation of how, for example, Europe’s 
populations experience a world that is structured by competition for scarce resources. 
Cultural paradigms are used to ‘explain’ inequality in all its concrete manifestations: 
unemployment, poverty and marginalisation.  
Meanwhile, this differential cultural racism has been lent a theoretical 
respectability and aura of scientific neutrality by borrowing selected themes from the 
disciplines of sociobiology, ethnology and psychology, which are then used, in their 
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turn, to ‘explain’ the phenomena of popular racism and racial violence that it has itself 
provoked. Balibar (1991a) believes that, in this sense, cultural racism has become a 
‘meta-racism’, which presents itself as a politically operative theoretical explanation of 
the underlying causes of racist aggression. As the new racism clothes itself in the mantle 
of such scientifically ‘neutral’ theoretical discourses to present the notion of cultural 
identity as an immutable and determining essence, racial reference need have no explicit 
recourse to biological reference (although, as argued earlier, cultural racism carries 
biological essentialism as an undercurrent within itxxxvii). As overt biological racism, 
alongside anti-Semitism, are now held to be the only forms in which racism exhibits 
itself, the nation-state, by espousing essentialist ideas about culture, can evacuate itself 
of the charge of racism, even as it is reconfigured beneath the skin of everyday life. 
 
‘Race-free’ anti-asylum discourse 
Thus, racism appears to have abandoned the notion of a fixed, quasi-biological essence 
in preference for the idea of ethnicity and culture – seemingly a more permeable 
account of identities, but one that is equally essentialised and reified – in a move that 
Fekete (2006) describes as ‘cultural fundamentalism’. The mechanisms are the same, 
but this time the practices of objectification, dehumanisation and exclusion employ 
seemingly ‘race-free’ cultural terms. As cultural racism has become an increasingly 
hegemonic and unified discourse, its oft-repeated concepts are embedded in and through 
populist political narratives, and are fast developing into technologies of social control. 
This is manifest, for example, in the way that ‘criminality’ and ‘illegality’ are measured 
and defined by ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ cognitive, socio-psychological and statistical 
techniques, and then transferred onto their cultural avatars: in the first instance, forced 
migrants, closely followed by members of Muslim communities in Europe, then by a 
so-called ‘feral underclass’, addicted to ‘gang culture’ – for example, black inner-city 
youth in Britain or youth of North African origin in the banlieues of France. This is not 
to forget the eternal ‘outsiders’ of every country throughout Europe: the Roma and Irish 
traveller populations. As culture is reified, those subjected to this discourse are equally 
objectified and divested of individual identity. 
The new racism appears to have arisen primarily as a justification for ‘government 
strategies for managing minorities, managing migration for capital accumulation, and 
depoliticising racism to accommodate neoliberal ideology’ (Seymour, 2010, p.90), 
legitimating inequality and exclusion as rationally acceptable by using immigration as a 
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substitute for the idea of race. Indeed, since the 1980s, the focus of ‘race relations’ in 
European countries has been on immigration and the ‘integration’ of ethnic (and 
migrant) communities. The new racism has been embedded through the mechanisms of 
asylum and immigration laws and border controls – an acceptable, clinical form of 
institutionalised racism focused on the forced migrant. Racism, therefore, is now 
directed at those perceived as culturally ‘alien’, and as it operates by allusion and 
conflation, adopting and reconstructing elements of national, religious and ethnic 
stereotypes, the same ideological, technological and administrative mechanisms that 
have been focused on the forced migrant can be equally deployed against the European 
Muslim.  
This is a process that is characterised by Fekete (2009, p.19) as ‘xeno-racism’ 
directed at the forced migrant, a racism that objectifies the individual as ‘alien’ before 
segregating them from society and/or expelling them. As the European harmonisation of 
migration control coalesces into a system of ‘global migration management’ (moving 
towards a de facto near-abolition of the right to claim asylum within Europe), the ‘xeno-
racist’ discourse supplies an ideological response to global dislocation and 
dispossession, using a mixture of ‘neutral’ managerial language and emotive imagery. It 
dehumanises the individual by viewing them through the prism of ‘objective’ numerical 
projections and statistical reports, and these are then co-opted and disseminated by a 
populist rhetoric that is deeply imbued with cultural determinism. Thus, the European 
immigration and asylum regime is able to formalise racial difference through its 
exclusionary processes without recourse to articulating overtly racist themes. 
 
 
Cultural racism and national belonging  
The ‘national identity’ debate 
The idea of cultures as unchanging, closed totalities is crystallised in the idea of an 
inherent national identity. ‘Identity’ is a malleable concept and is vulnerable to being 
shaped by ideas central to the dominant ideology: national identity, Goldberg (2002, 
pp.117-8) maintains, is simply ‘the (informal) codification of the cultural characteristics 
and values of a dominant or majority group whose definition is state related or directed’. 
By enclosing all the identities of individuals dwelling within the national space in one 
reductive category, it attempts to translate the artifice of a racial (and class) 
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homogeneity – one that is no longer tenable as it so transparently does not accord with 
reality – into a cultural homogeneity.  
This reductive definition of identity has led to a closer alignment between the 
themes of national belonging and shared values and the right to be a part of the group of 
national ‘insiders’, partaking in the privileges of citizenship – employment, welfare and 
personal security being prized as the foremost benefits, the more so at times of high 
unemployment and rising poverty, when the security net of welfare is under threat from 
neoliberal governments intent on reducing its scope, promoting a radical sense of  
personal insecurity. An individual who possesses a certain dominant national identity 
(‘belonging’ to a European nation-state, for example) is portrayed as inherently imbued 
with a set of superior social and moral norms, giving them a sense of entitlement, and 
thus rationalising and naturalising the differential access to social goods at both a 
national and a global level. As such, national culture and national identity as the bearers 
of entitlement have become key themes in the transmission of a neoliberal ideology – an 
ideology that attempts to displace discontent at rising unemployment, the dismantling of 
essential public services and the ever-widening gulf between wealth and poverty.  
The codification of national identity in citizenship laws is an example of the way 
in which privilege and marginalisation are constructed and normalised as they are 
sutured into the social fabric. The racial politics of inclusion and exclusion, translated 
into a cultural narrative of national belonging, naturalises the binary relationship of 
insider/citizen and outsider/’alien’. The individual is relegated to one or the other 
category ‘not according to what one does or what one believes, but on a “common 
sense” basis, on account of who one “is” ’ (McNevin, 2006, p.137). In each European 
country the national identity debate has taken on nationally specific themes, defining 
more exclusively what it means to be a citizen, thus reinforcing the identity of the 
‘alien’ and the idea that such individuals carry within them a threat to core ‘European 
values’ – representing, at the very least, the danger of cultural dilution. These racialised 
discourses animate, and are disseminated through, the administrative technologies of 
citizenship reforms, integration policies, cultural codes of conduct, and securitised 
asylum and immigration laws. For example, the 2002 UK White Paper, Secure Borders, 
Safe Havens, with its introduction of citizenship tests, language tests and oaths of 
allegiance, intended to inculcate a ‘shared sense of belonging and identity’ and ‘cultural 
cohesion’, heralded the definitive break with an official tolerance of cultural diversity 
(or ‘multiculturalism’) (Seymour, 2010, p.81). This was reinforced by the appeals of so-
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called liberal commentators for the privileging of nationalism and ‘British values’ and 
the demand for integrationxxxviii. 
Throughout Europe, such demands have continued to be reinforced by a 
succession of punitive measures. Fekete (2004) details how those who refuse to take or 
who fail such ‘integration’ tests are threatened with expulsion (Austria), with fines and 
having their social security payments cut (the Netherlands), or their residence rights 
removed or curtailed (France). As early as 2004, former Dutch immigration/integration 
minister Rita Verdunk felt empowered enough by the mainstreaming of the ideology of 
a superior ‘European culture’ to float the idea of ‘integration badges’ (although this was 
a step too far for the majority of her fellow politicians: it was too redolent of the Nazi’s 
introduction of the yellow star for European Jews)xxxix; while the current French 
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, raised the proposal, when interior minister in 2005, that 
immigrant women ‘trapped at home’, who do not speak the national language, should be 
divested of their right of residence (Fekete, 2009, p.85).  
More recently, in keeping with the mood of resurgent, exclusivist nationalist 
rhetoric and policies, the European Commission issued a directive to the European 
Parliament in 2011, entitled ‘The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals’, that called for ‘more efficient and effective integration policies’ and 
introduced ‘a flexible European toolbox … allowing Member States to choose the 
measures which are most likely to prove effective in their context’ (European 
Commission, 2011). The force behind this injunction may be veiled in neutral official 
language, but given the context in which it is deployed and the heightened sense of 
nationalist feeling that the very term ‘integration’ is imbued with, it could scarcely fail 
to be taken as an endorsement of the adoption of punitive measures against those who 
are deemed to fall short of the radically unequal standards of ‘national belonging’, and 
who are therefore characterised as unwilling to ‘integrate’ into the ‘national 
community’. Indeed, in Germany, a new word ‘Integrationsverweigerer’ has entered the 
racially inflected lexicon of negative descriptions of migrant ‘identity’ – it means ‘one 
who refuses integration’. 
 
Language and ‘integration’ 
The issue of language as the touchstone of cultural homogeneity has become a recurring 
theme in Europe over the past few years. In relation to migrants and migrant 
communities, the debate about language is couched in terms of a ‘language deficit’, and 
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this particular aspect of ‘cultural identity’ has found a new level of urgency in the 
rhetoric of leading national politicians – at a time when governments, facing the impact 
of global economic crisis on their countries’ fortunes, are administering deep cuts to 
public welfare, including the near-uniform withdrawal of funding for provision of 
precisely the sort of language courses the Commission appears to recommend. That 
language has become a tool in the ongoing process of marginalisation is clearly 
illustrated by recent examples from Germany and Austria. At the same time as the 
Association for German Languages was attempting to insert an acknowledgement of the 
primacy of the German language into the German constitution itself, across the border 
the Austrian government was introducing ‘pre-entry integration language requirements’ 
and proposing legislation that would decree the deportation of those migrants already 
living in the country whose German does not attain a certain level of competence within 
their first few years of residence (cf. Fekete, 2011).  
The defining motif of such policies and pronouncements is that of the border (cf. 
chapter three). It arises in this context with the concept of ‘identity gatekeepers’, in the 
dual shape of those delegated to maintain European border controls against ‘culturally 
alien’ ‘outsiders’ and those mandated to police the increasingly exclusionary citizenship 
criteria. In Younge’s (2010, p.105) words, ‘The gatekeepers adjust the rules of entry 
according to the political, economic and social demands of the time, even as they insist 
they are authenticating a timeless truth’. The creation of a Ministry of Immigration and 
National Identity in France symbolises this intimate connection between securitised 
borders and cultural assimilation policies, mobilising through its very name a set of 
racialised images and stereotypes. Identities, however, for all they have become 
ideological tools, remain rooted in material circumstances – for the forced migrant, 
grounding access to citizenship (and consequently to an approved and nationally 
recognised official identity) in racialised cultural criteria can mean the difference not 
only between citizenship and statelessness, and between a measure of material security 
and absolute poverty, but even between life and death. Between them, the material 
function of globally extensive border controls and the ideological function of internal 
‘identity borders’ perform a triangulation of the forced migrant, trapping them in the no-
man’s land of a seemingly inherent ‘alien’ status. 
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Islamophobia and cultural racism 
The new Orientalism 
The securitisation of the asylum process (cf. chapter five), which drives both the 
incessant (re)construction and ‘strengthening’ of border controls and the creation of  
‘identity borders’ in the form of immigration and asylum, residency and citizenship 
laws, has contributed to the development of cultural racism and, at the same time, been 
defined by its assumptions. However, cultural racism, in the form of a xeno-racism 
directed towards the forced migrant, which is portrayed as an objective, ‘raceless’ form 
of governance, has been further wedded to (and complicated by) a new form of 
Orientalism. In Said’s (1991 [1978]) seminal description, Orientalism was created as a 
tool for hegemony – a body of theory and practice that seeks to provide an ontological 
explanation that obliterates ordinary human reality. Islamic societies (and those 
individuals who comprise them) are thus confined within a set of static, reductive 
categories. A web of social and cultural stereotypes act as ‘an accepted grid for filtering 
the Orient into Western consciousness’ (Ibid., p.6). Said further points to the 
‘redoubtable durability’ of Orientalist discourse; it appears to contain the capacity to be 
continually reproduced from one era to another. Today, however, its subjects are no 
longer confined to a specific geographical area, located beyond European borders, but 
are to be found within Europe itself. Davis (2006, p.205) believes this is the highest 
stage of Orientalism, the ‘culmination of a long history of defining the West by 
opposing it to a hallucinatory Eastern other’. Under the aegis of the war on terror, the 
re-emergence of the discourse of an embattled Western civilisation opposing a 
‘backward’, ubiquitous ‘barbarism’ (most specifically, a fundamentalism that is inferred 
to be inherent in Islam) has provided a near-hegemonic analytical structure that 
retrieves old explanations of difference in cultural (and implicitly biological) terms. 
That is, it has adopted a fundamentally racialised discourse.  
As many analysts of race have shown, Orientalism also reproduces the classic 
features of anti-Semitism. The transmutation of the former Jewish enemies into Muslim 
ones has been a smooth, silent process because they essentially represent the same 
figure: ‘Islam’ as a social and religious prototype is equally an ideological portrayal, 
primed for political use through the deployment of the same dogmas and the same sense 
of absolute and systemic ‘difference’. Both deal in abstractions, creating – by means of 
a systematic and generalised vocabulary – a uniform template that forces individuals 
into the same immutable shape. As in the anti-Jewish conspiracy theories of the first 
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half of the twentieth century, the figures thus created are to be despised and feared in 
equal measure, and consequently must be controlled or expelled. In the Britain of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the media-led campaigns that 
were so obsessed with the ‘problem of the alien’ were directed against East European 
Jewish refugees seeking shelter from the pogroms raging in the Russian empire. A 
similar politics of fear as the one we are witness to today was threaded through the 
rhetoric of the day: not only fear of ‘Jewish anarchist terror’, but of potential cultural 
and racial ‘extinction’. This apocalyptic discourse spoke in the scientific language of a 
particularly virulent strand of social Darwinism, what Carr (2006) calls ‘racial 
Darwinism’. Thus, when the common supremacist trope of the threat of being ‘outbred’ 
and ‘overrun’ by a culturally ‘alien’ and hostile population is rehearsed in modern form, 
as when the feted British author Martin Amis (2006) refers to European Muslims in 
such terms, it cannot be simply dismissed as anachronistic. This theme has remained a 
fertile source for racially motivated verbal attacks, and its use by such an established 
literary figure means that, despite its genocidal history, it is making its way once again 
into mainstream discourse. This time round, however, such ‘liberal’ commentators 
appear to believe they have immunised the trope against the charge of racism by 
disconnecting it from its historical victims and applying it to new ones, and by clothing 
their rhetoric in the garb of ‘cultural difference’. In fact, Balibar (1991a) describes anti-
Semitism – the very essence of a ‘racism without race’ – as the prototype of today’s 
cultural racism.  
 
‘Cultural identity’ and ‘cultural difference’ 
I would further argue that an influential strand of ‘cultural’ academic discourse, with its 
conscious retreat from ideas of class and ‘grand narratives’ of resistance, especially 
collective struggles, has provided the necessary sociological language in which the new 
cultural racism can be expressed by such cultural commentators. An understanding of 
the multiplicity of different identities co-existing within one nationally defined 
geographical space and increasingly across ‘mobile borders’ has led to celebration of 
the birth of a new ‘hybrid subject’ (cf. Bhabha, 1994). However, an analysis based on 
the idea of identity as defined solely by its cultural attributes cannot fully interrogate the 
stark realities of neoliberal ideology and policies that structure the world such ‘hybrid 
subjects’ inhabit. As Sharma (2006) shows, Hardt and Negri theorised this danger: 
postcolonial theory, they claimed, had deconstructed racial binaries but replaced them 
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with the concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘difference’; the early discourse of ‘cultural 
difference’ thus occluded the reality of an institutionalised differential 
inclusion/segregation and exclusion. Minimising the complex, dialectical relationship of 
knowledge and power, culture and ideology to a class-based, globally operative system 
of exploitation that produces extremes of power and powerlessness, means that such 
concepts as ‘cultural identity’ and ‘difference’ can then be mobilised as ideological 
tools of racialisation.  
By drawing on this privileging of ‘cultural identity’ above all else, such ‘liberal’ 
commentators as Goodhart (2007) are able to claim that European politics has been 
eclipsed by the new ‘culture wars’ – code for the idea of Islam as an alien and 
monolithic cultural bloc, the very antithesis of ‘European cultural values’. This is 
despite the overwhelmingly obvious fact that, as Carr (2010a) points out, in France 
alone, the Muslim population hails from over fifty-three countries and speaks twenty-
one different languages, and therefore can hardly be described as homogenous. The 
differentiation within the Muslim world, with its complex interrelationships of 
ethnicities, cultures, and economic, sociological and political histories, renders the idea 
of a single Muslim/Islamic ‘culture’ meaningless. As Ahmad (2007) explains: 
  
For most, being a Muslim mainly signifies the fact of birth in a 
Muslim family, at best a Muslim subculture within a wider national 
culture (Egyptian, Nigerian, Lebanese or whatever); while religion … 
is always one of the many ingredients in one’s complex social 
identity, which is always specific, and hence deeply tied to language, 
region, customs and class, and so on… [R]eligious observance, if any, 
remains largely local and personal. This subcultural Muslimness itself 
is contextual, deeply shaped by history, geography, politics, the larger 
multi-religious milieu [and] myriad rhythms of material life… 
(Ahmed, 2007, p.1)  
 
As Ahmad (2007, p.2) illustrates, it is totally misleading to ‘ascribe to some inherent 
Islamic-ness of the polity or the culture as such’ as this obscures the many different 
forms that Muslim societies take, and posits instead a sort of ‘hyper-Islamicity’. It 
resurrects the idea that ‘religion is the constitutive element of a culture, and hence also 
of its social existence and political destiny’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, Islam itself, as a 
theological rather than cultural expression, encompasses an equally wide variety of 
theoretical and political positions, which are also shaped by internal currents of class 
and ethnicity. In fact, religion is itself historically constructed, and the way it develops 
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shows that the demarcation between religion and non-religion is neither trans-historical 
nor transnational – it is an expression of the ongoing struggle over the way individuals 
insert themselves into a specific society that has been shaped by forces that appear to be 
beyond their ability to change (cf. Vakil, 2010).  
A sense of alterity has been formed by a globalised world shaped by Western 
cultural, financial and military institutions: the neoliberal vision of prosperity until 
recently expounded by Western ideologues and endlessly portrayed by the media as a 
realisable aspiration is no more than a deception for billions of people – the more so as 
economic crisis and radical austerity measures dismantle the basis for this myth. This is 
compounded in Europe by racial stereotyping, poverty and the singling out of Muslim 
and migrant communities by security measures and targeted legislation. Such measures 
are used to further essentialise Muslims, whereby signs of cultural difference, such as 
wearing a niqab or even a headscarf, are interpreted as symbolic of subversive intent. It 
is of little surprise that many young European Muslims react by using such symbols, in 
a political gesture of defiance, as signs of a common, universal religious identity. 
Meanwhile, the idea of Islamic societies, and therefore Muslim populations, as 
homogenised ‘unrelenting enemies’ of the ‘European values’ of human rights, 
democracy and freedom of the individual (cf. Huntington, 1998) continues to thrive – 
and this is seemingly validated by the reactive political appropriation of the myth of a 
‘universal’ Islam.  
The new Orientalism, therefore, homogenises, racialises and dehumanises those it 
categorises, but as it is posed in cultural (as well as security) terms, its racial 
implications are denied. Yet expressions of anti-Islamic sentiment have become the 
leitmotif of contemporary racism, one that facilitates the passage of older racisms into 
the mainstream. The representation of Muslim communities as a ‘demographic 
timebomb’ at the heart of Europe, for example, not only uses military terminology to 
enhance the sense of threat, but harks back to earlier colonial themes of 
‘mongrelisation’ and ‘degeneration’. This time, however, the racism is based on 
religious belonging as the primary marker of ‘cultural’/racial difference (as was its 
precursor, anti-Semitism).  
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National identity and the discourse of ‘Eurabia’ 
The role of the ‘intellectual elite’  
To be fully functional, any form of institutional racism must reproduce itself at different 
levels of society: a complex web of public actors and governmental processes help 
embed it in everyday language and social structures. Anti-terrorist and anti-asylum 
legislation ensure the gradual normalisation of Islamophobia and the new racism within 
Europe by legitimising a commonsense anti-alien/anti-Muslim discourse that, in turn, 
justifies the implementation of increasingly targeted authoritarian policies. At the same 
time, the populist press is aided by media commentators and/or academics (such as 
Caldwell, Cohen, Amis, Hitchens, Goodhart, Anthony and Ferguson in the UK; Henry-
Levy and Bruckner in France; Scheffer in the Netherlands; Storhaug in Denmark; and 
Sarazin and Schwarzer in Germany) in drawing the parameters of this discourse and 
directing its flow along well-worn, highly racialised channels.  
Throughout its history, the nation-state has frequently harnessed the power of 
intellectuals (academics, advisers, expert commentators) and bent it to the task of 
framing, directing and authorising popular prejudices, lending them a semi-scientific 
veneer. Such discourses, of course, are never merely ‘neutral’ analyses but evaluative 
interpretations, and, as they are deployed in a climate of heightened racialisation that 
they themselves help establish, they are intensely political  – although the actual 
political function of ‘disinterested humanists’ is mediated through a complex dialectical 
process (one that Gramsci analysed at length (cf. Thomas, 2009)) and it is not 
necessarily apparent. However, through the theoretical and discursive construction of 
Europe’s formative ‘other’ as representing a distinctly different culture, European 
citizens have historically been encouraged to view Islam, and Muslim communities, 
through a well-honed imperialist prism of ethnocentrism and racism. As this discourse 
now takes place in a ‘cultural’ framework, it can be evacuated of its political and 
historical context and rendered as a morally neutral and objective viewpoint, cleansed of 
the taint of politicisation.  
Armed with this depoliticising ‘sociological’ discourse, the figure of the Muslim, 
as in previous phases of Orientalism, can be reduced to a few simple phrases, images 
and concepts. Different forms of vocabulary may be employed – ‘immigration’, 
‘integration’, ‘citizenship’, ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ – according to the context, but 
these coded expressions all have one consistent referent: the Muslim/‘alien’. Although 
at first sight the overtly Islamophobic rhetoric of far-right members of national 
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parliaments in Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as that of 
politicians in the more centrist parties, may appear to bear little relationship to the 
(sometimes) more measured arguments of ‘cultural’ commentators and researchers, in 
both cases the language is highly organised and encoded; it trades on agreed codes of 
understanding. The dominant framework is the absolute demarcation between East and 
West, which has been centuries in the making. Earlier traditions of cultural racism have 
provided a rich store of vocabulary, imagery and generalisations, which lend the 
polarisation between different cultures and societies the status of a generally accepted, 
commonsense ‘truth’. An interlocking system of specific modes of expression and 
intellectual currents of thought transform superiority/inferiority and inclusion/exclusion 
into seemingly natural phenomena (cf. Brennan, 2007). 
Within such an environment, the argument espoused by Caldwell (2009), for 
example, that large-scale immigration (in particular, Muslim immigration) is 
transforming a weak, ageing, unconfident Europe, loosening the bonds of national 
allegiance and chipping away its social cement, appears to be gaining the status of 
orthodoxy amongst European politicians. And as it does so, its essentialist assumptions 
move from the political margins into the mainstream, as the mostly uncritical reception 
of Caldwell’s work testified. The rehearsal of such themes as the demographic advance 
of an antagonist Muslim culture in Europe through migration and high fertility rates has 
taken on a new, hard-edged, aggressive expression among a certain intellectual milieu. 
The historian Niall Ferguson (2004), for example, speaks of a ‘youthful Muslim society 
to the south and east of the Mediterranean’ poised to colonise a ‘senescent’ Europe, and 
warns of the ‘creeping Islamicisation of a decadent Christendom’.  
In time-honoured Orientalist mode, the ‘intellectual elite’ disseminate their 
version of the received notion of ‘Muslim rage’, whereby ‘radicalisation’ is only 
explicable in psychological or cultural terms. For example, Harold Evans (2006), an 
influential commentator on both sides of the Atlantic, claims the drive towards ‘a new 
Salafist totalitarianism’ is fast becoming a fundamental part of the ‘identity’ and 
psychological makeup of young European Muslims. Meanwhile, Amis (2006) openly 
espouses all the racialised tropes of Islamophobia: a Muslim belief in one Islamic 
continuum, where there is ‘no individual, only the umma’, that threatens Europe’s 
Enlightenment tenet of the sacred status of individual freedom; the ‘tyranny, corruption, 
absence of civil rights and civil society’ – an ‘institutionalised irrationalism’ – endemic 
in Muslim societies; and the birth of a ‘millennial Islam’, ‘an ideology superimposed on 
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a religion’. ‘Islamicism’, Amis claims, is ‘not just a violent tendency, violence is all 
there is’, and he further describes ‘Islamicism’ as a ‘barbarism’ more invidious than 
German fascismxl (Ibid.). Indeed, the term ‘Islamofascism’ is fast becoming common 
currency.  
As Mishra (2007) says, such discourses are unable to acknowledge the political 
and ideological beliefs upheld by some Muslims as a ‘social and emotional reality in the 
world’ that cannot be reduced to individual rage and envy or to a certain form of 
religious observance or interpretation of religious edicts. Yet the conflation of the terms 
‘Islamicist’ or ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islam’xli means that such concepts can be used to intensify 
a sense of impending catastrophe and to predict the end of secular society in Europe. 
The continent, it is claimed, has not only become criss-crossed by ‘no-go areas’, created 
by ‘self-segregating’ Muslim communities, but is now a base for jihadist operations 
across the globe. The danger is that ideologues do not operate in a political vacuum, and 
the vocabulary they use can gain a popular purchase when societies face real economic 
and social crises. In this context, Mishra (2007) quotes Reinhold Neibhur in the 1920s: 
‘men of culture’ give ‘the hysteria of wars and imbecilities of national politics more 
plausible excuses than the average man is capable of inventing’.  
 
Cultural racism and European identity 
It can be politically convenient for the national managers of capitalism in its neoliberal 
guise to attribute to a religion (Islam) questions that are fundamentally political. By 
further stressing the psychopathology of ‘Islamicism’, the real causes of disaffection 
within Muslim societies, that lie rooted in the experiences of imperialism, war, 
oppression and racism, can be depoliticised. The current slew of government-backed 
research, conducted throughout the core countries of the European Union, into issues 
such as that of the ‘problem’ of ‘Muslim integration’, helps construct such a 
psychologically inflected ‘sociology of Islamic radicalisation’ (cf. Dornhof, 2009). By 
denying the necessity for political analysis and framing its debate in purely 
‘sociological’ terms, such research serves a crucial ideological function. It is 
dialectically related to the racialised ideology that it helps succour, being both 
embedded in and giving credence to the political discourse of Islamophobia. For the 
most part, such research fails to interrogate the accepted idea that a lack of ‘integration’ 
is due to a certain Muslim ‘attitude’ (which is then related to specific cultural 
characteristics) that represents an intractable social problem. Based on a set of 
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normatively loaded concepts and reductive assumptions, it traffics in a reality of its own 
making. Such research provides intellectual support for the policies of targeting and 
controlling already marginalised minority populations.  
Equally, the spread of agenda-driven think-tanks, focused on the question of 
‘Islam in Europe’, plays a crucial role in disseminating and naturalising Islamophobia 
and the new racism by popularising the idea of a new existential threat. Kundnani 
(2008a) shows how, in the UK, Policy Exchange speaks in terms of ‘alienated ghettos’ 
and ‘Islamic fascism’, and calls for the curtailment of civil libertiesxlii; the Social Affairs 
Unit calls for the dismantling of ‘state multiculturalism’, the withdrawal from European 
human rights law, deportations, and the surveillance of Muslim students in British 
universities; while the Centre for Social Cohesion (formerly Civitas) recommends a ban 
on ‘Muslim immigration’. The reports emanating from these organisations conflate the 
idea of extremism and British Muslims, buttressing an ideological atmosphere that 
normalises ‘attacks on multiculturalism, the restriction of civil liberties, the suppression 
of Muslim voices, [and the] downplaying of international issues’, moulding them into 
an ‘acceptable common political agenda’ (Ibid.). These key themes are employed by 
politicians time and again in the ‘national identity debate’ – for example, translating 
social exclusion into a failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ into society, and condemning 
multicultural policies as the source of the erosion of collective norms, core values and a 
sense of ‘community cohesion’.  
Britain is not alone in propounding the idea that multiculturalism has been used as 
a cover for reactionary cultural practices; this sentiment has been echoed in France, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany – in fact, throughout most of Europe. 
Incorporated into the agendas of Europe’s mainstream political parties, particularly in 
countries where openly Islamophobic parties hold the balance of power in coalition 
governments or collaborate with mainstream parties at a regional or local level, and 
where increasingly vocal neo-fascist and ultra-right wing nationalist parties mobilise a 
high share of the popular vote, the political manipulation of such a highly racialised 
discourse provides a dangerous precedent.  
The image of Islam as incompatible with ‘European-ness’, added to a racialised 
discourse that presents Muslim communities as a threat to European national integrity 
(culturally, by virtue of their ‘alien’ culture, founded upon ‘backward’ and heirarchical 
religious ideas, and demographically, through migration and high birth rates) has 
spawned the concept of ‘Eurabia’. This apocalyptic vision of a Europe dominated by its 
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Muslim presence is deployed as part of a political project: the quest for a pan-European 
identity. Orientalism, of course, as Said (1991 [1978], p.7) says, ‘has never been far 
from the idea of Europe’. It is used to cement a collective notion of ‘us’ Europeans 
through the identification of the ‘other’ non-Europeans – the sense of an overarching 
European identity is thus derived negatively. By converting individuals into the 
ideological bearers of a region’s values, ideas and culture, the European identity is 
discursively produced through projecting a sense of absolute ‘difference’. ‘Europe’ is 
defined in the shadow of the threat of a supposed Islamic ‘hyper-identity’. Taking their 
cue from Huntington’s (1998) idea that the ‘cultural wars’ of Europe presage a Fourth 
World War (he describes the Cold War as the third global conflict) which will usher in 
an ‘era of barbarism’, proponents of the idea of ‘Eurabia’ view Europe as the new front 
line in a battle to decide the future of its identity, and of the continent itself.  
 
 
The war on terror, the military discourse of race, and the securitisation of asylum 
The institutionalisation of anti-Muslim racism 
Although these themes have been rehearsed many times over recent decades, especially 
since the end of the Cold War, the war on terror appears to have been the catalyst for 
their projection into mainstream visibility and their embedding in European society. The 
war on terror itself follows a racist logic: anti-terror legislation adopted throughout 
Europe, but especially in the UK, has institutionalised anti-Muslim racism. The debate 
on the limitations of cultural diversity, the attack on multiculturalism, and the 
construction of ‘Islam’ and the figure of the ‘Muslim’ as objects to be studied and 
categorised in traditional Orientalist fashion, cannot be divorced from the global 
franchising of the war on terror. I argue that his has resulted in the naturalisation of the 
securitisation of legislation concerning forced migrants, who are now portrayed as an 
‘alien’ threat not only to social and cultural cohesion but also to national security – 
especially if they originate from Muslim-majority countries (cf. chapter five). 
The war on terror has, indeed, added a further dimension to the neoliberal pan-
European project, providing it with a military discourse, imbuing the structures of 
national security – which are inextricably connected to Europe’s ‘global asylum regime’ 
– with the politics of fear and a culture of xenophobia and Islamophobia. The call for a 
‘new crusade’, in the form of an aggressive reassertion of ‘liberal’ values and national 
identity, has taken hold – one that presents itself as both a cultural and ideological 
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response to the imminent threat to an essential ‘European-ness’. This is interpreted, in 
Kundnani’s (2008b) words, as ‘the first phase in a new Cold War’. In this scenario, little 
if any distinction is made between the term ‘Muslim’ and the term ‘Islamicist’ (or 
‘Islamic terrorist’); either already ‘radicalised’ or ‘at risk of radicalisation’, due to the 
very nature of their religious belief or ‘identity’, European Muslims are presented as a 
sort of fifth column or Trojan Horse, infiltrating the core countries of the European 
Union. But whether they be established communities in Europe, forced migrants from 
Muslim-majority countries, or the populations of these countries themselves, 
particularly those in North Africa, at the edges of Europe, Muslims are seen as an 
apocalyptic threat, representing the implantation of an ‘alien culture’ in the heart of 
Europe – one that threatens to engulf the continent demographically, culturally and 
politically (cf. Carr, 2009b).  
Many so-called liberal commentators openly deploy all the elements of a narrative 
of fear. For example, Caldwell’s (2009) analysis of what he perceives to be the moral, 
‘spiritual’ and social crisis wracking Europe, and of its impending cultural demise (his 
account was written before the spread of a more earth-bound economic crisis in the 
Eurozone countries), employs the themes of European decadence and Islamic 
resurgence, comparing Europe’s ageing population and faltering birth rates with a 
youthful and fertile Muslim one. Caldwell believes that ‘multiculturalism’ has led to the 
establishment in cities throughout Europe of ‘parallel societies’ and ‘ethnic colonies’ 
that harbour crime and backward cultural practices, and represent potential seedbeds for 
a ‘home-grown’ ‘Islamic terrorism’ (Ibid.). 
In distinction to such emotive rhetoric, however, the reality is that in the European 
Union Muslims constitute no more than 20 million out of a 540 million-strong 
population (Council of Foreign Relations, 2009); many are underprivileged and 
marginalised, ‘internal outsiders’, struggling against racism and a lack of opportunity 
and access to civil rights. Many more live with an increasing sense of existing in a state 
of siege, subject to both a rising level of verbal and physical violence and intimidation, 
and the disciplinary tactics of state ‘biopower’ in the form of profiling and invasive 
surveillance. The Muslim youth, for example, who live on the high-rise estates that ring 
the outskirts of French cities, zones of deprivation and exclusion, are subject to 
military-style policing and locked into a cycle of discrimination and criminalisation (cf. 
chapter five). In particular, forced migrants, who also happen to be Muslim, often find 
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themselves living a precarious existence. Yet the concept of ‘Eurabia’ completely 
reverses this dynamic. 
 
The European security agenda: the Muslim ‘other’ and the forced migrant 
The ideological mobilisation of ‘identity’ in such a context can only lead to further 
sedimentation of the already extreme relations of power and marginality manifest in the 
policies dictated by a near-uniform European security agenda that appears to have even 
national legislation in its grip. An institutionalised anti-Muslim racism is displayed in 
both the criminal justice systems and the citizenship laws of the core European nations. 
Citizenship entry requirements have been redrafted to include ‘codes of conduct’ (as 
outlined earlier) in country after country: speaking a minority language or cleaving to a 
minority cultural background is portrayed as representing not only a threat to national 
coherence and the integrity of the national culture, but also a potential security risk. 
Meanwhile, the roll call of anti-Muslim legislation has grown increasing long, from the 
calling of referendums to authorise a ban on the construction of mosques with minarets 
in Switzerland and Italy, and the monitoring of places of Muslim worship and their 
imams in Denmark, to the criminalisation of Muslim women who wear the veil in 
public in Francexliii, Belgium and Switzerland. Meanwhile, a system of disciplinary 
surveillance, religious profiling, control orders, curfews, exemplary arrests and 
detention (the policies vary according to the country), ushered in by the war on terror, 
naturalises the image of Muslims as a suspect ‘nation within a nation’xliv. This has 
helped provoke an exaggerated sense of fear among the general population, directed 
towards their Muslim neighbours.  
In the UK, a shadow criminal justice system appears to have emerged, one that 
mimics the already established lineaments of a separate system of justice for asylum 
applicants. This has opened the way for the deportation of foreign nationals who are 
deemed to be a ‘security risk’ back to situations of extreme personal danger (in flagrant 
contradiction of the government’s professed adherence to the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’ as laid down in the Refugee Convention). Due to the already established 
definition of forced migrants as inherently ‘illegal’ and ‘alien’ and consequently falling 
outside the norms of national (and even international) justice, the use of immigration 
and asylum legislation as a template for anti-terrorist measures has lent an aura of legal 
impunity to the avoidance of the customary checks and balances of the judicial process. 
These political operations are therefore premised on the racialised stereotypes and 
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culture of suspicion endemic in an emerging ‘security state’. This new strain of anti-
Muslim racism has, in its turn, further legitimised the securitisation of the European 
asylum regime (cf. chapter five). The security agenda has linked anti-terrorist measures 
into the asylum process: its victims are for the most part not ‘Islamic terrorists’ but 
forced migrants. Raids against undocumented migrants and arrests for the infringement 
of alien/immigration laws, justified by recourse to the discourse of security, criminalise 
the struggle by ‘illegal migrants’ to survive. As they are ‘vulnerable to the awesome 
power of the European state and to the repressive reach of their countries of origin’ and 
marginalised by poverty and a lack of rights, forced migrants are easy targets (Fekete, 
2004, pp.16-17).  
In many ways, therefore, the characterisation of the forced migrant as the ‘illegal’ 
‘global alien’ has melded with the construction of the figure of a demonised Muslim 
‘other’. This particular racial stereotype has become politically operational throughout a 
Europe obsessed with, on the one hand, its destiny as the carrier of universal ideals of 
individual freedom and democracy, and on the other, with its sense of itself as a waning 
global influence (particularly vis-à-vis China), with its ageing, apparently morally 
ambivalent and often fractious populations, who are seemingly infected with a faltering 
sense of national identity and increasing feeling of disenfranchisement from the political 
process. This latter concern has frequently surfaced in the ‘European identity’ debate, 
despite the fact that, as Anderson (2011) argues, the development of the European 
Union has not cleaved to any original concept of it as a democratic federation. It has 
instead proceeded over the decades along distinctly Hayekian lines, becoming an elite, 
financially driven project, with little or no democratic accountability, subject only to the 
constraints of the market. This mixture of grand visions and dystopian views has been 
further compounded by a very real economic crisis, presaging the return of a full-scale 
global recession. With the stalling of its neoliberal motor, Europe faces the possibility 
of the implosion of the Eurozone, a potential retraction of the European Union itself, 
and the threat that popular protests against the neoliberal doctrine of austerity could 
ignite a more generalised social upheaval. 
Huntington (1998), some time before the onset of crisis, gave expression to this 
fear of a Europe cut loose from its moorings in a sea of warring cultures and forced to 
cede its role as the universal arbiter of human values. Even as he claimed the West to be 
the very source of the modern notion of a benign universal civilisation, informed by its 
inherent liberal, democratic, Enlightenment values, he warned that in future there will 
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be no universal civilisations, but a world of different civilisations. Elements of 
Huntington’s thesis, however discredited it may have since become in academic circles, 
appears to remain an attractive recourse for European politicians and their security 
establishments. For many years since the end of the Cold War, these organisations and 
their political managers have been preoccupied with the ‘problems’ of immigration and 
asylum, that is, with the ‘threat’ posed by the non-European forced migrant. Now the 
focus has also turned to the ubiquitous, abstract, global threat of a ‘radical Islam’ (and, 
by conflation, of Islam itself) – a threat that is believed to be carried into the heart of 
Europe by migrants from Muslim-majority countries, thus combining the twin security 
preoccupations in one. This image of an embattled but universal European essence, 
challenged by overwhelmingly youthful, ultra-religious and profoundly illiberal Islamic 
societies beyond its borders, has gained power and coherence by virtue of placing 
Europe’s perceived antithesis, the ‘Islamic enemy’, in a similar ‘trans-temporal, trans-
racial category’, producing, as Said (1991 [1978], p.155) puts it, a coercive framework 
that reduces human plurality into ‘two terminal, collective abstractions’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Although the figure of the Muslim ‘outsider’/‘enemy’ has been forged out of racially 
specific Orientalist assumptions and nationalist tropes, the forced migrant (whether 
Muslim or not) has equally shared in the demonisation. As related above, the forced 
migrant has become the most vulnerable victim of a securitised system of control and 
exclusion – ostensibly targeted at the putative ‘Islamic terrorist’ – that now openly 
defines Europe’s global regime of asylum and immigration. Both figures are abstract 
constructions of the universal ‘other’/the eternal ‘alien’ in modern form: although the 
cultural racism that fashions these figures and drives the asylum regime appears rooted 
in national concepts, it is not bounded by national borders, but has become a 
‘spatialised’ politics of identity (cf. de Genova, 2010). The ideological and material 
production of the ‘alien’ is stripped of social location; the quality of being ‘alien’ is 
sourced solely in the cultural essence of the forced migrant, a quality they carry around 
with them whichever borders they cross. At the same time, the individual thus 
represented is dispossessed not only of their own social and familial world, but divested 
of the very identity born out of this world. Meanwhile, the national border where this 
racial identification is materialised has become the site of a global racialised 
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(re)definition of human lives: a multitude of individuals are divided into two mutually 
exclusive identities – global ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The border no longer lies 
between states but is, in a sense, a demarcation that separates the world of destitution 
from that of consumption, a division that is structural but inherently unstable, and 
therefore in need of constant reassertion and reinforcement. For this reason, Balibar 
(1991a) calls the new racism, the ‘racism of globalisation’: a binary global division of 
humanity that is profoundly exclusionary.  
This division conceals the fact that highly concentrated forms of power are 
spatially located. Each territorial space is a specific articulation of a system that 
functions through global connections and relationships (cf. chapter two). Some places, 
such as the major economies of the European Union, wield control and influence 
(particularly in relation to the stateless, rights-less individual), others are more or less 
powerless. Those forced migrants who flee to one from the other also possess spatial 
locations, as well as identities that are formed by their relationships with, and within, 
these locations, and where they come from on the global territorial map has a profound 
impact on which side of the global binary division they fall. By contrast, racist 
configurations appear to have no fixed frontiers. Racism, in fact, disguises itself in the 
form of a ‘supranationalism’ in a way that accords neatly with the concept of 
‘European-ness’ in its sense as the bearer of an overarching, universal canon of 
Enlightenment values. However, ‘supranationalism’ is based on the assumed integrity 
of the nation – what it defines as superior racial or cultural (and therefore ‘universal’) 
qualities are ‘concentrate[s] of qualities that belong to [certain] nationals “as their 
own”’ (Balibar, 1991b, p.59).  
This paradoxical universality is an essential attribute of the idealisation of the 
‘European nation’ in racial terms – the theme of universality that lies within nationalism 
imposes a ‘European’ conception of culture on humanity at large. At the same time, 
however, for the culture to be pure, the nation-state must expel the ‘cosmopolitan’ 
(leading to the racialisation of ‘alien’ groups and individuals, branding them with the 
mark of ‘impurity’). Racism within Europe, as Marfleet (2006) points out, is thus given 
not merely a continental but a global dimension as inward national coherence is based 
on a culture of global exclusion. Hence, the racial and cultural identity of those 
designated as ‘alien’ is at one and the same time represented as a danger to a society’s 
national cultural coherence and identity and to its universal civilisational attributes.  
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Neoliberalism propounds the idea that politics, economics and culture are 
autonomous, and that its value system lies in a yet further abstract realm beyond all 
three, yet its racialised instruments of border control – which, Brown (2006, p.23) 
characterises as ‘tool[s] for managing … culturalised identity claims’ – are very 
concrete manifestations of its political and economic policies and their ideological 
underpinning. The insistence on universality lends the legal and administrative 
application of ‘global migration control’ the appearance of an instrument that, while 
responding to the everyday concerns of national citizens, exists in a realm guided solely 
by abstract principles, above and beyond the taint of everyday, nationally specific 
political demands. The forced migrant can therefore be dehumanised and reduced to a 
legal abstraction through the imposition of a universally applicable ‘alien’ identity. The 
global order that promotes migration and creates forced migrants even as it criminalises 
them is therefore a world that appears only marginally connected to its structural socio-
economic inequality. By elevating racial consciousness to a universal, a-historical given 
(at the same time as depoliticising and naturalising the coercive realities that lie behind 
the phenomenon of forced migration, the circumstances the forced migrant confronts 
and their ideological translation into the ‘illegal alien’), the ideologues and political 
managers of this global system are able to obscure the racial objectification of the 
forced migrant and turn them into a parallel universal, a-historical figure – the ‘global 
alien’. This is compounded by the implicit interweaving of the forced migration 
discourse with an Islamophobic discourse concerning a supposedly ‘homogeneous’ and 
‘universal’ Islamic culture, and through the application of the security agenda, which 
has been amplified and advanced by the war on terror directed against the global 
‘Islamic terrorist’ (or potential terrorist infiltrating Europe in the guise of a forced 
migrant). 
The global figure of the forced migrant, I argue, is the essential hidden component 
in the construction of a European identity – its recessive twin. Its ideological function as 
the negative substrate of the idea of ‘European-ness’, however, entails that the forced 
migrant must be visibly identified and rejected, and so they are caught in a relentless 
political focus. This is particularly so at times of crisis, when the need to prevent the 
discourse of ‘European-ness’ from disintegrating into incoherence becomes 
overwhelming. The new racism, therefore, includes through its strategy of exclusion. 
The ideological creation of the forced migrant as a ‘global alien’, contrary to the 
abstract universality espoused by the system that fashions this racialised figure, is 
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infused with state power and pushed onto the central stage of national politics; it 
becomes the ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation 
as it is manifest in its national form.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Politics of Fear and the Securitisation of Forced Migration 
 
Introduction 
As the borders of Europe become increasingly elastic, they are further mutating into 
securitised ‘technological borders’, and the discourse of security that frames this 
development is fast becoming one of the definitive political discourses of the region. 
Created and normalised first and foremost at the edges of the nation-state, it is described 
by Bauman (2004) as a ‘rhetoric of borders’. This is a rhetoric charged with the 
amplified sense of external danger that the concept of the border (delineating and 
protecting ‘inside’ from ‘outside’) provokes, creating a ‘theoretical grid of moral panic’ 
(Welch and Schuster, 2005, p.399). I argue here, therefore, that the language and 
instruments of security have become pivotal to the process through which the figure of 
the ‘illegal’ border-crosser is produced as a primary object of external danger, one that 
is woven into a contextual framework in which all manner of diffuse anxieties find 
common cause. General feelings of apprehension and anxiety among the populations of 
the European Union’s core member states are fused with the discourses of nationalism 
and race to create an existential fear of the ‘external’ and ‘alien’. This is ratcheted up on 
a regular basis to achieve a heightened sense of insecurity through rhetorical reiteration, 
allied with public displays of border policing that help confirm this narrative of external 
danger as the only way of perceiving an insecure and volatile world.  
Europe’s borders have come to symbolise both a porous membrane through which 
leak elements of acute threat and a site where the bloc of wealthier nation-states can 
demonstrate its power to protect against such danger – a power that is on daily display 
in its security guards, visa checks, pre-emptive arrests, places of detention and 
ubiquitous surveillance targeted at the ‘global alien’. ‘Islamic terrorists’, transnational 
‘people trafficking/smuggling’ syndicates and ‘illegal immigrants’ all fall within its 
security remit and are treated as an undifferentiated global threat. Energised by the war 
on terror, this twenty-first century ‘politics of fear’ has helped transform Europe’s 
‘global asylum regime’ into first and foremost a security issue, thus elevating the forced 
migrant into a figure of paramount political value for the neoliberal ideological arsenal. 
In their turn, the increasingly integrated administrative procedures and networked 
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technologies of a securitised asylum and immigration system help ease national 
societies into neoliberal ‘security-state’ mode.  
In seemingly paradoxical fashion, even as border security consistently fails in its 
declared aim of sealing the borders against illegalised forced migrantsxlv, a politics of 
fear focused on the figure of the forced migrant retains its ideological salience for 
Europe’s neoliberal regime – and continues to hold economic and political benefits for 
those involved in devising, marketing and deploying the technological infrastructure of 
a putative ‘security state’. Indeed, politically induced fear represents the means whereby 
the construct of a national/European identity is naturalised through its distinction with 
its binary opposite, the ‘global alien’. To keep this figure of global danger – both 
rationale for and part-creation of its security technologies – in circulation it must be 
reconstituted daily in the attempt to fill the vacuum of a tenuous European identity with 
content. My key point is that by using the bodies of forced migrants as sources 
of essentialised digital information, these procedures and technologies ensure their 
translation into the embodiment of external danger – the very foundation of a 
fundamental European/‘alien’ dichotomy. 
 
Europe and the ‘politics of fear’ 
The depoliticisation of the object of fear  
The mechanisms by which the figure of the forced migrant is elevated to its prime 
political position are obscured through a process of depoliticisation. The political 
creation or manipulation of fear relies on the arousal of inchoate emotions (which are 
presumed to be sub-primal and therefore malleable) by taking the object of fear and 
placing it outside the ‘rationality’ of the political sphere, denying its political origins 
and designating it as the progenitor of culturally based psychic insecurities (cf. Robin, 
2004a). In order to have real impact, however, fear cannot remain an abstraction but 
needs to be suffused with the material threat of violence in some form, whether 
indeterminate or specific. It is at this point that its primary utility to the capitalist system 
stands revealed. The presence of objective violence – a violence that is foundational to 
the radically dehumanising processes of dispossession and exploitation that oil the 
wheels of the global economic system – must be rendered abstract, and its perpetrators 
and beneficiaries invisible, if the system is to continue functioning without major 
disruption. The subjective, individualised violence that arises when this systemic 
violence imbues society with unfocused fear and anger can then be portrayed as ‘a 
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perturbation of the “normal”, peaceful state of things’ (Zizek, 2009, p.2). It is this 
subjective violence that is privileged as the true danger and source of fear. The 
unrelenting focus on the potential for the eruption of subjective violence – ‘that violence 
which is enacted by social agents, evil individuals’ –  distracts attention from the ‘true 
locus of trouble’ (Ibid., p.9).  
The reality of the systemic violence inherent in the economic and political system 
that shapes Europe’s societies has surfaced most visibly (and perhaps most dangerously 
for those whose wealth and power depends on obscuring its functioning) in the austerity 
plans whereby its political managers attempt to shift the full burden of economic crisis 
onto their populations. The attempt to deflect the outbreaks of collective protest in those 
countries most affected, and prevent its spread across the region, has entailed a struggle 
to present the effects of mass unemployment, sharpening poverty, and the erosion of the 
welfare safety-net as the unavoidable outcome of global economic crisis – as if it were a 
natural disaster. The abstraction of violence from its source in the workings of the 
capitalist system mirrors the ‘abstraction’ of capital itself (the ‘hidden hand of the 
market’), which, as Zizek (2009, p.10) points out, is neither an objective nor anonymous 
process but is itself ‘real’ in that it determines the ‘structure of material social 
processes’ and ‘the fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole 
countries’: 
 
Certain features, attitudes, norms of life … appear neutral, non-
ideological, natural …a spontaneously accepted background. [This is] 
ideology at its purest and most effective. […] [It] appears as its 
opposite, as non-ideology. [T]he same holds for violence. Social-
symbolic violence at its purest appears as its opposite, as the 
spontaneity of the milieu in which we dwell… (Zizek, 2009, p.31) 
 
This ideological operation, which veils the basis of subjective violence, is an act 
of displacement, whose ultimate purpose is to ensure the survival of the capitalist order 
itself. It takes place, however, at an almost subterranean level, in an ongoing, banal 
process, daily translating unfocused unease into politically directed fear. The way this is 
accomplished has been an academic preoccupation for many decades. In modern, 
psychologised definitions of emotional states, ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ are defined as related 
but separate terms. Fear is related to an immediate and specific, usually external threat, 
while anxiety refers to an anticipated subjective threat – it denotes a more unformed, 
generalised state that is seen to originate from within the individual. As Bourke (2005, 
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p.189) says, ‘The difference between fear and anxiety oscillates wildly … [but] anxiety 
is easily converted into fear’. Thus, the current process of converting anxiety into fear 
could be described as the function of a range of ‘security professionals’, whose 
influence on government policy throughout Europe is formidable (as discussed later in 
this chapter). Their unspoken political remit is to legitimate control over the description 
of the object of fear, obscuring the reality that fear is generated by the violent effects of 
the capitalist system.  
The experience of unease must be given a specific focus, and this requires that the 
designated source of anxiety be interpreted and elaborated in such a way that it can be 
structured into social consciousness as a constant presence that entails the unremitting 
vigilance of security and political professionals alike. At the same time, any link to the 
wider, less visible causes and creators of fear must be severed: the figure of fear can 
have no function or reason beyond that of embodying potential danger. Once shorn of 
its political rationale, there is no longer ‘any realistic way of calculating the seriousness 
of [the] threat, [and] the disjuncture between the risk and the degree of fear widens’ 
(Ibid., p.367), in much the same way as Cohen (1972) described in his seminal work on 
‘moral panics’.  
According to Cohen (1972), it is marginalised ‘outsiders’ who are most frequently 
given the role of ‘folk devils’ or objects of fear. A global capitalism, grounded in 
systemic exploitation, cannot help but forge the social conditions that create excluded 
individuals, such as forced migrants (cf. chapter two). Their resulting social and 
economic vulnerability means they can be easily selected as a screen for the projection 
of the many, varied anxieties of a population already sensitised and daily guided in this 
direction by the rhetoric of politicians and the mass media. The forced migrant 
becomes, on the one hand, a focal point of a system of control over global mobility, and 
on the other, is materialised as an object of profound unease. This unease may not only 
stem from the portrayal of forced migrants as embodiments of existential danger and 
harbingers of social disturbance, but also from the fact that they display (through their 
need to escape extreme poverty, protracted civil wars, invasions, persecution and/or the 
breakdown of their societies) the marks of the hidden, disavowed violence of the 
capitalist system itself. The sense that they are imbued with the potential to detonate 
violent social disruption is compounded by their provenance in an apparently ‘anarchic’ 
world beyond Europe’s borders. As surrogate figures of fear they can then be used to 
denote an ever-present existential danger that only security experts, with their forensic 
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analysis, relentless attention and state-of-the-art technology, and politicians, with their 
administrative measures and legal instruments, can hope to identify and deflect.  
Political fear, however, as Fekete (2004) points out, also relies heavily on the non-
specific, diffuse nature of the threat it evokes (as in the ‘global’, vaguely specified 
nature of terrorism or organised crime). Hence, the symbolic use of the abstract notion 
of ‘national security’. But when it is necessary to gain consent for specific, exceptional 
forms of security measures, which through repeated exposure can be gradually 
transformed into the norm (for example, mass surveillance, the introduction of 
biometric identity documents, the building of a vast detention estate for those claiming 
asylum, the use of a parallel judicial system for certain non-nationals that flouts 
accepted legal standards, or the increasing identification of immigration and asylum 
legislation with anti-terrorist measures), the threat must be embodied. The ambient 
sense of existential insecurity the system engenders has, from the 1990s on, been 
focused most consistently on the ‘alien’ figure of the forced migrant. Effectively denied 
any ‘legal’ route into Europe’s nation-states, they are, as a consequence, criminalised in 
their attempts to reach or cross the border and are designated ‘illegal entrants’. In this 
way, their identity is now elided with that of other figures operating beyond the law, 
‘Islamic terrorists’ and members of the organised criminal networks that have 
supposedly enabled the forced migrant’s journey to the border; they assume the sense of 
threat such figures carry and enter the list of global dangers. 
So it is we see the paradox of spectacle allied to secrecy: the idea of ‘national 
security’ creates exaggerated, indefinable fears, and this is vital to governments and 
their institutions which have ‘an inherent desire to act in secrecy and hide the materials 
from which national decisions are made from scrutiny’ (Peirce cited in Fekete 2004, 
p.7). At the same time, this fear must be both stoked and assuaged by providing a very 
visible symbol of danger. The figure of the forced migrant, now discursively related to 
‘transnational criminality’ or ‘global terrorism’, is imbued with a sense of subjective 
violence and their condition depoliticised. This is made possible by the slow accretion 
of a commonsense, depoliticised lexicon of crime, deviance and alterity – reaffirmed by 
periodic moral panics – which not only provides the vocabulary and images by which 
the target can be singled out and interpreted, but also enables politicians and their 
ideologues to map together anything that can be described as a threat to the stability of 
society.  
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The emotive use of such a commonplace term as ‘illegal’, for example, as if it 
were ‘a noun, a force in the world, rather than an adjective describing certain acts’, 
represents a ‘retreat from evidence-based thinking’ into the reliance on ‘instinctive’ 
responses (Keen, 2006, p.7) (cf. chapter two). A mainstay of right-wing political 
rhetoric which rapidly entered mainstream European political discourse with the advent 
of the war on terror, the elevation of ‘instinct’ as a benchmark for policy decisions helps 
justify the punitive effects of this verbal distortion. The privileging of instinct and 
emotion further allows for the ‘diver[sion of] economic and social discontent into anger 
over diverse “moral issues” ’ (Ibid., p.119), including the newly minted crime of 
attempting to cross European borders without the correct documentation. 
Furthermore, the eruption of so-called ‘moral panics’, by means of which such an 
embodiment of threat is reproduced on a continual basis, although ephemeral in nature, 
are therefore productive: they leave legacies and create material effects. One subsequent 
effect of the fear they arouse – analysed by many in this sphere of the social sciences 
(Cohen, 2001; Garland, 2007; and Hall, 2007, for example) – is an expansion of the 
reach of state control over a far wider section of society than that involved in the initial 
‘event’ that precipitated the moral panic. To facilitate and justify the increasing 
securitisation of society, political fear must be first narrowed down to a particular target. 
The measures introduced to isolate and control the so-called immediate ‘danger’, 
however, are then equally available for the management of a potentially more accurately 
focused, generalised unrest against the system’s effects.  
 
‘Cultural fear’ as a political tool 
Fear is an well-used political tool of class rule: those who are invested in the unimpeded 
continuation of the capitalist system define the object of fear and decide what/who is 
worthy of attention. In the process, they use (and further refine) the distorting 
ideological lens through which we are encouraged to view the world around us. 
Although national or regional politicians struggle to manage a system that is global in 
reach, their primary constituency comprises those who inhabit the nation-state to which 
their local power is tied, and it is here that the historically tried-and-tested tropes of 
nationalism lie ready to be deployed in their efforts to keep the system afloat (cf. 
chapter two).  
Keen (2006, p.5) takes issue, however, with what he sees as the simplistic idea 
that the security-driven nationalist discourse that defines the object of fear is merely ‘a 
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smokescreen for power’, and quotes Miller as saying, ‘members of the elite …unable to 
break free of the operating assumptions of the system… come to believe that the world 
seen through the distorting lens of their own self interest is how [it] really is’. Taking a 
Foucauldian perspective, Keen points out that politicians, for example, are trapped 
within systems of language and thought that are part of a shared culture (in Bourdieu’s 
(1986) terminology, their ‘habitus’) – one that is, of course, partly of their own making. 
He concedes that there are practical political and economic benefits that a dysfunctional 
system that propagates its own (‘fallacious’) internal logic can yield to individual 
members of the capitalist elite, but holds that the politicians and the highly placed 
officials/bureaucrats responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the system are 
unknowingly complicit.  
This understanding undeniably conveys a sense of the complexity of how 
ideology itself is systematised – how the discourses, policies and practices of 
government and the activities of daily social life coalesce into a common pattern that 
promotes a perception of the world as it is presently constructed as self-evident and 
natural, one that becomes part of the everyday environment in which individuals and 
institutions operate. Yet, there is a danger that Keen’s analysis could lead to the 
assumption that political fear arises automatically out of this ‘dysfunctional system’. 
This, I believe, is due to Keen’s reliance on Foucault’s definition of power. Foucault 
abstracts power from its source by stressing its omnipresence (it appears to rise from 
everywhere), and takes no account of the actual structure of power relations within a 
class society. As de Genova and Peutz (2010, p.12) comment, ‘the play of power seems 
relentless… [Foucault’s] emphasis on the multiplicity, relationality and restlessness of 
power … turns out to be tantamount to (re)essentialisation’. In distinction to Keen’s 
thesis, the very term ‘political fear’ implies direction. It may be a cultural product, but 
in order to become intelligible it has to be interpreted, embodied and disseminated by 
those with an interest in maintaining the culture that produces it. Furthermore, if it is to 
be normalised and given logical coherence it must take its place within the ordering 
‘political pattern’, both deriving its legitimacy from and helping legitimise the dominant 
worldview (such as that of the ‘natural’ character of a world system comprising nation-
states and national citizens).  
Moreover, the system’s ‘operating assumptions’ that Keen refers to can never be 
relied upon to circulate free of challenge in a society whose limitations in fulfilling the 
majority of individuals’ needs are always apparent – at times, glaringly so. The 
129 
 
hegemonic world-view used to frame the objects of fear does not go uncontested, and 
this is especially the case at times of political and economic crisis, when apprehension 
of the causes of the physical and psychological violence it implicitly endorses threatens 
to reach a critical mass. Likewise, although political fear helps determine the social 
existence of the interpreted subjects, it ‘does not affect them in the very core of their 
being, and consequently … they can (and do) resist as free autonomous agents…’ 
(Zizek, 2009, p.62). It cannot be taken for granted, therefore, that the ‘operating 
assumptions’ will remain as the solid foundations of a widespread (manufactured) 
consensus about how the world is structured; they must be continually renewed and 
reasserted, and certain conscious decisions must be taken as to the best way to organise 
and disseminate discourses and practices that will help stabilise them. Imposing a 
certain reading of the world involves relations of authority. In this context, it can be 
seen that the discourse of fear provides ‘a direct ontological grounding to the social 
relations of domination’ (Ibid., p.60). 
Fear is manipulated by those with a stake in creating fear while promising to 
eradicate it. The most recent attempt to obscure the way ‘difference’ is conditioned by 
inequality or economic exploitation – processes which are politically governed – 
depoliticises and naturalises the true nature of such divisive outcomes by interpreting 
them as immutable ‘cultural differences’: a more or less effective attempt at what Zizek 
(2009) refers to as the ‘culturalisation of politics’. Prominent intellectuals who promote 
what Robin (2004a) calls ‘the liberalism of fear’ perform a vital role for the capitalist 
elite by diverting anger and/or anxiety into the channel of cultural fear. The ‘clash of 
civilisations’ framework has provided such ideologues, think-tanks and security experts 
with a seemingly inexhaustible resource that can be built on and refined according to 
the current political moment. Huntington’s (1998, 2004) warnings of ‘cultural 
contamination’, particularly through immigration from Islamic countries into Europe, 
have proven particularly viralxlvi (although it has yet to be seen how such a neo-
Orientalist mindset will attempt to accommodate the recent popular uprisings for 
democracy in Muslim countries throughout North Africa and the Middle East).  
The current ‘liberalism of fear’, therefore, manifests itself in ‘identity politics’ (cf. 
chapter four). The most pressing political problems are presented not as concerning the 
deeply unequal distribution of power, wealth and resources, but the issue of national 
membership and exclusion, and is manifest in a manufactured anxiety over the 
coherence of borders: who is included and who excluded. These preoccupations are then 
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drained of political content. Michael Ignatieff, for example, propounds an increasingly 
common trope, first aired by Huntington: as globalisation destroys old identity 
boundaries, we react by clinging to ‘the margins of difference’ (cited in Robin 2004a). 
As Robin (2004b) shows, Ignatieff defines the transformation of anxiety into national 
chauvinism (and often overt racism) as the ‘natural’ psychological response of 
individuals to the disruptions caused by an impersonal global force, standing over and 
above politics, that cannot be gainsaid:  
 
By painting fear as an eruption from the psyche and culture, 
Huntington and Ignatieff, and writers like Robert Kaplan, fulfilled the 
imperative that made fear such an ideal political foundation in the first 
place. Fear, in their hands, remained an intrusion into politics. It did 
not emerge from the requirements of politics or from the conflicts that 
politics so often generates; it stood outside of politics. (Robin, 2004b, 
p.927) 
 
The ‘cultural turn’ in politicsxlvii, therefore, with the emphasis on a renewed spirit 
of national pride in cultural and historical identity, was a deliberate political manoeuvre 
that helped to both depoliticise the object of fear and racialise it (while divesting its 
progenitors of the charge of racism) (cf. chapter four). It is no accident that it 
accompanied the rationalisation of an anti-immigration politics that has overtly entered 
the mainstream. The mainstream political parties of Europe ‘cut the umbilical cord 
[attaching this theme] to the far-right [and fascist] fringe parties’ and openly adopted 
their rhetoric and rationale (Zizek, 2009, p.35). The inherent violence of the language of 
national culture when used as a tool of social control is seen not only in its concrete 
outcomes – in the rise in racist attacks, for example – but also in its ability to strip 
individuals down to an abstract ‘cultural essence’. As Zizek (2009, p.57) comments, 
‘verbal violence is not a secondary distortion … the image overdetermines the way I 
experience real [people]’, and guides and justifies the actions that flow from this 
experience. It ‘inserts [the designated object of fear] into a field of meaning which is 
ultimately external to it’ (Ibid., p.52).  
This ‘field of meaning’ is delineated by the discourse of security. Although there 
may be no logical connection between the object of fear (the forced migrant) and the 
proposed solution (the creation of an integrated European ‘security state’, whose overt 
rationale is as a defence against ‘global terrorism’), this disconnect is obscured. 
Through the language and instruments of an increasingly dominant security discourse, 
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they are made to function as emotionally coherent, and as Bourke (2005, p.181) points 
out, this allows ‘[t]he ranks of the demonised … [to] expand rapidly as the irrationality 
of the original persecution [leads] to a determination to defend it as rational and 
reasonable’. The definition of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is thus situated on a continuum, and 
the security measures are able to stretch out along the continuum to include not only 
members of European Muslim communities and forced migrants from Muslim majority 
countries, but forced migrants per se.  
However, my contention is that the underlying drive behind the discourse of 
national security has little connection to either terrorism or ‘illegal migration’ – it is to 
be found in the need to secure control over the global mobility of labour in the interests 
of the economic system (both in its global and local, European manifestations), while 
simultaneously attempting to ensure legitimacy for an increasingly violent and unstable 
(neoliberal) political system through allegiance to global capital’s national or regional 
form by infusing its populations with a sense of ‘belonging’ to a common national or 
European ‘community’xlviii. It has to be borne mind, however, that although such global 
and local needs may be co-dependent in the larger perspective, they do not necessarily 
work smoothly in tandem – they are as often in conflict as in agreement, particularly as 
they also encompass all the various contradictory interests and ambitions of the mass of 
competing powerbrokers variously situated in the economic and political structures of 
the capitalist state system and its ‘glocal’ economies. 
 
The backdrop of the war on terror  
The current wave of political fear has been given form and power by the war on terror. 
Although it has now fallen into official disuse as an operational term in the US and in 
Europe, the practices associated with the war on terror (such as extraordinary rendition, 
targeted assassinations by ‘drones’, the use of torture and secret prisons, indefinite 
detention and unauthorised surveillance) are still in use, and, even without recourse to 
the term ‘war on terror’, the doctrine of ‘national security’ continues to be deployed to 
conceal these practices from public view. National security has indeed become 
entrenched as an acceptable and necessary framework for the day-to-day functioning of 
Europe’s neoliberal system – as it has elsewhere in the world. This is partly due to the 
fact that, despite the rhetoric, 9/11 was not in itself a sudden turning point: the 
‘liberalism of fear’ had already set the interpretive framework. Sections of the capitalist 
elite (and their ideologues) had not abandoned the idea of the promotion of fear as a 
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productive source of national coherence with the ending of the Cold War, although a 
dramatic, fear-inducing event was needed for it to regain legitimacy as a workable tactic 
of governance. Indeed, this event presaged the rise to prominence of a spate of new 
political discourses of ‘disaster’, an ideological aspect of what Klein (2007a) coins 
‘disaster capitalism’. Thus, the ideological justifications were in place, the exceptional 
security measures were at hand, and the sophisticated security technology was already 
in trial or under development (although doubtless the security industries had not 
anticipated such a spectacular loosening of government purse-strings). What 9/11 
represented was a unique opportunity to unleash these instruments.  
The ideological tactics, of course, did not arise without historical precedent. They 
built on a feeling which has frequently appeared as the accompaniment of capitalist 
upheaval and change – that we live in an age of ubiquitous fear. In fact, in hindsight, 
there seems to have been little respite: the international fundamentalist terrorist of the 
twenty-first century came hard on the heels of the Red Menace of the twentieth. 
Looking further back to nineteenth century Europe, during an earlier era of capitalist 
globalisation, with its seismic processes of dispossession and forced migrations, the 
transformation of the sense of foreboding and anxiety induced by such upheavals into 
fear of an external, powerful and unpredictable enemy appeared as a constant leitmotif 
of capitalist rule. Bourke (2005, p.364), for example, quotes a member of the British 
police force in 1898 as proclaiming that terrorists at the end of the nineteenth century 
‘are more dangerous, …are served by the more terrible weapons offered by modern 
science, and the world nowadays is threatened by new forces which, if recklessly 
unchained, may some day wreak universal destruction…’. Such sentiments appear to 
mirror more recent rhetoric, whereby a fear of extremism is fused with anxiety over 
Europe’s fast waning influence in an unstable world that appears to be shifting on its 
axis towards the East.  
‘Globalisation’, in this context, reveals itself to be neither a ‘meta-process’ nor 
simply a ‘structural backdrop’, but a neopolitical imaginaryxlix (Larner, 2008, p.47) – 
one that normalises the turbulence of the prevailing economic and political 
environment. In the attempt to naturalise the processes of capitalist expansion and 
deflect the anger that arises from its deeply unequal outcomes, the ruling class of the 
time enlists in its service such ideological narratives, whether they be those of empire, 
colonialism or globalisation (imaginaries that have so far emanated from the currently 
dominant countries of the West). The discourse of security that accompanies these 
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imaginaries animates and compels an intense focus on the ‘outsider’, the criminalised 
representative of capitalism’s ‘underbelly’, by means of spatial segregation, disciplinary 
surveillance and pre-emptive profiling and monitoring, and the use of ever more 
sophisticated forms of ‘security knowledge’ and control. Today, this impulse is 
manifest in the increasingly global deployment of networked technologies of 
surveillance and biometrics, which have taken such measures to an unprecedented depth 
and intensity. These processes are driven by the ultimate vision of the seamless global 
management of national populations in the form of a ‘smart, specific, side-effects free, 
information-driven utopia of governance’ (de Goede 2008, p.119) – the elusive goal of 
‘Total Information Awareness’ (TIA) proselytised by the ‘experts’ of global security. 
Therefore, despite the evidence provided by two devastating world wars that the 
potential for global destruction lies with the major national players themselves, it is 
often the most ‘alien’, marginalised figures of presumed subjective violence and evil 
intent and/or disruptive potential that continue to be used as the triggers of existential 
fear, justifying the concentrated political focus and the vast financial resources poured 
into the development of technologies of control. Although the end of the Cold War 
drained the threat of global communism of much of its ideological charge, the transfer 
of its power to the threat of Islamic terrorism was facilitated by the fact that the tropes 
used to resurrect a global Islamic enemy lay already entrenched in European society. 
The creation of a sense of dread over the reputed spread of Islam had been a lingering 
presence for decades, with Arabs frequently portrayed in European discourse as 
‘radicalised, marginalised and often violent […], at war with modernity’ (Bourke, 2005, 
p.373). Most recently, to emphasise the gravity of the threat, Islamic fundamentalism 
has been equated with fascism (cf. chapter four). Such inflammatory rhetoric, however, 
must remain on an abstract level unless it is concentrated in the concrete figure of the 
‘dangerous outsider’.  
The means by which this could be effected, and the way such a discourse could be 
popularised and disseminated throughout society were already in use before 9/11. The 
demonising rhetoric of the war on terror was closely allied to forerunners such as the 
‘war on drugs’ and the ‘war on crime’, both of which attempted to construct what Davis 
(2006, p.202) calls ‘epistemological walls’ in order to ‘disable honest debate about the 
daily violence of economic exclusion’, and both of which summoned up a suitably 
representative enemy: the disaffected, racially identifiable member of the ‘dangerous’ 
‘underclass’ (cf. Wacquant 1999, 2008, 2009). This discourse of ‘war’ is capacious, and 
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can be expanded to embrace other ‘threats’, analogous to those it initially summoned 
up. In France, for example, a so-called ‘underclass’ of young men of Arab origin (who 
have grown up in the ghetto conditions of the impoverished banlieues, subject to 
violent, military-style policing) are identified with their Muslim heritage and the 
migrant status of earlier generations. This has meant they can be discursively demoted 
as French citizens (particularly after the 2005 riots) and given a rhetorical status of 
alterity – in a similar way as has happened with migrant or ethnic minority communities 
of Muslim background throughout Europe. As the nature of the relationship between a 
politics of fear and the management of the global system of production changes, 
necessitating a transformation in the characterisation of the ‘threat’, this can be 
accommodated through the ever-creative capacity of the state to sew new categories 
into the web of its dominant self-referential discursive imaginary. The discourse of war, 
and the institutions and policies it infuses, are therefore able to shape the representatives 
of fear to fit a norm – one that reflects in a fragmented, distorted fashion the nature of 
the (neoliberal) capitalist world we live in. As Zizek (2009, p.84) claims, this rhetoric of 
‘war’, and the demonisation of ‘enemy-outsiders’ that it propounds, represents the ‘true 
dialectics of globalisation’, as ‘segregation is the reality of economic globalisation’, 
although it hides the real divide – that between those included in the sphere of (relative) 
economic prosperity and those excluded from it. Consequently, ‘it is about those on the 
other side of [this] wall that we fantasise: more and more they live in another world, in a 
blank zone that offers itself as a screen for the projection of our fears…’ (Ibid., p.88).  
The discourse of the war on terror was, of course, premised on the reality of the 
bloody and destructive wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the fashion in 
which its rhetoric was deployed within Europe shows that its discourse was not 
conceived in the way that the conventional discourse of war is: in distinction to the 
conventional military goals abroad, failure appears inbuilt. The European Union’s 
official definition of ‘terrorism’, for example, is both wide-ranging and vague, a gradual 
accumulation of offences, added to year by year. In addition to the European Union and 
UN definitions, many member states have also adopted their own domestic blacklists, 
expanding the remit of the war on terror yet further, helping transform migrant and 
diaspora communities in Europe into ‘suspect communities’. ‘Refugees’ and ‘asylum 
seekers’, visitors on visas, even third-generation Muslim nationals are all now to be 
regarded as potential terrorists or ‘supporters of terrorism’, their international 
movements recorded by a centralised regional visa database, and asylum applications 
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scrutinised for any connection with alleged terrorists, no matter how banal or distant. In 
2001 the EU Common Positions on combating terrorism, for example, instructed 
member states to vet all those seeking asylum to determine whether they have even the 
remotest connection to terrorism, including ‘passive’ support (the European Council 
cited in Fekete,  2004). This ensures that as the list grows more expansive, the apparent 
threat posed by those it draws into its net becomes ever more intangible. 
However, it is precisely in this way that the failure to banish the alleged threat can 
be accommodated – by continually redefining both objectives and targets. In fact, the 
war on terror’s very utility lies in its obvious failure to remove the ambient sense of 
insecurity it instils: it actively stimulates a demand for more security and reinforces 
calls for an increase in the scope of its security measures and technologies, and for a 
further widening of the definition of those it encompasses. As it continually runs the 
risk of losing its purchase through overuse, the war on terror must be as continually 
revivified. In this sense, it is not a ‘war’ as such at all, but a social practice that brings in 
its train political and economic benefits – benefits that can only be assured as long as its 
rationale remains operative. Keen (2006, p.4) takes this further: he describes the war on 
terror as not merely a social practice but a system in and of itself, with all the ‘hidden 
political, economic and psychological functions of indiscriminate counter-terror’. Given 
this, it has been all the easier to allow the actual term ‘war on terror’ to fall into 
abeyance, while the system it describes continues to thrive and grow. Indeed, its self-
reinforcing, circular logic ensures that it endures. As Keen (2006, p.68) says: ‘How can 
all this [security expenditure] be justified in the context of massive world poverty and 
the high and growing levels of poverty…? …through continued conflict’.  
As a result of its ever-widening remit, the doctrine of ‘endless war’ has a tendency 
to seep into other spheres – an aspect of the ideological drive that has animated the war 
on terror from its inception. Thus neoliberal politicians have been able to turn to the 
discourse of security in an attempt to intensify and direct collective anxiety towards the 
forced migrant. By contrast with ‘the tangible daily experience of insecurity 
manufactured by the markets’, the politics of fear is openly used to engender a 
preoccupation with personal safety, which has been ‘inflated and overloaded with 
meanings beyond its capacity’ (Bauman, 1998, p.119) (cf. chapter four). And as 
‘Islamic terrorists’ are not a discrete or isolated group, they can be situated on a 
continuum, enabling the targeting of those more accessible enemies – forced migrants. 
What Keen (2006, p.81) calls the ‘schizophrenic official discourse’, whereby ‘we are 
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invited to believe that this is simultaneously a war and not a war’, has been aided by the 
delegitimisation of terrorist violence as ‘criminal’, while state violence is legitimised as 
‘war’ – a common tactic in state counter-terrorism – and this in turn has enabled the 
retrospective justification of the creeping securitisation of European asylum and 
immigration procedures, in train since the 1990s. This process of securitisation has been 
brought out into the open and rapidly accelerated by the doctrine of the war on terror. 
As the criminalisation of the forced migrant through a process of ‘illegalisation’ has 
meant that their exposure to harsh security measures can appear to be reasonable, 
logical and unavoidable, the punitive treatment meted out to them at the borders or 
within Europe itself is often taken as evidence of guilt (what is termed as ‘just world 
thinking’). In such a way, the forced migrant can begin to resemble, in the public 
perception, their pre-ordained image as dangerous and alien, and their ascribed identity 
becomes imbued with the similarly depoliticised and criminalised attributes of the 
terrorist ‘outlaw’.  
 
The dispossessed and global insecurity 
Turning those targeted as the object of fear into their preconceived, negative image 
shows that dehumanisation is not a mere side effect of the war on terror but a 
fundamental part of the politics of fear it has promoted. In this context, Keen (2006) 
aptly quotes Hannah Arendt on how this technique was materially effected by the Nazis 
in the 1930s:  
  
‘The official SS newspaper, the Schwarze Korps, stated explicitly in 
1938 that if the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were the 
scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable beggars, 
without nationality, without money, and without passports crossed 
their frontiers…’  A circular letter from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to all German authorities abroad … [in] 1938 [also] stated, 
‘The emigration movement of only about 100,000 Jews has already 
sufficed to awaken the interest of many countries to the Jewish 
danger… [T]he influx … forms the best propaganda for German 
Jewish policy’. (Arendt cited in Keen, 2006, p.140) 
 
Fear of being ‘swamped’ by large numbers of Jewish refugees/impoverished ‘outsiders’ 
was indeed a common theme of the right-wing press and politicians during the 1930s in 
Britain, and was taken up – if less vociferously – by the mainstream. The fear generated 
by the potential social disruption these refugees supposedly represented was even more 
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potent as they were, as the Schwarze Korps noted, dispossessed and stateless. Refining 
the doctrine of the war on terror in 2002, Bush’s National Security Strategy also used 
‘statelessness’ as a condition that condemned its bearers to lives as dangerous ‘aliens’: it 
described the ‘terrorist enemy’ as an ‘outsider’ whose ‘most potent protection is 
statelessness’ (Keen, 2006, pp.85-6). Statelessness signifies that an individual has fallen 
outside the international state system that defines the world – it appears to depict an 
existence in some sort of twilight zone, beyond the reach of recognisable legal and 
cultural norms, and those condemned to this zone can therefore be assumed to be 
‘outlaws’, carriers of the potential anarchic disintegration of the ordered system of 
nation-states. Political fear thus endows those classified as stateless with an ‘alien’ 
power. Once their citizenship has been erased or downgraded (as with those fleeing 
such states of conflict and social and political disintegration as Somalial) or their right to 
acquire another, more privileged one denied, their identities can be simultaneously 
emptied of content and endowed with ideological meaning and power as purely objects 
of fear.  
This betrays the fact that fear is a social enaction: it does indeed concern power, 
but in the sense of the actual relations and distribution of power within society. Fear is a 
constituent element of the relationship between the powerful and the powerless. It could 
hardly be otherwise. Those who have the least power obviously have the most to fear. 
As Foucault (2002 [1969]) famously put it, power shapes knowledge and vice versa. 
Those with power are endowed with the right to speak what counts as the ‘truth’, and 
through the language and definitions they adopt, and the instruments of governance they 
wield, can shape the identities of those with the least power, whose voices are muffled, 
interpretations disqualified, and individuality suppressed. The practical consequences 
for such individuals can be grave. But fear of those without power (in the final analysis, 
fear of a global working class: fear of their numbers and collective strength, of their 
suppressed, unrealised, concrete power as the creators of the system’s economic wealth, 
and of their lack of any true stake in the economic and political system that dispossesses 
them of this power) also keeps the powerful aware that, if other ways of sewing the 
national representatives of this class firmly into the warp and weft of the system prove 
too costly or ineffective, promoting fear of the ‘anarchic’ consequences of its 
breakdown is a historically proven strategy. The ‘world of order’ is opposed to a ‘world 
of disorder’ – located primarily in the Global South – that threatens to overwhelm it. 
Kaplan’s (1994, 2001) ‘world of disorder’, for example, is constituted by the global 
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threats of ‘overpopulation, drugs, disease and refugees’, which he presents as poised to 
overrun and infect the rational, stable world of American and European societies (cf. 
chapter two). 
Thus a picture of a world appears, one that is on the brink of chaos. It has 
resonance as it approximates in a distorted way to reality (the potential for global 
economic breakdown, environmental disaster or the outbreak and uncontrollable spread 
of war, and the daily possibility of individual loss, is written into the operating code of 
global capitalism), but it manipulates this reality, transposing it onto other, 
manufactured ‘threats’, and thus deflects attention away from the true source of danger. 
Yet, as argued earlier, the threat of anarchic breakdown can appear too abstract and its 
causes too diffuse to label and locate, and it is liable to become diluted and muddied by 
the immediate, short-term needs of daily life. The personification and identification of a 
clearly defined source of anxiety/fear that can be somehow linked to this potential 
anarchy, as well as to more mundane daily problems, is therefore of paramount 
importance – even more so when the system is under strain. ‘[T]he ‘them and us’ 
certainties … gained in allure as a result of conditions of extreme economic and social 
uncertainty and inequality, [and personal] misfortunes’ (Keen, 2006, p.92).  
The fear that hovers round the powerful/powerless equation can be displaced onto 
those close at hand, those most vulnerable and ‘available’ for victimisation. And as 
Arendt showed (above), these chosen objects of fear (delineated not simply by rhetoric 
but through targeted legal and administrative measures) can come to resemble the 
distorted figure they are claimed to be, and the naturalisation of this figure as an 
immediately recognisable image from a known lexicon of threats is assured as the 
predictions are apparently shown to be ‘accurate’. Although the majority of forced 
migrants do not, in reality, pose any conceivable terrorist threat, the fact that they are 
denied national rights and protections enables governments to use security measures 
against them, such as administrative detention or deportation, while the rule of law 
lends a patina of legitimacy to their treatment. The very extremity of the response to 
their presence can then be taken as evidence of the extremity of the target’s guilt – the 
fact that governments are willing to employ such punitive measures against these 
‘outsiders’ can go some way towards convincing their citizens of the threat they pose. 
Thus, as Robin (2004a) shows, the manipulation or creation of fear does not need the 
application of overt coercion to society at large: it bleeds into the fabric of everyday 
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life, and this effect is at its most potent when the target belongs to a vulnerable group 
that can be labelled as ‘alien’.  
 
 
The birth of a European ‘security state’ 
The discourse of ‘difference’ and ‘authoritarian democracy’  
As it depends on the creation and propagation of a sense of ontological danger, the 
politics of fear entails recourse to a source of protection – hence, in the twentieth-first 
century it has become synonymous with a ‘politics of security’. However, as argued 
above, except when portraying the immediate physical threat of annihilation through a 
terrorist attack (a level of fear that would be difficult to sustain psychologically on a 
daily basis), the danger appears in more complex, less direct ways. It is fashioned to 
represent a threat to the security of our social and cultural identity – that is, to that part 
of our sense of self that is formed through unconscious negotiations with, and 
adaptations to, the capitalist milieu in which we exist, specifically through a sense of 
our place as national citizens in a shifting and unstable worldli.  
This is a world where millions are daily on the move across global space 
(mobility, forced or otherwise, being a common human condition in an uncertain 
world), but one that is at the same time politically ordered into a seemingly static, 
hierarchical patchwork of boundaried nation-states. In a global environment shaped by 
systemic inequality, the difference between being a national citizen of a more privileged 
state against that of a state on the margins of the global economy, and the difference 
between living as a citizen and of existing without the status of full citizenship or 
without status at all, can be crucial to physical safety and well-being. The fear of 
‘difference’ becomes inherent to our sense of ontological security, and can appear to be 
integral to who we are and to a commonsense understanding of what identity means.  
As Dillon (1996, p.36) notes, security creates a political order in which ‘we’ are 
constructed by ‘teaching us what to fear’ – fear, in this way, can be directed to flow 
along well-worn channels towards an embodiment of ‘difference’. This is particularly 
so in those societies where the neoliberal doctrine of ‘rights and responsibilities’ holds 
sway. Here, despite the rhetoric extolling the importance of a culturally cohesive 
community, the individual self is extracted from society, privileged above it, then left 
exposed to the vagaries of a profit-driven economic system and made to bear full 
responsibility for its impact on their life. The alienation that capitalism imposes on its 
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subjects through the forcible dispossession of their creative labour is characterised as 
personal autonomy/freedom, and this is sharpened by a neoliberal political agenda that 
includes the wholesale privatisation of social goods. The resulting sense of 
fragmentation that can assail the individual who is thus disembedded from society must 
be countered by the idea of belonging to a ‘national community’, by virtue of 
possessing a common, immutable ‘cultural identity’. However, as this ‘identity’ is not 
an essential substance but a highly artificial one, it can only be maintained through a 
(now-intensified) sense of difference. The constructed, horizontal, ‘cultural community’ 
– which flattens out the increasingly stark divisions of class, wealth and power – and the 
sense of identity it gives rise to, can only be given meaning by reference to those 
deemed to fall outside it, due to their irreconcilable difference. In this way, security and 
subjectivity become inextricably linked – identity is ‘secured’ through a definition 
based on differentiation. However, this process itself compounds the sense of alienation, 
in ways that could potentially impact the semblance of social cohesion so vital to 
systemic order: 
  
[T]he more unity, uniformity and immutability is demanded of the 
self, the more ethical dissolution and irresolution is produced; and the 
more the self is fragmented into competing egotistical solipsisms, 
incarcerated within equally fragmented and dessicated worlds. 
(Dillon, 1996, p.200) 
 
This enhanced sense of alienation, therefore, demands a yet more intensive focus on 
identifying and expelling those characterised as different and ‘alien’, in an attempt to 
displace an obscured, underlying psychic discomfort or distress onto those designated as 
agents of the fragmentation of a notional national community and the sense of identity 
wedded to its supposed coherence. 
As the neoliberal version of national security relies on the construction of this 
very specific sense of personal identity, it becomes the site of a ‘politics of difference’. 
Connolly (cited in Dillon, 1995, p.169) is attuned to the dangers that such a political 
condition, when taken to its logical conclusion in the explicit endorsement of a politics 
of fear, holds for a system of liberal democracy. He predicts the result will be that ‘state 
mechanisms for electoral accountability [become] reduced to conduits for the 
production of others against whom to wage moral war’ (Ibid., p.169). Bunyan (2009) 
believes this scenario is already taking form within Europe, with the drift towards more 
authoritarian and militarised societies – what he terms ‘democratic authoritarianism’. 
141 
 
The attempt to privilege and ring-fence an unaccountable executive power, alongside 
the normalisation of exceptional measures, has been formalised in the European 
Union’s Stockholm Programme, the latest five-year plan for ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs’, adopted in December 2009 (cf. the Council of Europe, 2009; Bunyan, 2009; 
Wicht, 2010), and the 2010 Treaty of Lisbon (cf. Europa, 2009)lii. The latter, in 
particular, betrays its underlying purpose in its actual construction. It involved a sleight 
of hand: through its formulation as a series of amendments to already existing treaties, 
the political managers of the European Union were able to impose, without democratic 
debate, a near-identical version of the constitutional-style treaty roundly rejected by 
those populations allowed to vote on its adoption. Meanwhile, in an attempt to manage 
the economic crisis threatening the very existence of the Eurozone, the core economies 
created a centralised ‘fiscal union’ in 2011 that entrenches their power to enforce a pan-
European austerity programme on populations across the region.  
What these moves point to is the silent, gradual transformation of power relations 
taking place within Europe’s core nation-states – although not in the way the apologists 
of globalisation celebrated with the idea of the waning of nation-state power, the 
dissolution of borders, and the release of the individual from the restrictions of a 
singular national identity with the creation of mobile, cosmopolitan ‘global citizens’.  
The managers of the nation-state must, of course, increasingly operate according to a 
‘global agenda’ – shaping policies to fit the demands of a global economic system and 
its transnational agents who wield unprecedented influence inside their national borders 
– but they have not abandoned the nation-state form (cf. chapter two). Far from it, the 
state itself has become increasingly centralised, and while its power to determine 
economic strategy has radically diminished, it has further strengthened its authority over 
its citizens’ mobility (and thus identity) under the guise of ‘e-government’; the 
centralisation and consolidation of an unaccountable state power is seen most visibly in 
the collection, processing and sharing of personal information for the purposes of 
‘population management’ (cf. Talbot Rice, 2009). This, of course, is a technique of 
government with a long history, but as technological developments hold out the goal of 
an exponential deepening and widening of state access and control, this strategy appears 
to be facilitating the growth of Bunyan’s ‘authoritarian democracy’. Indeed, Hayes 
(2009a) takes this scenario further with the belief that the securitisation of European 
societies is mutating into a fundamentally new form of governance. He claims that 
profound structural changes are taking place: ‘…the word “security” now serves to 
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justify a range of policies and practices… [It is now] a byword for the state to deal 
coercively with all risks, real and imagined’ (Ibid., p.1).  
It could be argued, however, that the European Union has from the first displayed 
the contours of a ‘security state’, one that is primarily focused on the ‘alien’/‘outsider’. 
Transnational and intergovernmental fora, the Trevi Accords (1975) and the Schengen 
Agreement (1985) all incorporated migration into its constitutional structure, and 
European policies were first and foremost focused on its borders. The subsequent 1990 
Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, which signalled the dissolution of its 
internal borders, specifically linked immigration and asylum with terrorism, 
transnational crime and the control of Europe’s external borders. Schengen unleashed a 
host of surveillance systems to track, monitor and control those deemed to be ‘alien’ 
(including the creation of a Europe-wide database, the Schengen Information System – 
now known as SIS II). The Dublin agreement (2004), in its turn, introduced Eurodac, a 
central register of fingerprints of all who claim asylum at the borders of member states, 
which has since been updated into a vast database recording and storing biometric 
details. The 1995 Barcelona Conference signalled a further key moment in the 
interpenetration of security and migration, and the outward reach of Europe’s security 
agenda. The conference was convened as a meeting between all the European Union 
foreign ministers and those of the nation-states of North Africa and the Middle East 
(including Israel) with the purpose of drawing up ‘development initiatives’ tied to 
agreements concerning the militarisation of these states’ borders against the forced 
migration of their nationals to Europe. The agreement was cemented at a time when the 
neurosis over the rise of Islamic movements, particularly in Algeria, was beginning to 
take European leaders in its grip (cf. Marfleet, 2000). The war on terror has 
subsequently reinforced this whole security framework and fine-tuned its activities to 
the point where forced migrants, particularly those from majority Muslim countries, can 
be conflated with so-called ‘Islamic terrorists’. This perception is now embedded in 
everyday discourse through the activities of a vastly expanded security apparatus.  
Even when the most recent technological developments in the field of security 
and their application in the service of a ‘global regime of migration management’ are 
taken into account, it can be seen that the intertwining of security with migration 
management, evidenced in the common asylum and immigration regime that 
accompanied Schengen’s opening of Europe’s internal borders, is not necessarily the 
outlier of a novel political structure. On the contrary, although its economic structure 
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looks increasingly precarious, the global reach of its securitisation agenda and the 
extension of its influence over the direction of Europe’s societies is perhaps a sign that 
the elite project that is the European Union is in fact reaching its apogee in a way that 
was already inscribed in its undemocratic, unaccountable and secretive decision-making 
processes. 
The pre-emptive and ‘predictive’ technologies of securitisation, however, have 
significantly enhanced the appearance of state control of mobilityliii, shifting state 
power to a more coercive level, and reaffirming its sovereignty. In the ‘defence’ of a so-
called enlightened, liberal culture, the much-vaunted rights and freedoms presumed to 
be the essential elements of a European identity have been, as Dillon (1996, p.29) 
remarks, ‘reduced to determinants of security’, while the sovereignty of the state has 
become increasingly synonymous with the production of identities based on a 
securitised politics of difference – as Connolly predicted (op. cit.). This has conferred 
increased power to Europe’s ‘global migration management’ regime to open, limit or 
deny access to national and transnational labour markets. Such an attempt to assert 
control over individual mobility necessarily entails the coercive suppression not only of 
the freedoms and rights believed to inhere in liberal democracy, but of one of the most 
fundamental attributes of humanity itself – the freedom of movement: 
  
[H]uman life, in its socially undifferentiated or unqualified (animal) 
sense, is inseparable from the uninhibited capacity for movement 
which is a necessary premise for the free and purposeful exercise of 
creative and productive powers. The exercise of these vital powers is 
… the foundation for all properly social life. Thus freedom of 
movement is inseparable from that still more basic human power 
which is generative of the very possibility of social life, namely, 
labour – the capacity to creatively transform our objective 
circumstances. (De Genova and Peutz, 2010, p.9) 
 
As de Genova and Peutz (2010, p.2) show, the resulting ‘production and 
reconfiguration of political subjectivities’ (according to a differential template marked 
at either end by extremes of global mobility and immobility) means that that the 
‘national community’ itself has become a site where the ‘expansive and punitive 
ramifications’ of the techniques of mobility management, such as interdiction, 
detection, detention and deportation, and the security technologies that ensure that the 
‘alien outsider’ is ‘illegalised’, ‘insinuate the inequalities and excesses of state power 
and sovereignty into the everyday production of social space and the disciplining of 
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mundane social relations’. Those who manage global capitalism’s European nodes of 
wealth and power have seized the opportunity for the untrammelled exercise of power 
over those they attempt to condemn to a coercive immobility but who are 
simultaneously forced by this very economic system into the global circuits of ‘survival 
migration’. In the process, they are able to introduce the disciplinary mechanisms of 
security into the governance of their national citizenry, while obscuring this process 
through the consequent ‘reconfiguration of subjectivities’ according a calculus of 
‘difference’.   
Huysmans (2006) contends that a new understanding of political community has 
thus emerged within Europe, one that is designed to achieve the creation of ‘outsiders’, 
against whom the regional bloc of nation-states (organised in its current form as the 
European Union) can constitute itself as a unity. In order to instrumentalise this political 
understanding, a discourse of ‘hyper-nationalism’ is required to reify the sense of a 
European cultural unity (cf. chapter three). In seemingly contradictory fashion, because 
‘difference’ is integral to cementing this definition of ‘European-ness’ within its 
divergent and increasingly restless societies, it has to be constantly summoned into 
existence, even as its actual presence is rhetorically condemned as threatening cultural 
cohesion. The sense of a specific cultural identity, so crucial to the popular legitimation 
of the neoliberal European project, is placed in the ‘domain’liv of (in)security – which is 
delineated by ‘Islamic terrorism’, organised crime and ‘illegal’ immigration. Widely 
differing forms of unease are melded together according to a security template, and 
sealed in place by the codified agreements, institutional practices and policy decisions 
that help constitute the political identity of the European Union.  
 
The construction of a European securitisation process  
Both the physical and imagined space of the European Union is, therefore, discursively 
structured by security terms that find their source – their vocabulary, images and 
narratives – in already well-entrenched ideological imaginaries of the world. The 
political and economic developments of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
Western-based capitalism that precipitated the first wave of globalisation gave birth to a 
corresponding ‘globalisation of the language, forms and practices of the policy of 
security on which [the European state system] is based’ (Dillon, 1995, p.165). These 
practices have continued to be ‘fundamental to that axiomatic privileging of security 
upon which a Western understanding of the political relies’ (Dillon, 1996, p.27). Dillon 
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further asserts, however, that ‘[t]he same period also witnessed the exhaustion of the 
European State system’s modern metaphysical resolution of the question of the political 
– its profoundly ambiguous and deeply problematic inauguration as both a State of 
emergency and a certain kind of democratic project...’ (Ibid., p.27). Yet, arguably, these 
tropes have remained a core part of the rationale for the neoliberal project of the 
European Union.  
In an earlier era, such nationalist discourses, expressed in colonial and overtly 
racial terminology, reflected and supported the violent inscription of ‘the limits of 
political community, political identity and political rights’ that accompanied 
capitalism’s spread (Ibid., p.170, my italics). Violence, therefore, is historically inherent 
in the practices of capitalist globalisation. The reification of the uneven and unequal 
processes of global capitalism as a unified, autonomous, ‘natural’ force entails that the 
violence these processes betray must be accounted for and therefore personalised. 
Hence, globalisation discourses are fashioned to fit the (in)security model through an 
emphasis on its so-called ‘dark side’, located primarily in the Global South. This is said 
to comprise the hidden undercurrent of crime, terrorism and lawlessness, including 
‘illegal immigration’, that globalisation has unwittingly unleashedlv. The image of those 
who make up this ‘dark side’ is necessarily structured in terms of ‘difference’: they are 
‘alien’ forces hijacking the otherwise ‘beneficial’ global spread of neoliberalism.  
The construction of a domain of security that can both interpret and, by 
implication, contain these forces by enabling the securitised control of global mobility, 
is a central activity of those who manage and benefit from neoliberal globalisation. It 
activates an entire theoretical apparatus. The word ‘security’, in and of itself, is 
described by Dillon (1996) as a ‘floating signifier’ – an abstract, unquantifiable term, 
with powerful emotive connotations, that can attach to any discourse and become 
invested with a plurality of meanings. To be of specific political use, it must be defined, 
given substance and grounded in a theoretical apparatus – one that is dominated by 
‘security professionals’ (academics, officials with oversight of national security 
concerns, and those who control or manage the security industry). These professionals, 
by virtue of their expertise in the field, are endowed with the power to specify what is to 
be feared. They are able to impose definitions of security (that is, definitions of what 
should be identified as jeopardising it). In the course of this pursuit, they mobilise 
previously assembled conceptual and narrative resources, and further create and order 
expert knowledge to which the ordinary person has little access. In this way, the equally 
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abstract figure of the forced migrant can be problematised as a security preoccupation 
and embedded in ‘a discursive structure … of knowledge already accumulated in that 
field’ (Aradau, 2008, p.15). The forced migrant enters a space ‘structured and 
categorised in security terms … by [both] discourses and institutional practices’ (Ibid., 
p.20) that are well adapted to creating forms of exclusion in the name of ‘order’ and 
‘security’. 
The role of ‘security professionals’ – whom Bigo (2006) describes as 
‘professionals of the management of unease’ – in delineating this discursive space is 
linked to the increasing physical transformation of Europe into a space structured and 
controlled by what Hayes (2009a) terms, a ‘security-industrial complex’, with the 
private sector at is heart. The privatisation of state violence marks Europe’s security 
system as the child of neoliberal capitalism. Contracting out much of its practices to 
nationally based transnational defence/security industries and third-party states confers 
the benefits of ‘deniability’ on the political managers of Europe’s nation-states, while 
awarding the security conglomerates a vast profits bonanza. Hence, a mutually 
beneficial relationship has developed between the defence industry and European 
government officials. Former EU Commissioner Franco Frattini (2007) confirmed this 
policy of privatisation and outsourcing as central to European Union philosophy: 
‘Security is no longer a monopoly that belongs to public administrations, but a common 
good, for which responsibility and implementation should be shared by public and 
private bodies’.  
A plethora of private security organisations and representatives of the powerful 
multi-billion-dollar global security industry (as well as representatives of the national 
security industries of certain privileged non-European nation-states, significantly the US 
and Israel) are now incorporated in various ways into the core of the European Union’s 
security/migration apparatus: sitting on its committees; operating its think-tanks, 
producing directional papers and organising its conferences; designing its security 
research; providing its technology and the personnel to direct and operate it; and helping 
draw up the content of its security policies – basically, assembling Europe’s security 
apparatus and shaping its structure according to a profit-based agenda. In so doing, they 
are transforming their so-called ‘security knowledge’ into the theoretical bedrock of a 
form of privatised political governance of mobility, untroubled by democratic 
accountability. This expert knowledge has introduced a terminology specifically geared 
towards integrating the national security technology of each member state into one 
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seamless security apparatus stretching across the region: the terms ‘the principle of 
availability’ and ‘interoperability’, alongside the more generally operative mantra of 
‘public-private partnerships’, are to be found liberally scattered throughout the more 
recent European Union documents (cf. Hayes, 2009b). This terminology forms a 
semantic continuum, linking together the common interests and forms of expert 
knowledge of all areas of security, and thereby disguising the slippage of the military 
approach from the war on terror to border control and the management of migration, 
and allowing for the ever-expanding scope of the definition of existential threats (cf. 
Carr, 2010a).  
What is most disturbing, of course, is the way the security paradigm is manifest in 
the ‘technological revolution’ of border control; the professed aim of a seamless 
integration of national police forces, customs and immigration services into an 
international intelligence and law enforcement system lies embedded in its semantic and 
theoretical construction. The technological systems developed to further this aim 
include networked surveillance and profiling technologies, automated targeting systems, 
and a range of satellite and space-based surveillance applications (cf. Hayes 2009b). 
Prominent multinational corporations have played a central role in the development of 
Galileo (the European Union’s GPS and satellite tracking system), for example, and 
have ensured that the remit of Korpenicus (its ‘earth observation system’) has been 
extended to cover law enforcement, including garnering ‘intelligence’ on the global 
movement of forced migrants. The European Union has also funded a covert 
programme introducing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’), remotely piloted 
military aircraft adapted for border-control purposes, in anticipation that the current ban 
on their use in European airspace will soon be overturned (cf. Hayes, 2009b).  
Indeed, the discourse of security (premised on the ‘interoperability’ of its 
dedicated technologies) infects all areas of security policy research, even those seeking 
to control ‘threats’ far into the future: a 2008 European Council paper outlining the 
European Union’s ‘Climate Change and International Security Strategy’ predicts that 
environmental disasters will trigger mass migration in the direction of European 
borders, which must be stymied at source (Council of the European Union, 2008). This, 
of course, is a continuation of the programme in operation from the 1990s of preventing 
forced migrants leaving areas of devastation, and outsourcing the policing of Europe’s 
increasingly de-territorialised borders to the Global South (cf. the Barcelona Conference 
referred to above; Marfleet, 2000). However, although the transformation of an asylum 
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regime based on the 1951 Refugee Convention into a regime of ‘global migration 
management’ dedicated to pre-emptive prevention and control has been taking place 
beneath a surface of lip-service to its precepts for a number of decades, it is now openly 
accepted as formal European policy. It has become so as a result of being embedded in 
an increasingly normalised discourse of security and the expansion of the ‘security-
industrial complex’.   
The European Union’s security policy is thus coalescing around a security-
industry defined high-tech blueprint. Its model envisages a future world of what Klein 
(2007a) terms ‘red zones and green zones’. Its external borders are to be controlled by 
military force, with passport checks and immigration controls replaced by security 
fences; centrally operated and specifically adapted military robotslvi; ‘sprawling e-
borders’ enabled by biometric technology and satellite surveillance; rapid reaction 
forces, such as the ‘rapid border intervention teams’ (RABITS) controlled by Frontex 
(cf. Frontex 2008; 2010a; 2010b; 2011); interdiction in international waterslvii; and a 
seamless system of forced removals and readmission agreements with ‘third countries’. 
Meanwhile, its internal borders will be policed by a network of physical and virtual 
security checkpoints, linked to dedicated border police, personnel seconded from 
private security firms, and high-tech surveillance and intelligence systems (Hayes, 
2009b, p.5). The fact is, however, this blueprint remains a dystopian vision and is far 
from being effected. Its technology is being introduced in a far more haphazard and 
ineffectual way than at first appears when reading its ambitious policy and planning 
documents, which are couched in the language of the security industry advisors who 
help pen them. It must be continually borne in mind that such security experts have a 
vested economic interest in the mystification of technology and its portrayal as endowed 
with a potentially omniscient and omnipresent, near-autonomous power.  
However, whatever the ineffectuality on the ground, the introduction of what 
Amoore, Marmura and Salter (2008) call ‘smart borders’, predicated on this new 
paradigm of control through ‘total surveillance’, are having a real impact not only on 
those individuals immobilised by them, but also, crucially, on the discourse defining the 
figure of the forced migrant. Smart borders have been promoted as an attempt to combat 
the ‘fragmentation and displacement of the [European] border’ (cf. chapter three) 
through control of the mobile body of the forced migrant by tracking their movement 
through the grid of a continuously monitored global space until they are materialised 
and immobilised at networked, ‘de-territorialised nodal points of information exchange’ 
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(Ibid., p.96). The ‘smart border’, therefore, is diffuse, it extends both far beyond and 
deep inside its geopolitical location and involves ‘a multiplicity of sites for the 
surveillance of movement’ (Ibid., p.99), where the supposed existential ‘threat’ to 
national citizens is managed by the automatic separation and segregation of ‘illegal’ 
from ‘legal’ ‘mobile bodies’.  
The form this surveillance takes is characterised by Bigo’s (2006) concept of the 
‘Ban-opticon’. This adapts Foucault’s seminal theory of the ‘Panopticon’, the image of 
a society controlled through surveillance at a distance, to fit the political environment of 
twenty-first century Europe, where the strategic function of the ‘panoptical gaze’ has 
been transformed – despite the rhetorical aim of ‘Total Information Awareness’ – from 
the focus on a whole population to that of the selective surveillance of smaller numbers, 
overwhelmingly comprising racially defined forced migrants, especially those from 
Muslim majority countries, who are ‘trapped in the imperative of mobility’ (Ibid., p.35). 
This ‘ban-optical’ process relies on the concepts of ‘hyper-control’ and ‘social sorting’ 
through the categorisation of individuals according to surveillance-based data. The 
targeted violence this entails, as witnessed in its outcomes, is displaced onto its subjects 
– those who are forced into the most vulnerable and marginalised condition. This 
reveals that behind the rhetoric of ‘total control’ over migration lies a starker reality: 
these technologies facilitate the inclusion into European member states of a highly 
vulnerable, highly exploitable, hidden workforce, labouring under the threat of exposure 
and deportation. The ability to effect this is enhanced by the fact that such technologies 
of security, driven by a politics of fear, are becoming detached from the national polity 
itself and from the constraints of territorially based legal regulation (cf. Wilson and 
Weber, 2008). Any residual logic of legal rights or enshrined liberties (or even simple 
humanity) is finally evacuated at these ‘biometric borders’.  
Biometrics, therefore, are arguably becoming the new border – ubiquitous and 
mobile. As physical borders are never impermeable, and can be and are frequently 
transgressed, those individuals selected as the focus of surveillance are to be monitored 
and tracked by a network of transnational and deterritorialised security agencies and 
bureaucracies. Amoore (2006, pp.347-8) believes that the actual bodies of such targeted 
individuals appear to those who wish to control their movement as the ‘sites of encoded 
boundaries’: individuals carry the border within them wherever they go as part of their 
given identity as ‘illegal aliens’. The new biometric technologies reduce them to 
collections of numerical algorithms. Their identity is hostage to a suite of interrelated 
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security systems, programmed to collect, process, store and disseminate the information 
produced by that most fundamental of all alienating and objectifying practices – the 
reduction of an individual human being to an assemblage of digitalised body parts. The 
disaggregated, dehumanised individual is woven into an intricate web of digital 
information, integrated into permanent databases and stored in vast ‘data warehouses’, 
and their ‘patterns of behaviour’ are constructed by ‘data mining’ the movements and 
activities of the digitalised collections of information they have now become. They can 
then be identified at the physical border by comparing their ‘data shadow’ with its live 
representation.  
The outcome of this insistent drive towards a technologically enabled European 
‘security state’, even as it fails to deliver the rhetorical dream of a seamless, integrated 
management of global mobility, is already having devastating consequences on those 
individual forced migrants caught in its net. The technologies of exclusion rolled out 
across Europe, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS II), Eurodac, or the Visa 
Information System (VIS)lviii, all rely on searchable databases. The stereotype of the 
‘illegal alien’ is fed into the data-mining systems, giving them both content and 
rationale. As Lyon (2003, p.22) shows, these ‘increasingly automated discriminatory 
mechanisms for risk profiling and social categorising represent the key means for 
reproducing and reinforcing social, economic and cultural divisions’ – and this 
‘categorical suspicion has consequences for anyone … caught in its gaze’. The punitive 
character of this politically driven security agenda, however, is hidden beneath a routine 
administrative visage – the inherent violence of its selection and segregation operations 
(pre-emptive exclusion, detention and deportation, and the creation of an invisible, 
vulnerable informal workforce) is obscured by the ‘neutral’ character of the 
technologies it employs. ‘[B]iometric technologies mask the often discriminatory 
character of this exclusionary move behind its objective, technological and scientific 
discourse’ (Ceyhan, 2008, p.113). A seemingly impersonal, ‘value-free’ technological 
apparatus is mobilised to impose a definition of (in)security upon the selected object of 
fear, helping to simultaneously confirm and create the discursive operation that invests 
this apparatus with purpose and power.  
Furthermore, the development of a framework for the implementation of these 
biometric identification systems is effectively being outsourced to companies and lobby 
groups promoting the technological infrastructure of mobility control. European Union 
legislation mandating the collection, storage and inclusion of biometric data in travel 
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documents, for example, is now supported by a number of security research projects (cf. 
Hayes, 2009a, 2009b), under the tutelage of the security industry. (Among the main 
beneficiaries is the European Biometrics Forum, an umbrella group of suppliers.) Thus 
the process of identifying and criminalising the forced migrant/‘illegal’ border-crosser – 
that is, the construction of their identity – has been privatised. As Epstein (2008, p.185) 
says, their body is ‘scrutinised and controlled in intimate detail’, dehumanised and 
objectified, by anonymous private organisations. Alienation appears to have reached its 
ultimate neoliberal form. 
 
The security system: discourses, practices and technologies 
These cross-referential instruments of security determine the boundaries of legitimacy, 
and in so doing, help generate a normative European identity, one that derives from the 
idea of the necessity to banish ‘difference’ and exclude those who embody it. In the 
attempt to ‘secure’ this coercive sense of identity, ‘security’ has become an insistent 
preoccupation within Europe. However, as Dillon (1996, p.158) notes, in this context 
‘security’ is not a descriptive noun but exists as a ‘principle of formation that does 
things’: the creation of the figure of the forced migrant as the dangerous antithesis of a 
stable, cohesive European identity requires the ‘securitisation’ of the asylum and 
immigration system, and this demands far more than simply a discourse of security. In 
fact, it is a process, and as such is multidimensional. The security regime comprises 
what Aradau (2007) calls a ‘plural, interlocking system’ of co-dependent institutions, 
technological systems and discursive practices.  
Aradau’s analysis of the formation and function of the security system is one that 
is reflected in many of the studies emanating from the critical security field. Cehyan 
(2008, p.103), for example, characterises the system as a ‘security assemblage’, using 
Foucault’s depiction of an ‘assemblage’ as a process in which heterogeneous elements 
are linked together with governmental ‘procedures, regulations, institutions, discourses 
and perceptions’. However, by emphasising ‘the social, symbolic, organisational and 
juridical aspects of technology’, and its formative contribution to ‘the profiling and 
control of individual and social behaviours’ (Ibid., p.103), Cehyan leans towards Bigo’s 
(2006) analysis of securitisation. Bigo appears to extrapolate the technology of 
government from this ‘interlocking system’ in order to emphasise its significance to the 
creation of a security regime. He tends toward a Foucauldian privileging of the discrete 
areas of social power that arise from the administrative and technological practices of 
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government: the ‘field of forces’, of which these technologies are part, constitutes 
various ‘institutional archipelagos’ in which professional managers cooperate and 
compete in overseeing the technologies of control and surveillance that construct a 
biopolitical image of the ‘alien enemy’. Although he sees discourse as essential in that it 
provides the rationale for the practices that propel the process of securitisation, Bigo 
(2006, p.8) claims that it flows from the creation of a security regime of ‘transnational 
truth’ that is sourced in the statistics, biometrics and sociological profiles generated by 
technological processes. This appears to infer that how these security technologies 
operate, and the specific ways in which they process information, dictates their 
application and gives form to the objects of their scrutiny and control. Bigo, therefore, 
believes that the security frame ‘derives from practices that are embedded in 
organisations and institutions…’ (Ibid., p.30).  
Although a cogent depiction of the way the development of security technologies 
and their application can transform outcomes on the ground, such an analysis leaves 
little room for the dialectical relationship between such an operation and the political 
form its animating security discourse takes. Such a discourse both implicitly confirms a 
particular ideological picture of the world and helps embed the political and 
administrative practices and procedures, and their technological applications, within its 
(currently neoliberal) imaginary – an imaginary that not only endows them with 
rationale and direction, but helps shape the form in which they develop, the way they 
are applied and, most importantly, to whom they are applied. Unless we remain attuned 
to the constant dialectical interweaving of often dissonant impulses within the attempted 
naturalisation of the system, we come up against a seeming disconnect between the 
routine, technological governance of mobility – a process whose unnatural and 
alienating nature demands that it must be normalised if it is to be integrated into the 
accepted day-to-day management of society – and the manifestation of the ‘alien’ 
subject of a politics of fear. This runs the risk of promoting a tendency to privilege one 
over the other, negating the complex interconnections within the ‘interlocking’ political, 
administrative and technological machinery of this system of security.  
The capitalist system relies on control of the flow of living labour (and of the 
mobility of its bearers and of the spaces through which they move) in order to control 
the process by which their labour is appropriated and transformed into an essential unit 
of production and its value extracted and expropriated for the purposes of capital 
accumulation and profit. This process requires a machinery of management that will 
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circumscribe the freedom of movement that is ‘an ontological condition of human life’ 
(de Genova and Peutz, 2010, p.8). In the attempt, the technological and managerial tools 
thus deployed help to bring into being the figure of the ‘global illegal’, the ‘border-
crosser’ who attempts to evade this regime of global mobility management. Conversely, 
however, the ideological creation of this figure lies embedded in the security discourse 
that animates and directs these technologies of control. This digitalised embodiment of 
capitalist alienation, therefore, is also their motor and rationale, as well as their part-
creation. The contradictions revealed in the changing nature of the relationship of the 
politics of fear (and its political and social enactment in an enhanced security regime) to 
the fluctuating needs of a national/global economic system of production can only be 
accommodated by what Wacquant (2008, p. 13) calls ‘the capacity of the state to 
produce reality through the inculcation of categories and classifications’. Institutions, 
practices and discourses, therefore, ‘shoulder both tasks at once, simultaneously acting 
to enforce hierarchy and control contentious categories’ by ‘communicating norms and 
shaping collective representations and subjectivities’ (Ibid., p.13).  
As Harvey (2007 [1982]) points out, capitalism is a social relation that internalises 
the relationship between its tensions and contradictions, a relationship that is then 
played out in everyday life. The struggle by the different nationally based managers of 
the global system to control to their advantage the qualitative changes in this dynamic, 
expansive and disruptive economic system (changes that continually throw up such 
contradictions), includes the attempt to manage or direct the movement of peoples 
across the globe. ‘Therefore, abstract market movements in practice mean highly 
exclusionary measures against groups of people’ (Ibid., p.450). At the same time, the 
attempt to naturalise the eruption of the contradictory manifestations of a profit-driven 
system into everyday social existence requires that such practices segue with an 
ideological worldview that is already buried deep in social consciousness as a given, 
commonsense understanding of the world – one that must be daily adapted or 
reconfigured to answer the need to address immediate concerns.  
It is no surprise that this practice in itself raises yet further tensions and 
contradictions, as the attempt to present a unified conception of the world that 
naturalises a system that is profoundly unnatural and conflicted will itself be 
fragmentary and incoherent. The attempt to impose a violent system of capital 
accumulation on social life as ‘a set of abstractions or [narrative] fictions’ (Harvey, 
2006, pp.81-2) is therefore part of a process, one that is composed of dialectical 
154 
 
movement. As capitalism is a social relation or process that is constantly changing, the 
interplay between the various techniques, technologies and discourses of government, 
and between these and the different processes of a market-driven economy, although 
independent of one another are at the same time drawn together in a ‘dynamic field of 
interaction’ (Ibid., p.76).  
Ideology, therefore, operates on several, often divergent and seemingly unrelated 
levels. However, in its security guise, it represents an attempt to control mobility and to 
displace the social antagonisms that arise from the activities of dispossession and 
exploitation that the control of movement attempts to facilitate. These imperatives do 
not always sit easily together, and they are also frequently undercut by the more 
immediate, competing interests of all those involved in, or standing to benefit from, the 
operation of such a security programme – as well as by ensuing consequences as its 
targeted violence spills out into society at large. The fundamental purpose of the 
ideological operation that frames the discourse of security and informs the creation of 
the security apparatus, however, is to disguise and thus undermine the potential power 
of a now-global working class that carries within it the risk of the radical destabilisation 
of the capitalist order itself. Hence, the signal importance of the representation of the 
forced migrant as the ‘global alien’ to neoliberalism’s ideological toolkit. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The ‘security knowledge’ that invests the technological and managerial apparatus of 
Europe’s security regime with power and direction is, therefore, inherently political: it 
creates and sustains a specific political imaginary that defines and reifies the ‘national 
community’, and its strategic deployment is an ‘analytical and normative choice’ 
(Huysmans, 2006, p.145). The framing of forced migration by a security discourse – the 
‘securitisation’ of the asylum and immigration system – undoubtedly involves more 
than symbolic narrative. However, although this process includes the use of expert 
knowledge, security technologies and administrative techniques, the profoundly 
political question of European identity is knitted into all of these. As Huysmans (2006, 
p.145) reminds us, ‘security knowledge is political [because] it creates and sustains 
particular images of the place and nature of a political community’. An increasingly 
global asylum and immigration regime is thus enmeshed at an institutional level with 
internal security concerns, creating a European state infrastructure designed to define 
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who is and who is not ‘European’, the better to both control global mobility and to 
effect the conversion of the forced migrant into an ‘illegal’ presence. The figure of the 
‘global alien’, ripe for ideological (and economic) exploitation, arises from the attempt 
to manage an inherently unstable and uncontrollable system.  
The objectification and dehumanisation of the forced migrant into a figure of 
‘illegality’ justifies, in turn, the continual stream of border legislation, fast-track 
development of surveillance and policing technologies, and expanding number of places 
of detention. These militarised administrative technologies and punitive legislative 
processes help keep in circulation a narrative of security that validates a belief in the 
essential integrity of Europe’s external borders as boundary and defence of an inherent 
national/European culture and identity – and the threat posed to these by ‘culturally 
alien’ ‘outsiders’ seeking to cross into Europe’s core nation-states ‘illegally’. However, 
its displaced, de-territorialised and increasingly virtual borders, extending into global 
space, cannot be guarded through administrative and military border policing alone, but 
also calls for biopolitical technologies for identifying, categorising and intercepting 
such ‘illegal’ individuals. The figure of the forced migrant as ‘global illegal’ is thus 
framed by the discourse of security that suffuses the European Union’s integrated 
asylum and immigration policies – a discourse that is embedded in its increasingly 
digitalised technologies of mobility control.  
My contention is, therefore, that the figure of the forced migrant is recruited as a 
key ideological component (in the European Union there have been few subjects more 
intensively discussed than ‘illegal immigration’lix) in the attempt to create and secure 
amongst the region’s disparate populations the sense of a unified European cultural 
identity. This is particularly the case at a time when Europe’s political managers face 
fears that the current crisis will unravel its putative coherence, expose its inherent 
contradictions, and render its national governments and their hegemonic narratives 
vulnerable to the spread and generalisation of social unrest.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion  
 
The historical context 
From the 1880s to the beginning of the First World War, the nation-state form was 
globalised and generalised into a fully international system as, under the banner of 
imperialism, each of the leading European economies entered the competition to stake 
their claim to a share of the world’s resources, or wrest control over them from their 
competitors (leading, in turn, to the first truly global conflagration). It was in this 
context of imperialist economic and geopolitical competition that the idea of a 
threatening, ‘cosmopolitan’, racial ‘alien’ (identified in Europe as the Eastern European 
or Russian Jewish migrant) came to the fore. Although defined by nationalist tropes, it 
emerged as the accompaniment to the theme of global domination. The creation of a 
figure representing an absolute alterity – an ‘otherness’ that indicated a supposedly 
ubiquitous and inimical global presence – implicitly complemented the national drive to 
economic and geopolitical global expansion. This figure has been propelled to the 
forefront of the ideological agenda, albeit in alternative guise, at different times since 
(finding its most deadly manifestation in the Nazi era) but always as an ideological 
companion to the global outward push and restructuring of the capitalist system, a 
process that inevitably involves displacement and dispossession across the globe, 
precipitating mass upheaval and migratory movements. The shifting of the geopolitical 
tectonic plates, under the pressures of a globalising system of capital accumulation, 
engenders a generalised sense of the mutability, volatility and insecurity of the world. 
Thus, this figure of the ‘global alien’ has re-emerged most recently in Europe in the 
context of the most far-reaching spread of capitalism yet and its transformation into a 
truly global system – one that is now on the verge of experiencing an equally global 
economic crisis that could well leave no country untouched.  
My research has shown that this trope of the ‘global alien’ has been developed, 
refined and enlarged over the last thirty years, ready to resurface in a virulently racial 
form as the world enters recession, as a consequence of the resurgence and reassertion 
of an openly nationalist agenda in the major European nation-states. However, despite 
the turn to nationalism, and the crisis threatening the very existence of the Eurozone, the 
project of a unified regional European bloc is far from being abandoned. The need to 
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compete in a world economy structured by global markets impels not only fierce 
competition between the nation-states, but also their cooperation in some semblance of 
regional unity, however truncated the European Union may become in the future. The 
resulting tension between these contradictory impulses has produced a sort of ‘hyper-
nationalism’. The political elite within the European Union’s member states are 
engaged in a struggle to both reassert their hegemony within their national domains 
(reassembling and re-emphasising a specific national identity) and to project this 
identity upwards into an ‘identity of identities’, a sense of ‘European-ness’. They are 
compelled to take this ideological course by the divisive and disruptive tendencies of a 
global capitalism, characterised by endless circulation, transience and insecurity, that 
articulates with their national economies and with their projected image as spaces of 
immobility and security in an inherently mobile world. 
It is within the context of this contradictory and conflictual climate within Europe, 
that this thesis investigates, and proposes some answers to, the question of how the 
figure of the ‘alien’ is given its current power as a ubiquitous, global threat – and why 
its mantle has fallen upon those individuals forced by dispossession and displacement 
into the criminalised global circuits of ‘survival migration’, who are rendered the most 
vulnerable and marginal. However, if a critical analysis is to dismantle the ideological 
prism through which the forced migrant is viewed, it must first deconstruct the 
hegemonic discourses that both seek to naturalise and de-historicise the commonsense 
imaginaries that imprison social consciousness within their ideological boundaries and 
elevate capitalist globalisation into an abstract force, masking its reality as a radically 
unequal, exploitative and historically situated process. Analysing how and why the 
figure of the forced migrant has become such a vital resource in this process of 
abstraction has entailed tracing the origins of the discourses that turn the individual 
forced migrant into a generic figure of alterity back to their source in the narrative 
threads of nationalism from which it is woven.   
In order to do this, I structured this problematic by using the tools provided by 
previous research in various disciplinary fields and melding together their insights into 
an interdisciplinary perspective. I then approached its analysis by placing it in the 
context of the struggle amongst sections of the European political elite to establish a 
normative pan-European identity. I argue that it is within this context – a globalised one 
of upheaval, crisis and reconstruction – that the figure of the ‘global alien’, created from 
the materials supplied by nationalism and its racialised discourse, and refined by the 
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securitisation agenda that the war on terror has introduced into European politics, has 
emerged as a key ideological trope. I believe, by so doing, my thesis presents a different 
avenue by which to approach the question of the forced migrant as both a national and 
global embodiment of the ‘other’. 
 
 
Discourses of nationalism, race and security: the creation of the ‘global alien’ 
Capitalism’s socio-economic order can only be understood in global terms, even as it 
continues to take the shape of the nation-state/regional bloc of nation-states. However, 
its ideological narratives must be continually restructured to mirror the social 
manifestations of its systemic changes. In the attempt to negate the vision that economic 
crisis generates of a complex, conflicted and crisis-ridden system, the figure of the 
forced migrant stands ready primed as the ultimate paradigm of those global 
criminal/‘illegal’ forces apparently threatening to tilt a fragile world system into chaos. 
However, although this figure may be a vital resource in the attempted stabilisation of 
the given ideological sense of a world that obscures its basis of exploitation, 
competition and profit, the forced migrant simultaneously threatens to highlight its very 
real fractures and contradictions.  
The spontaneous journeys of forced migrants (albeit under the compulsion of 
flight from untenable circumstances) undermine border regimes and the attempt to 
enforce ‘global migration control’ – the management of the mobility of labour. 
Moreover, forced migrants through their enforced mobility create networks that span 
the globe, from their countries of origin, through their countries of transit, to those 
European countries whose borders they seek to cross. These networks constitute 
communities that exceed the territorial frame of the nation-state, being for the most part 
situated in global spaces beyond the nation-state’s remit or in the interstices of the 
nation-state itself. Inherent in the forced migrant’s unregulated movement, therefore, is 
a challenge to the exclusionary politics of asylum and immigration control, and to the 
differential inclusions of a territorialising order. 
This challenge is lent an even graver import by the contradictions that arise from 
the nature of the global economic order itself. The impact of restructuring a global 
system that displaces one crisis at the risk of precipitating another (cf. Harvey, 2010) 
has engendered for the first time in history a truly global working class. Although, 
admittedly working under radically altered conditions and with different profiles and 
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immediate interests, this transnational class has an increasingly universal experience of 
exploitation, inequality and social injustice. So it is that, as the mega-metropolises at the 
heart of the system increasingly become the setting for an intermingling of cultures, 
languages and ways of understanding the world, the forced migrant equally becomes the 
representative of this potentially fatal threat to the global system; their presence disturbs 
its surface appearance as a unified, autonomous force of nature, and disrupts its 
normalising narratives of national cross-class allegiance. At the same time, due to the 
reality of their situation of intense vulnerability imposed on them by all the ideological, 
political and administrative means at the disposal of the most economically and 
politically powerful nation-states, the forced migrant provides an ideal ideological 
resource in these states’ attempts to circumvent such a scenario. It is for this reason that 
the figure of the forced migrant has become imbued with such political power. As a 
deliberately depoliticised and marginalised figure, they have become a vital political 
tool, included in the ideological lexicon of the major European economies as the 
essential discursive connection between these nation-states’ inherently contradictory 
integration into the global economy and their national attempts to establish a sense of a 
(paradoxically) immutable yet vulnerable pan-European identity – in the face of the 
threat of its disintegration into the sense of a far wider collective identity that the global 
economy unwittingly generates.  
Given such circumstances, the ideological mobilisations used to form this global 
figure of threat out of the forced migrant can only be fashioned from the timeless and 
habitual categories of nationalism, with its legitimising and hegemonic discourse of 
inclusion/exclusion. As the nation-state is moulded into new shapes by the demands of 
the global economy and the capitalist system’s ceaseless processes of transformation 
and reconstruction, the definition of the forced migrant as the ‘alien’ at the border has 
become increasingly functional to the construction of a European identity. The 
nationalist template is employed by political ideologues in the attempt to invest the idea 
of Europe with an emotional legitimacy, at a time when it is fracturing under the weight 
of crisis-induced austerity measures differentially imposed by governments responding 
to the edicts of the global financial markets. This entails the daily reproduction of a 
sense of ‘European-ness’ through a banal rhetorical reiteration of nationalist themes and 
multiple daily acts of exclusion and marginalisation. 
Europe, in fact, faces an even deeper crisis of representation than do its individual 
member nation-states. The coherence of the European Union partially rests on its ability 
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to legitimise its existence among the national populations of its member nation-states, 
who are equally subjected to the ongoing (re)validation of competing national 
narratives. The idea of ‘European-ness’ has often appeared as an abstract formulation, 
with little coherence or authenticity, especially when coupled with the sense of the 
European Union as home to an elite, undemocratic, secretive centre of government. 
This, I argue, is particularly the case in the current situation, with the attempts at a fiscal 
unity (under the disciplinary supervision of an opaque European Central Bank) which 
depend on the authoritarian imposition of region-wide austerity measures entailing mass 
unemployment, the radical reduction of systems of welfare, and deepening poverty. 
Hence the turn to a nationalist narrative of identity, enlarged to encompass the idea of a 
European identity. A sense of ‘European-ness’, therefore, can only be engineered 
through a recalibration of national narratives of belonging – a ‘hyper-nationalism’ 
rooted in the identification of the global ‘alien outsider’ against whom it is measured, 
and whose provenance lies in the supposedly chaotic and threatening world beyond the 
common European border. 
The nationalist tropes of inclusion/exlusion that underpin this sense of European 
identity are nested in the long-rehearsed theme of a European culture based in the 
rationality, individual freedom and inherent sense of morality attributed to the espousal 
of ‘universal’ Enlightenment values. The racialisation of those who stand beyond the 
nationalist European template, and thus lend it its internal coherence, is therefore 
manifest in ‘cultural’ disguise. This has become the form in which the racial code of 
this exclusionary nationalism is expressed – what Balibar (1991a) calls a ‘racism 
without race’ is focused on the forced migrant as the global embodiment of the threat to 
national identity and cultural cohesion carried by those portrayed as imbued with a 
hostile ‘alien’ culture.  
As this form of racism now operates in an environment shaped by the Europe-
wide security agenda unleashed by the ‘global war on terror’ it has become intertwined 
with an increasingly overt current of institutional and popular Islamophobia. The figure 
of the ‘absolute other’, invested with global characteristics by the universalising and 
dehumanising tropes of racism, is set in opposition to an equally universalised and 
essentialised European cultural identity. This figure then plays a fundamental role in the 
construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’. The insertion of Islamophobia 
into the institutional structures of European society, with the image of Islam already 
framed by a discourse of existential danger, has resulted in the naturalisation of an 
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agenda of securitisation, which is equally employed to frame the figure of the forced 
migrant. Forced migrants can now be portrayed as not only disrupting national/regional 
cohesion and cultural unity, but also – especially when identified as coming from 
Muslim majority countries – as a potential global threat to ‘national security’. Through 
their insertion into the security agenda, the forced migrant is criminalised and driven 
into the ‘illegal’ spaces carved out by the necessities for global mobility, and into the 
‘illegal’ interstices of Europe’s national economies, making them even more vulnerable 
to being re-inscribed as the ‘global enemy’, representative of all dangerous illegal 
practices.  
This procedure forces to the surface the tensions and contradictions evident in the 
treatment of those who fall into the category of ‘irregular migrants’ or ‘illegal’ forced 
migrants. Europe’s racialised, ‘hyper-national’ discourse presents forced migrants as 
‘illegitimate outsiders’, reinforcing the narrative of ‘national belonging’ through 
selective administrative processes of interdiction, incarceration and deportation. 
However, the global economic environment in which the major European economies 
operate reveals the contradictory basis of this discourse. One of the main purposes of 
the nation-state is to facilitate a global regime of capital accumulation, and the 
management of the flow of a highly exploitable irregular workforce is part of this 
function. ‘Illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular migrants) are part of a vast global web 
of illegalised labour. As they are highly exploitable, precisely because they are rendered 
highly vulnerable by their inherent ‘deportability’ (cf. de Genova, 2007, 2008, 2010) 
they are highly attractive to employers in certain sectors of the European economy. 
However, as my thesis has concentrated on the ideological development of the figure of 
the ‘global alien’ and its formation through the processes of securitisation, I have only 
been able to give glancing reference to this theme, which is developed far more 
comprehensively elsewhere (cf. Anderson and Rogaly, 2005; Andreas and Synder, 
2000; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Shelley, 2007; Sassen, 2003).  
That said, the creation of this ‘illegal’ figure is intimately related to a structural 
demand in the global economy for cheap, exploitable migrant labour, coupled with the 
growth of a transnational industry in clandestine migration, which seized the economic 
opportunities presented by an increasingly security-driven agenda of border control that 
compels forced migrants to enter nation-states ‘illegally’. The fact is that as part of the 
‘shadow economy’, the ‘illegalised’ forced migrant is invisibly incorporated into the 
political community as an economic participant and, simultaneously, very visibly 
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endowed with the status of immanent ‘global outsider’. This illustrates the 
contradictions between the struggle of Europe’s political elite for economic legitimacy 
in a competitive global marketplace and its rhetoric of ‘national security’ that places the 
forced migrant within the framework of a politics of fear and endows them with the 
identity of a global existential threat – a threat that its rhetoric demands must be kept at 
bay if Europe is to sustain the stability and coherence of its cultural identity, as well as 
the security of its national populations. 
The language and instruments of security have become pivotal to the process 
through which the figure of the ‘illegal’ border-crosser is produced as a primary object 
of external danger. With the inception of the war on terror, this figure was placed on a 
‘security continuum’, alongside the global ‘jihadist’ and internationally organised 
criminal networks, thus allowing the apprehension and anxiety (induced by the feelings 
of personal insecurity that arise from the experience of living in an alienating, volatile 
world structured by inequality and competition) to fuse with the discourses of 
nationalism and race to create an existential fear of the ‘external’ and ‘alien’. This fear 
is then woven into the social fabric through the banal, daily rituals of nationalism, 
whose racialised tropes are buried so deep they often need only an allusory reference to 
activate them.  However, it is also emphasised on a regular basis in order to achieve a 
heightened sense of insecurity through rhetorical reiteration, bolstered by the enactment 
of security measures and displays of border policing (security guards, visa checks, pre-
emptive arrests, detention facilities, and a ubiquitous surveillance network) that help 
confirm the ‘danger’ posed to society by the ‘illegal’ ‘global alien’. Energised by the 
war on terror, a ‘politics of fear’ focused on the forced migrant has helped transform the 
Europe Union’s ‘global asylum regime’ into a primary issue of security, elevating the 
forced migrant into a figure of paramount political value for the ideological arsenal of 
their neoliberal regimes. In their turn, the increasingly integrated administrative 
procedures and networked technologies of a securitised asylum and immigration system 
help transform European societies into an increasingly convincing semblance of a 
‘security state’. In distinction to the rhetoric, however, as its major economies are a 
crucial node in a global economy that thrives on the migration of ‘illegalised’ labour, 
Europe’s system of border security must in reality consistently fall short of its declared 
aim of sealing the border. Despite this, a politics of fear focused on the figure of the 
forced migrant retains its ideological salience, and continues to hold economic and 
political benefits for those involved in creating the structural edifice of a ‘security state’ 
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– and the discourse of global threat continues to represent the means whereby the 
construct of a national/European identity is naturalised through its distinction with its 
binary opposite, the ‘global alien’.  
 
 
The human consequences of a securitised asylum regime  
As a consequence of this securitisation agenda, whose avowed aim is to ensure the 
security of Europe’s populations, those caught up in its asylum regime are confronted 
with a security process that threatens them with a very radical form of insecurity – they 
are subject to a form of spatial and social segregation that can have profound 
consequences for their lives. Since the inception of the nation-state, the most powerful 
example of spatial segregation has been the construction and maintenance of the borders 
used to carve geographical space into national and regional parcels. The core European 
nation-states, driven by neoliberal ideological imperatives, now condemn those 
excluded from their privileged territorial spaces to an existence in a liminal zone: a 
global no-man’s-land both inside and beyond their borders. The condition of many 
forced migrants can be described as liminal not least because their spatial segregation 
within Europe itself as an ‘illegal’ figure, either incarcerated or forced into the ‘informal 
economy’ and living under the threat of deportation, corresponds to a temporal 
segregation. In a sense, they are condemned to living in an eternal present, confined in a 
sort of space/time prison, unable to anticipate the future without fear as they are forced 
to wait from day to day for the results of an asylum claim, or for a summons or dawn 
raid.  
Equally, the attempt to control global mobility has resulted in a global 
circumscription of the ‘legal’ space through which the forced migrant can travel, and 
they are forced into the so-called ‘illegal’ spaces in the interstices of the nation-state 
order. Their designation as ‘illegal’ border-crossers justifies the intensity of the 
surveillance trained on them and their technological inscription as the ubiquitous ‘global 
alien’. Bauman (2004, p.75), for example, traces the trajectories of those who flee 
countries torn apart by the neoliberal deregulation of both wars and national economies. 
They traverse ‘illegal’ corridors across continents, in the ‘frontier-land conditions in the 
“interstate” global space’ – where they find themselves without rights or ‘legal’ identity 
and exposed to constant danger – in order to reach the borders of Europe’s privileged 
sites of capital.  
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Europe’s securitised asylum and immigration regime may have to negotiate 
internal contradictions, such as that thrown up by the need to ensure the circulation of a 
sufficient number of ‘deportable’ and thus highly exploitable migrants, without legal 
status, to satisfy fluctuating economic demands, but its struggle to control this situation 
propels, and relies on, what Mezzadra (2004) refers to as the ‘border wars of Europe’ – 
wars that are waged in what could be characterised as hidden ‘spaces of death’ scattered 
around the globe. These one-sided conflicts leave in their wake an unnumbered, 
anonymous but ever-increasing roll call of fatalities in the ‘sensitive’ areas of Europe’s 
‘periphery’, such as the Gibraltar Straits, stretches of the Mediterranean and Adriatic, 
and passages of the Alps and the Carpathian mountains. The violent security policies 
outsourced to Europe’s ‘gatekeeper’ countries, such as Morocco or Libya, under the 
aegis of the European Union or its individual member states, and financed by dedicated 
European Union funding, also realise a concrete function: not only to repel migrants but 
to install those who reach the core European states in a condition of permanent 
insecurity (cf. de Genova, 2008). As Bibler Coutin (2008) illustrates, the production of 
illegality means that those with so-called ‘hybrid identities’, who defy the grids of 
classification, occupy a position of great danger. Their inscription as different/‘alien’ 
and therefore dangerous, and the ‘illegalised’ spaces they are forced to occupy, both 
subjectively and geographically, ensure they live with the constant possibility of 
violence and even death (cf. UNITED 2011). 
The other potential hazard the forced migrant faces is being intercepted and 
warehoused in one of the dangerous, overcrowded and brutalising camps of a so-called 
‘transit country’ – camps that are for the most part situated in desolate, isolated areas, 
surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by armed guards. Bauman (2004, p.80) 
describes them as ‘nowhere places’ (equivalent in this respect to the infamous ‘black 
sites’ of the war on terror); they do not appear on the maps used by ‘ordinary human 
beings’, with privileged national identities, on their travels. Thus, ‘they flee from one 
lawless place to another’ (Ibid., p.75)  – ‘lawless’ because inhabitants of these spaces 
find that national or international human rights/refugee law lie beyond their reach. This 
is the case even when such camps are constructed on European national territory, such 
as Sicily, the Canary Islands or Croatia. The overriding laws here are those of 
immobilisation or often violently enforced radical mobility in the form of deportation. 
In such zones of ‘lawlessness’, individuals become defined by the nature of the spaces 
they are forced to inhabit.  
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Imprisonment is the most radical form of spatial confinement, immobilisation and 
social segregation. Refugee camps, holding camps, processing camps, detention centres, 
the ‘zones d’attente’ at French airports – all are names for legally administered 
incarceration. Although such forms of imprisonment are not labelled as such, they are as 
restrictive and punitive – even more so, as the terms of incarceration are vague, without 
the normal rationale, rights or time restrictions bounding the punishment of ‘national 
offenders’. These places of incarceration are specifically created for the global ‘outlaw’ 
or ‘illegal’. The ‘alien’ therefore has their alienation from society emphasised by a 
coercive and punitive containment; they are made to bear the mark of 
criminality/‘illegality’. The exponential increase during the last decade in the number of 
detention centres constructed throughout the continent for those ‘illegal migrants’ who 
have managed to cross the European Union’s external borders (cf. Jesuit Refugee 
Service, 2004; Migreurop, 2010), and the incarceration of ‘illegals’ on its behalf by 
countries lying beyond them, with little or no public scrutiny or democratic oversight, 
betrays a political objective: that of installing the whole immigration and asylum system 
within the security paradigm (cf. Schuster, 2005). The violence of this process, 
however, is both camouflaged and normalised by the constant reiteration of a 
commonsense discourse promoting the idea that this is the only rational recourse for 
overwhelmed national governments facing an unmanageable ‘stream’ of ‘illegal 
entrants’. Through the gradual adjustment of the asylum discourse in Europe over the 
past decade, its securitisation thus appears not only acceptable but also inevitable. With 
such exceptional measures now the norm, the security-immigration nexus that has 
defined the structure of the European Union from the outset is entrenched as part of a 
near-hegemonic security imaginary that invests Europe’s governments and societies. 
Detention is a formidable way of achieving this objective as, arguably, its core 
function is, as Bauman (1998) declares, ‘to reduce ‘the view of the other’. As 
‘individual qualities and circumstances are brought into sight through the accumulated 
experience of daily intercourse’ (Ibid., p.106), the outcome of enforced exclusion from 
the opportunity of such social intercourse is that the individual can be subsumed by a 
mass identity and disappear from view, only to be replaced by the figure of the ‘global 
illegal’. This figure has become such a common reference point in the rhetoric of 
politicians, their ideologues and the mass media alike, that it can be immediately 
recognised and accepted as ‘real’. In fact, the legal apparatus that helps provide this 
characterisation of the forced migrant with its socially legible meaning is central to the 
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creation of what Tuitt (2004, p.44) describes as a new global ‘hybrid category’ of 
individuals (that is, both person and object). Europe’s asylum and immigration laws 
create the conditions under which individuals can be dehumanised and identified ‘in 
ways that call attention to their non-autonomous nature’ (Ibid., p.44). Their existence is 
problematised: they are ‘marked’ by legal judgements or administrative decisions, and 
the bearers of that mark are associated with activities that are deemed non-human – the 
smuggling/trafficking of human beings across borders, for example, is equated with the 
trafficking of drugs or arms. Equally, the intensive surveillance, monitoring and 
tracking focused on the forced migrant, their detention/incarceration as ‘illegal 
migrants’, and their removal en masse from European space in chartered planes, both 
feeds into and is driven by a biopolitical discourse that portrays the forced 
imprisonment and banishment of individual human beings as equivalent to the removal 
of dangerous objects in as discrete and efficient a way as possible. The biometric 
sealing of their individual identity into a set of algorithmic calculations by the 
application of the most recent border security technology may be but the latest aspect of 
this process of objectification, yet it represents the ultimate reductive biopolitical 
process.  
The objectification and dehumanisation of the forced migrant into a figure of 
‘illegality’ justifies, in turn, the continuous expansion of border legislation, surveillance 
and policing technologies, and detention facilities. These militarised administrative 
technologies and punitive legislative processes help keep in circulation a narrative of 
security that validates a belief in the essential integrity of the European Union’s external 
border as boundary and defence of an inherent national/European culture and identity – 
and the threat posed to these by ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ seeking to cross into 
Europe’s core nation-states ‘illegally’. Europe’s displaced, de-territorialised and 
increasingly virtual borders, extending into global space, however, cannot be guarded 
through administrative and military border policing alone, but also calls for 
technologies to identify, categorise and intercept such ‘illegal’ individuals. The figure of 
the forced migrant as ‘global illegal’ is thus framed by the discourse of security that 
suffuses the European Union’s integrated asylum and immigration policies – a 
discourse that is embedded in its increasingly digitalised technologies of mobility 
control.  
Biometrics, therefore, is arguably fast becoming the new border: individuals are 
transformed into the sites of ‘encoded boundaries’ (cf. Amoore, 2006, 2008a, 2008b): 
167 
 
they carry the border within them as their ontological identity. The new biometric 
technologies reduce the forced migrant to collections of numerical algorithms, an 
assemblage of digitalised body parts. The disaggregated, dehumanised individual is then 
woven into an intricate web of digital information. The technologies used for this task, 
such as European databases and biometric systems, are increasingly making use of the 
bodies of migrants as an essential code-book for discriminatory security ‘intelligence’. 
By using their bodies as sources of essentialised digital information, these procedures 
and technologies intensify the depiction of the forced migrant as the embodiment of an 
utterly objectified external danger – the very foundation of a fundamental 
European/‘alien’ dichotomy. The subtle introduction of such a discourse, however, 
carries with it ominous reminders for Europe of the spread of an earlier, now-
discredited biological discourse of difference – although, Kohn (1996), in fact, suggests 
that racial eugenics is reappearing in an updated, ‘acceptable’ form. This discourse was 
equally reinforced and finessed by the implementation of bureaucratic techniques of 
objectification through categorising, marking, segregating and incarcerating.  
 
 
Into the future 
In contradiction, therefore, to the ‘hyper-national’ picture of a culturally coherent 
Europe under threat from its Muslim minorities and forced migrants from beyond its 
borders, the reality is one of a region struggling against relative decline in what has 
been coined ‘the Asian century’; a region that is, furthermore, now facing a potentially 
critical economic crisis that threatens to unravel the whole neoliberal project of the 
European Union that was created to counter that decline. The sense of crisis is 
compounded by the increasingly open expression of social discontent – in reaction to 
the neoliberal answer to the problem by the imposition of ever-harsher austerity 
measures – which holds the potential of creating a more widespread rejection of the 
forms that its ideological mystifications take. Such a situation can only intensify the 
reliance of Europe’s national political managers on the ideological support provided by 
a nationalism premised on the spectre of an immanent global threat. In societies 
polarised by crisis, if such movements against austerity are successfully suppressed, the 
danger is always present that an even more virulent and politically effective expression 
of the racism contained in the nationalist narratives directed against the forced migrant 
will rise to the surface. As a consequence, the abstract, supranational tropes of racism 
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(manifest in earlier times in its older form of anti-Semitism) that are used to summon up 
the figure of the universal ‘global alien’ could take on an ever more hysterical edge. 
This thesis, therefore, presents an analysis that can hopefully help to illuminate a 
small part of the complex and dialectically related structural and ideological 
mechanisms of a global system that depends for its ideological functioning on the 
pivotal figure of the forced migrant, particularly in reference to the attempt by the core 
economies of the Europe Union to inculcate their populations with the sense of a unified 
European identity. By showing how such ideologies can become part of the very 
structure of the forms of society that arise within such a global economic system, my 
hope is to help expose the appalling human consequences of such ideologies (and 
therefore of such a system that requires them in order to function), as well as to put 
down a marker for potential further research into this subject. 
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NOTES  
 
Chapter One 
i Just one example of this is the massive internal migration of many millions of people 
(an estimated 20 million) from inland rural areas in China to its booming mega-cities – 
probably the largest migration in human history (a figure quoted in IBIS, 2010). 
 
ii Anderson (2011, p.61) describes the Coreper committee (Comité des représentants 
permanents or Committee of Permanent Representatives) thus: ‘At the centre of the 
maze lies the obscure zone in which the rival law-making instances of the Council and 
the Commission interlock, more impenetrable than any other feature of the Union. The 
nexus of “Coreper” committees in Brussels, where emissaries of the former confer 
behind closed doors with functionaries of the latter, generates the avalanche of legally 
binding directives … Here is the effective point of concentration of everything summed 
up in the phrase … “democratic deficit”…’ 
 
iii I have only listed in the bibliography those official documents that I have referenced 
in the text; the bulk of those I consulted provided contextual background to my 
research. 
 
iv Wacquant (2008) here is speaking in the context of a study into the rise of the ‘penal 
state’, but in many ways this area of research is intimately linked to the criminalisation 
of, and punitive measures against, the forced migrant, and he therefore pinpoints a 
common need. 
 
v According to Save the Children (2011), the average stay for refugees in camps is now 
18 years. Less than 1% of those driven to live in such camps are resettled in another 
country. 
 
vi ‘[“Commonsense” is] a conception of the world [that is] uncritically absorbed by the 
social and cultural environments in which moral individuality is developed’ (Gramsci 
cited in Harvey, 2000, p.83). 
 
vii ‘The most sophisticated ports in the world can inspect a maximum of only 5% of the 
cargo passing through customs… 1% of the cargo is stopped at random. …95% of all 
shipments pass uninspected’ (Nordstrom, 2007, p.118). 
 
viii One example is coltan: this highly profitable mineral is extracted from mines in the 
war-riven Democratic Republic of Congo by war profiteers using virtual slave labour, 
smuggled to Azerbaijan (a desperately poor economy) to be purified, and then exported 
on to Finland where it becomes the staple of the massive mobile phone industry. Along 
the way vast profits and stockmarket killings are made, and the money and the product 
are duly washed clean and enter the legal economy. 
 
ix One recent example of this was the spectacle of one of the leading and most powerful 
global financial institutions, Goldman Sachs, standing accused of fraud by the US 
financial regulator (the Securities and Exchange Commission) in April 2010 (BBC, 
2010). 
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x In 2001, David Blunkett, then-UK Home Secretary, declared a ‘state of emergency’, 
stressing it was a technicality to enable the government to opt out of Article Five of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in order to pass its Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act. 
 
 
Chapter Two 
xi Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes, or PRSPs, have essentially taken the place 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes or SAPs, but their content has turned out to be 
remarkably similar: the banks and financial institutions, and the countries that fund 
them, still dictate the debtor countries’ policy-making processes, and the demands for 
privatisation, deregulation and austerity are the same. 
 
xii As Davis (2006, p.125) points out, the vulnerability of the poor, forced to make their 
homes in high-risk areas of pollution and danger, is so extreme that earthquakes in such 
areas are now known as ‘classquakes’, to characterise the biased pattern of destruction. 
 
xiii Blackwater or Xe Services – now infamous for its conduct in Iraq – was even 
expelled in 2007 from International Peace Operations (the trade organisation for the 
burgeoning private military industry – or the ‘stability operations industry’ as it prefers 
to term itself).  
 
xiv According UNHCR (2009) statistics, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Russian 
Federation and China were the five most important ‘source’ countries and regions for 
asylum seekers in 44 industrialised countries throughout the world in 2008/9. 
Afghanistan again became the main country of origin of asylum-seekers in 
industrialised countries in 2009. 
 
xv For example, the migration of health workers into the UK health system from Ghana 
indicates that by rights the two health systems should be thought of as one system (cf. 
Massey, 2007, p.191). 
 
xvi This in line with the neoliberal shift in ‘development’ policy discourse: aid or loans 
to the poor South are no longer focused on building up industrial infrastructure and 
production processes but merely on so-called ‘poverty-alleviation’ programmes. 
 
xvii The UNHCR (2010) estimates that 44 million people were displaced in 2009/2010, 
although these figures may well be an underestimate. However, 80% of the displaced 
remain in the Global South. 
 
xviii ‘For years a proper war has been going on around these and other “global borders”, 
which has caused (and continues to cause) the deaths of thousands of refugees and 
migrants in their attempt at bypassing them’ (Mezzadra, 2004, p.272). 
 
xix Former UK Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined in 2001 his intentions to 
‘reform’ the Refugee Convention, following a speech by the former Home Secretary 
Jack Straw to the Institute for Public Policy Research in 2000, in which he stated that 
the Convention needed to be ‘modernised’. More recently, in 2009, Phil Woolas, then-
immigration minister, proclaimed he wanted to restart the debate about the Convention 
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and its enshrinement of the individual’s right to asylum from state persecution (The 
Guardian, 10 January 2009). 
 
 
Chapter Three 
xx The term ‘xeno-racism’ is a conflation of xenophobia (traditionally defined as fear of 
the ‘stranger’ or foreigner) and racism. It is, in effect, a racism focused on the 
immigrant or forced migrant. It can be termed ‘racism’ as ‘[x]eno-racism denigrates and 
reifies people before segregating and expelling them … it is racist in substance and 
xeno in form’ (Sivanandan cited in Fekete 2009, p.19). 
 
xxi The Greek government – currently struggling with the local effects of the global 
economic crisis and the social conflicts precipitated by IMF-EU dictated austerity 
measures – is the latest European government to turn to populist anti-immigrant rhetoric 
and bow to the pressure of the EU’s strategy of ‘migration control’: it plans to build 
a12.5km wall along part of its 200km-long border with Turkey to ‘deter illegal 
immigrants and asylum seekers’ (Papaconstantinou, 2011). 
 
xxii In 2010 Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed: ‘We cannot let thousands of illegal 
workers … inundate our country ...’ Meanwhile, armed Egyptian police patrol the desert 
borders at Israel’s behest, killing at least 17 migrants in 2009 (McCarthy, 2010). 
 
xxiii Harvey (2010, p.246) believes that crises themselves are a ‘massive phase of 
dispossession of assets (cultural as well as tangible). … Devalued capital assets left over 
from bankruptcies and collapses can be bought up at fire-sale prices … and profitably 
recycled back into circulation. Surplus capital thus finds a new and fertile terrain for 
renewed accumulation. Crises may be, for this reason, orchestrated, managed and 
controlled to rationalise the irrational system… This is what state-administered austerity 
programmes, making use of the key levers of interest rates and the credit system, are 
often all about.’ 
 
xxiv Younge (2010, p.8) relates how in 2009 more than 100 immigrants, roughly a 
quarter of them children, were found living in a sewer system under Rome’s railway 
station. 
 
xxv In the US, for example, Halliburton has been contracted to build a string of detention 
centres and Boeing to construct a ‘virtual border’ of biometric ID cards (cf. Klein, 
2007). 
 
xxvi The European Union, for example, has fine-tuned its Surveillance System for the 
Straits, dedicated to preventing migrants from the African continent from entering 
European territory through the interdiction of boats carrying or suspected of carrying 
migrants in the Mediterranean, and further afield (in contravention of peacetime 
international maritime law) on the high seas and even in African waters themselves (cf. 
Migreurop, 2009). 
 
xxvii At the time of writing, the impact of the political crisis and revolutionary upheaval 
in Libya (and the rest of North Africa and the Middle East) on its border agreements 
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with Europe has yet to be fully assessed. 
 
xxviii ‘The candidate countries will soon be responsible for security at the Union's future 
external borders, the management of which will play a central role in developing 
relations with the future neighbouring countries, namely Belarus and Ukraine’ 
(European Commission, 2002). 
 
xxix See Amesty International’s 2010 report, ‘Seeking Safety, Finding Fear: Refugees, 
asylum-seekers and migrants in Libya and Malta’. Malcolm Smart, director of Amnesty 
International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, comments, ‘In Libya, foreign 
nationals, including refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, are particularly vulnerable 
and live in constant fear of being arrested and held for long periods, tortured or 
otherwise abused. Moreover, many are in fear of being returned to their countries of 
origin, with no regard to the real risk of persecution they face there’ (Amnesty 
International, 2010). 
 
xxx The death in 2010 of Jimmy Mubenga, an Angolan asylum seeker, while being 
deported from Britain by private security firm G4S on a routine passenger flight, 
resulted in an investigation and the firm’s loss of its multimillion-pound contract with 
the Home Office to forcibly deport foreign nationals. G4S has faced numerous 
allegations over several years and is subject to other ongoing investigations (Lewis and 
Taylor, 2010). Meanwhile, information on the exact number of deaths and severe 
injuries of those thus deported throughout Europe, particularly on privately contracted 
flights out of the view of the ordinary public, is difficult to gather. 
 
xxxi Denmark, Germany and Switzerland have returns and readmission agreements with 
Eastern European and Balkan states, while Italy, Spain, Greece and France have similar 
arrangements with a number of Mediterranean and African countries (cf. Cassarino, 
2010). 
 
xxxii The thinking behind such agreements was revealed by Frontex in its 2010 report. In 
June 2010 Libya expelled the UNHCR. Frontex  subsequently established that there 
were 9,000 refugees and 4,000 asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Libya; 
however, the conclusion it drew was not voiced as a humanitarian concern but framed in 
the language of security and the need for deterrence as, it claimed, these refugees 'may 
now attempt entry to the EU’ (Frontex, 2010). 
 
xxxiii See Point 26 of the 25-26 February 2010 European Council report on Turkey, in 
which it says it wishes ‘to welcome the constructive resumption of the formal 
negotiations on a EU/Turkey readmission agreement, which makes provision for the 
return of third-country nationals … and to stress that adequate implementation of 
already existing bilateral readmission agreements remains a priority. … The Council 
invites the Commission, the member states, and Turkey to further develop cooperation 
on migration, internal protection and mobility issues … [and] to explore possibilities to 
provide adequate financial means to improve Turkish capacity to tackle illegal 
immigration’ (Council of the European Union, 2010). 
 
xxxiv The very nature of informal or irregular work means there can be no valid estimates 
of the number of irregular migrants in the world, but various reports and studies all 
173 
 
                                                                                                                                               
indicate their number is increasing. In 2004 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
(cited in Burnett and Whyte, 2010) suggested that up to 15% of migrants were irregular. 
According to these authors, ‘By 2005 this number had increased to 190 million (UN 
2006). … Using the ILO estimate, this would suggest that, in 2005, there were up to 30 
million irregular migrants across the globe. … [T]he UK Home Office research 
suggested [in 2005] that irregular migrants made up to a maximum of one in every 100 
of the population’ (Ibid., p.8). The Greater London Authority further estimated in 2009 
that approximately 618,000 irregular migrants were living in the UK (Gordon et al., 
2009). 
 
xxxv Macklin (2007, p.365) comments that a person most likely to lack access to 
citizenship documents today is not the denationalised citizen of Arendt’s time but the 
citizen of a so-called ‘failed state’, such as Somalia, that lacks the infrastructure to 
generate official identity documents. But it is even more the case that when fleeing from 
state violence or civil war, for example, the forced migrant will be unable or unwilling 
for obvious reasons to claim identity documents from the state authorities (a fact 
recognised by the Refugee Convention but rarely acknowledged by countries of 
asylum). 
 
xxxvi Goodhart (2007) in an article for The Observer, for example, claims, ‘There is a 
tipping point between the UK’s minority population and the US’s 30 per cent that 
creates a wholly different society with sharp ethnic divisions, a weak welfare state and 
low political participation ... People from the poor parts of the developing world have 
little experience of urbanisation, secularism, Western values …’ The integrity of the 
British welfare system, he argues, can only be maintained if it becomes more ‘overtly 
conditional’; basically, a two-tier system that will cater in differential ways for national 
citizens and non-citizens, especially migrants (Goodhart, 2007). 
 
 
Chapter Four 
xxxvii Balibar (1991a) detects the return of the biological theme in the very framework of 
cultural racism since the difference between cultures refers to structural differences. 
This leads him to question whether the ‘new racism’ is not, in reality, a transitional 
ideological formation. 
 
xxxviii For example, David Goodhart, editor of Prospect, and Trevor Philips, head of the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (now the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission), have written at length in the media on the theme of ‘British values’, the 
dangers of ‘unregulated immigration’, and the ‘divisive’ effect of ‘multiculturalist 
policies’, with Philips famously pronouncing that Britain ‘is sleepwalking into 
segregation’. Meanwhile, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, has called 
immigration ‘a threat to the DNA of the nation’ and its liberal-democratic tradition (cf. 
Seymour 2010, p.82). 
 
xxxix This is emblematic of how the demands of the far right and neo-fascists can now be 
openly aired in mainstream political discourse. For example, Marfleet (2006, p.158) 
details a similar move in Italy in 1998, when a government campaign to arrest and 
deport asylum seekers was accompanied by demands from the Northern League that all 
immigrants should be tattooed with identification codes.  
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xl Mishra (2006) argues that ‘a loose network of fanatics and criminals hunted 
everywhere around the Islamic world little resembles the modern nation-state that in 
less than six years caused the deaths of tens of millions of people across Europe’. 
 
xli Kundnani (2008b, p.54) comments that  ‘Islamist’ has become a term that ‘denigrates 
any political appropriation of Islamic concepts as dangerous, effectively silencing most 
democratic forms of Muslim politics’. 
 
xlii In a recent report for the Policy Exchange, Mirza, Senthikumaran and Ja’far (2007) 
(researchers at the think-tank) call for a change to the official approach towards 
Muslims of emphasising difference and religious identity, but lay the blame for this 
tendency firmly on ‘multiculturalism’. They argue: ‘The emergence of a strong Muslim 
identity in Britain is, in part, a result of multicultural policies … which have 
emphasized difference at the expense of shared national identity and divided people 
along ethnic, religious and cultural lines… Islamist groups [have played] the politics of 
identity … [and] exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has fuelled a sense of 
victimhood…’ (Ibid., p.6). 
 
xliii France was the first country in the world to forbid veils anywhere in public, despite 
the fact that out of the country’s five million Muslims, fewer than 400 women are 
believed to wear a face veil (an investigation carried out by the French police in 2010 
found that there were 367 women in France who wore the burqa or niqab – 0.015% of 
the population). However, ‘anyone wearing the niqab or burqa in public could now face 
[arrest and] a fine of 150 euros, or lessons in French citizenship’ (Chrisafis, 2011). 
 
xliv The term ‘nation within a nation’ was a common anti-Semitic Nazi trope – Jews 
were portrayed as traitors to the German nation.  
 
 
Chapter Five 
xlv Borders are never impermeable (and arguably never meant to be so). It is implied that 
the sophisticated technology deployed at the border provides a comprehensive blanket 
of security. However, on the ground, the story is far different: a recent investigative 
analysis of border controls in the UK revealed how austerity measures resulted in the 
axing of 5,000 border control and customs posts in 2011. These were supposed to be 
seamlessly replaced by technology. Yet the fabled ‘e-gates’ at Heathrow (the 
programme is being rolled out at a cost of £1 billion) continually broke down, the 
software was not integrated between departments, and ‘essential information’ was 
handed to officials on scraps of paper. Meanwhile, the necessity to ensure the smooth 
flow of millions of travellers and goods gives the lie to the rhetoric of total coverage. 
On the English Channel’s ‘front line’ at Cherbourg, there is no border control presence, 
while freight checks at Calais have been halved and trucks allowed through unchecked 
on certain days. Other entry points to Britain, such as Stranraer, have no UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) presence at all (BBC, 2011). 
 
xlvi Christopher Caldwell (2009) is one of a number of intellectuals and commentators 
who have recently expanded Huntington's observations about ‘the frictions between 
Islam and every single culture with which it is in contact’. In Reflections on the 
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Revolution In Europe, Caldwell enlarged on Huntington’s comments concerning Islam 
as distinguished by the ‘penury, servitude, violence and mediocrity of Muslim societies 
worldwide’, arguing that these ‘insights’ are becoming increasingly relevant in a 
twenty-first century Europe facing the twin threats of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and 
‘mass migration’ from Muslim-majority countries (cf. Sardar, 2010). 
 
xlvii This refers to the adoption by mainstream European politicians of the rhetoric of the 
far right. Extremist politicians had been using this type of ‘cultural’ discourse in their 
anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic drive since the 1970s. In the late 1990s and the 
beginning of the 21st century, the language became a convenient alibi for the politicians 
of mainstream parties. Its adoption signified their accommodation to the anti-immigrant 
demands of the far right. Thus, the political agenda of the European Union, in many 
respects, became contaminated by the radical nationalism of local politicians of the 
extreme right – this was particularly so as many of these became part of local and 
national administrations (for example, in Italy and the Netherlands). 
 
xlviii In 2011, following the Arab Spring and the uprisings in North African countries, the 
governments of Italy and France announced that they were unilaterally withdrawing 
from the system of common European Union immigration controls in order to police 
their own borders against the upsurge of North African forced migrants, emphasising 
the inviolable sovereign nature of their borders. This announcement was aimed at their 
domestic constituency. 
 
xlix I adopt here Larner’s (2008, p.44) definition of an ‘imaginary’ as referring to a 
‘framing of economic, political and social spaces’. 
 
l Somalia is now also characterised not only as a source of piracy, threatening 
international trade, but as home to ‘Islamic terrorists’ in the shape of Al Shabab, 
described as affiliated to Al-Qaeda. 
 
li Of course, the way our subjectivity is arrived at is more complex; the understanding of 
how the ‘self’ is constituted is the subject of ongoing theoretical and practical research 
and debate. It appears to be reliant on the interaction of a wealth of psychological, 
environmental, genetic and social factors, including the physiological structure of each 
individual brain at a microbiological level and the way this responds to, interprets and is 
shaped by its environment. The sense of self is therefore mutable and subject to 
development and change. However, for the purposes of a study of political 
manipulation based on a discourse of ontological security, the element of identity 
formation singled out here is the most salient feature. 
 
lii Bunyan (2009) believes that a European State was in the making from 1991, and has 
now been cemented in the Stockholm Programme and Lisbon Treaty. On the level of 
economic policy, EU laws are enacted at the national level, but this is also the case at 
the less scrutinised second and third levels of foreign and security policy, which 
constitute the core of the state. Under Stockholm, state-building is called the 
‘convergence programme’: all the databases in the EU must now have the same 
software, hardware, platforms and readers, under one mega-contract with one or 
possibly two multinationals. Bunyan believes that, as a consequence, such 
multinationals now have a role in setting the European security agenda as great as that 
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of the officials of national member state governments, alongside the national law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
liii It is arguable that the control of mobility is not the main purpose of the securitisation 
of the asylum and immigration regime. As de Genova (2007, 2008, 2010) points out, the 
security agenda has facilitated installing those forced migrants working ‘illegally’ in the 
economies of the core nation-states in a position of extreme vulnerability. Hence, they 
have become ‘super-exploitable’. 
 
liv I am taking ‘domain’ here to mean a field of theory, discourse and action. 
 
lv José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, spoke of ‘the dark side 
of globalisation’ in these terms, in a speech entitled ‘The European Union and the 
Emerging World Order – Perceptions and Strategies’ at the 7th ECSA (European 
Community Studies Association) World Conference in Brussels in 2004 (Barroso, 
2004). 
 
lvi One area of EU security research is dedicated to adapting combat robots that can 
intercept individuals crossing borders ‘illegally’. The remit of the 20-million-euro 
TALOS project is to develop and field test ‘a mobile, modular, scalable, autonomous, 
adaptive system for protecting EU borders’, comprising aerial and ground unmanned 
vehicles, supervised by a central ‘command and control centre’. It will field specifically 
adapted robots able to ‘stop illegal action almost autonomously with the supervision of 
border guard officers’ (European Commission, 2011b). 
 
lvii The term ‘interdiction’ is never used in official discourse concerning Frontex, as this 
would leave it open to the charge of transgressing international maritime law that 
forbids such activity by nation-states in international waters. Instead, the term 
‘interception’ is used (cf. Watson, 2009). 
 
lviii The technology that enables the collection of personal data of ‘unwanted’ third-
country nationals in the SIS II database was extended to visas in 2007: VIS stores the 
biometric fingerprints of all those who apply for visas to Europe. 
 
lix As early as 1993 there were already 10 intergovernmental bodies in the European 
Union concerned with security, immigration and asylum, not to mention the many 
hundreds of meetings convened on the topic. 
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